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ABSTRACT
‘CAN’ AND CONSEQUENTIALISM: AN ACCOUNT OF OPTIONS
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Directed by: Professor Phillip Bricker
1 am confronted with choices every day. In many cases, 1 have to make a decision as
to which of several options I will pick. Generally, it seems to me as though I am free with
respect to this choice. In many cases, the choice is genuinely morally important.
These thoughts call to mind two interesting philosophical problems. The fust is the
problem of freedom and determinism. How can we be free in a world that seems to be
governed by physical laws that entail how our bodies, brains and environment will change
over time? The second is the problem of how we understand the notion of an alternative
action. The ethical theories that fascinate me the most are those according to which the
moral status of an action is dependent not only on the nature of that action, but also on the
natures of the actions that I could have performed instead. Which of the myriad of
unperformed actions count as my options, and how are these options evaluated in the
context of an ethical theory?
My approach to addressing these problems is to offer a general account of ‘can’ that
works as an account specifically of the ‘can’ of agent powrer. After reviewing the relatively
diverse literature on power and ‘can,’ 1 present my view and argue that it solves many
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF OPTIONS
I. The puzzles and problems
Could Garry Kasparov, the highest-rated human chess player
1
in the world, have
beaten Deep Blue, the highest-rated computer chess player in the world, in the last game of the
second match in their famous human vs. computer chess challenge? As of the last move of
the game, no. By that point, Kasparov had committed such an egregious blunder that all
roads to victory were closed. But what should we say about his chances of victor}7 as of the
first move of the game? Kasparov’s knowledge of the game of chess is deep and his
cleverness at maneuvering in a position is unparalleled. In fact, even in many of the games
he lost to Deep Blue, Kasparov later found during analysis that at some point during the
game, victory was possible for him — performance anxiety7 , time trouble and other factors
had gotten in the way of his seeing his way to a win. Since Kasparov had beaten Deep Blue
before on numerous occasions and had in fact beaten it in their first match by a fairly
substantial margin, it seems appropriate to say that Kasparov could have beaten it again, as
of the first move of the game.
Or perhaps we should say that Kasparov could have beaten Deep Blue even after he
had committed his blunder. v\fter all, computers are prone to making unusual mistakes
when playing a complicated game of chess as Deep Blue had in fact showed time and time
again during their two matches. One such mistake could have turned the game around for
Kasparov. Though a mistake of this magnitude would admittedly be rare, especially when
1
As of the beginning of the year 2001 Kasparov subsequently lost the title of World Champion to Kramnik.
He remained, however, the highest-rated human chess player and holds that record still in his retirement
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the computer was winning by such a substantial margin, certainly it was still possible. And if
it was still possible, then perhaps Kasparov could still have won.
What if many people’s lives were riding on the outcome of the game? Suppose that
if Kasparov won, then the Armenian nation would be spared future oppression at the hands
of Turkey. If he lost, such oppression would be guaranteed. If we say that Kasparov could
have won, then wouldn’t it have been the case that he was obliged to win? After all, his
winning would lead to a much better state of affairs than his losing, and we have said that it
was in his power to win. Notice that this result need not apply only to consequentialist
ethical theories: any theory whatsoever that implied that we should do what ive could to secure
good for others, or to secure a more morally perfect outcome over a morally outrageous
outcome, would, other things being equal, seem to yield the same implication for Kasparov’s
actions.
This result, if it really followed from the observations above, would be problematic.
Whether Kasparov would have won the game depends in large part on whether the
computer would make a blunder, at least as of the last moves of the game. And even as of
the beginning of the game, the outcome was not entirely in Kasparov’s hands. Though
Kasparov could have won, it seems wrong to say that he was obliged to win. How could it be
wrong for Kasparov to lose, if he played every move as well as possible but Deep Blue simply
played perfecdv as well? Could Kasparov be blamed for such a result? My own intuition is
that the answer to both questions is ‘no.’
Of course, the odd results can be avoided, as can the problems and puzzles they
entail. In response to the questions that led to the puzzling results, it is natural to appeal to
different senses of ‘can’ that are being used in describing Kasparov’s possibilities.
Sometimes when we claimed that Kasparov could do something, we meant merely that
Kasparov had all the abilities he would need to do it. This is however different from the
question of whether we could rightly claim in a moral context that winning was really one of
Kasparov’s alternatives. This naturally leads to a clarification of the crucial modal notion of
accessibility and how the accessibility relation attached to the word ‘can’ varies with the
context. Very roughly, what an agent can do is what that agent does in the possible worlds that
are accessible to him. This notion of accessibility can be understood metaphorically: a world is
accessible to an agent when the agent can “reach” that world. This notion of “reaching”
depends on a similarity between the world of the agent and the world he is trving to “get to.”
The similarity relation that applies to a particular ‘can’-claim depends on the kind of
accessibility in question. For example, for the ‘can’ of linguistic ability, an agent can translate
a word from English to French if, and only if, a world where he does so is accessible. The
similarity relation here will require that accessible worlds be similar to actuality as far as the
agent’s linguistic competence goes. Once a correct account of ‘can’ and its related notion of
accessibility are formulated, puzzles such as the ones above can be explained and the problems
resolved.
The issues involved in detailing such an account of ‘can’ and accessibility lie at the
intersection of a classical problem of philosophy and a problem in normative ethics. The
classical problem is the problem of freedom and determinism, and the other is the problem
of how an ethical theory7 based on alternatives or options (I will use these two technical terms as
synonyms) can be formulated in a coherent way. Options-based ethical theories are those theories
of ethics that entail that the normative statuses of actions are determined not only as a
function of the nature of the action that is actually performed, but also as a function of the
nature of the alternatives to that action.
J)
The solution to both of the problems, then, depends on solving a deeper problem:
what is the ‘can ’ 0/ agent power? If we can answer that question, then we can formulate an
account of an option. Freedom of an agent when acting, commonly understood in terms of
whether he could have done otherwise, can be defined as the agent’s having multiple options
when acting. It will also turn out that what many ethicists have always wanted to say,
roughly, is that one should select the best (or in the case of a tie, any best) option one has
when acting.
None of this is particularly novel. There is room, however, for innovation when it
comes to formulating an account of options (specifically, a contextualist account of options)
and when it comes to applying that formulation to the problems of normative ethics and
freedom. Many puzzles that arise when formulating an options-based ethical theory* can be
solved with an appropriate account of options, and problems that plague certain such
formulations can be avoided.
A general sort of puzzle that has been widely discussed in the literature on act-
utilitarianism is that of how to formally specify* an agent’s alternative sets. One puzzle about
alternative sets has to do with how to understand an agent’s power in the face of incomplete
knowledge. How is it that an agent who is free to spin the dial on a combination lock but
who is ignorant as to the correct combination cannot open the safe to which it is attached?
How can we give the truth-conditions for ‘can’-clatms and options that will yield an
alternative set of the right constitution to correctly analyze this case? Another puzzle about
alternative sets comes from cases involving objective probabilities. If you flip a fair coin and
it lands heads, that might seem to imply that some world where the coin lands heads is
accessible to you — i.e. the actual world. But if you were to conclude that therefore you have the
power (the option, the open alternative) to flip the coin heads, you would be mistaken. No
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agent can control the outcome of flipping a fair coin. How does an account of ‘can’ work
for puzzles like this? There are also puzzles regarding what sorts of things should count as
the outcomes of what we do. Should we take the outcome of the agent’s behavior to be some
class of states of affairs? Or should the outcome be a possible world, or a class of possible-
worlds? When we say that an agent has control over an outcome, what exaedy does he have
control over, and how do we correcdy analyze the notion of control over an outcome?
Most of the treatments of these puzzles assume a concept of ‘openness’ or
‘accessibility’ and then tackle formal problems that arise on various accounts of an
alternative (Castaneda 1969; Bergstrom 1971; Aqvist 1969). I am offering a different
approach — 1 will provide a fully general account of ‘can’ and provide a sufficiently detailed
account of truth-conditions for it such that it resolves the standard puzzles. My account has
the additional benefits of explaining the formal properties of the accessibility7 relations
attached to ‘can’ and explaining the nature of the ‘can’ of agent power when evaluated in a
moral context.
What is at stake in solving these problems? Classical act-utilitarianism is an options-
based ethical theory7 . According to standard formulations of utilitarianism, whether the
action you actually perform is morally permissible is dependent not only on the value of the
consequences of that action, but also on the values of your alternatives. If there is an
alternative that yields consequences with a higher value, the action you performed is wrong,
and if there is no such alternative, then your action is permissible (and possibly also
obligatory).
Some of the most important ethical theories ever discussed have been options-based.
Even theories that are arguably not options-based, such as Kantianism, seem to have a kind
of options-based element: Kant was famous for claiming that ‘ought implies can,’ and also
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for holding that there is always something permissible that an agent can do in any situation
an agent is never left only with impermissible options (Kant 1956, 38). I hough his theory of
maxims and right action might not be options-based, there is a question regarding why Kant
thought that there would necessarily be a right option available. Options-based theories give
a straightforward answer to this question: the reason why there is always a permissible
option is that there is always an option such that no option is better than it:
What is at stake in answering the problem of options is no less than our ability to
formulate consistent and cogent theories of ethics based on options. 1 do not mean to imply
that there are not already accounts that have been proposed that might meet these needs.
The problem is that many of the insights that have been brought to light by those
formulating accounts of ‘can’ and options have not been adequately utilized in formulations
of options-based ethical theories. Many of the proposed solutions appear to be ad hoc -
they offer formal finesse to particular concepts in e.g. an account of act-utilitarianism, but
none of them generalize to solutions to other problems in the same domain. In addition,
formulations of the notion of the ‘can’ of agent power in specifically ethical contexts have
not been as completely fleshed-out as, say, the modal notion of knowledge has been (Lewis
1999c). Finally, I think that a reasonable account of an option naturally coincides with an
elegant solution to another problem of options-based etlncal theories: what is the consequence
of an action? Since I have the intuition that the correct ethical theory1 must be options-
based, 1 believe I must answer the question of what an option is in order to be able to
proceed to formulate my preferred ethical theory.
2
There are tricky questions regarding infinite sets of options that e.g. have values that correspond to the set of
integers, and have no upper bound. I am putting aside such questions for the moment. I also do not mean to
suggest that a Kantian might not provide a different and entirely satisfactory explanation of why there is always
a permissible alternative available to an acting agent. I simply find the explanation that is entailed by options-
based ethical theories particularly natural and elegant.
3 Castaneda, 1969, Bergstrom, 1971, Aqvist, 1969 and Feldman, 1986 have proposed formulations of
utilitarianism that aim to avoid the very puzzles I discuss.
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In Chapter 2, 1 will present a detailed formulation of a fairly simplistic form of act-
udlitarianism I will call ‘Classical Act-Utilitarianism’ (CAU). This ethical theory bears strong
resemblances to those offered by Bentham, Sidgwick, Moore and Brandt. Then, 1 discuss
puzzles about alternative sets and consequences that arise for CAU. The significance of
these puzzles is that they show that even after a fairly detailed account of act-utilitarianism
has been spelled out, there remain open questions that require further work to answer.
That further work has taken two different general paths in the literature: ad hoc
formal additions to the account to answer the puzzles on the one hand (e.g. Castaneda,
Bergstrom, Aqvist), and entirely different ways of formulating act-utilitarianism on the other
(e.g. Feldman). 1 briefly discuss some of the ad hoc solutions and then discuss in detail a
particular alternative way of formulating act-utilitarianism: the world-theoretic framework
proposed by Feldman (1986). I will present his view, World Utilitarianism, and show that
though the view is framed in terminology that makes it easier to evaluate, it does not solve
the puzzles that arise on CAU and comes with interesting puzzles of its own. A particularly
elegant and powerful solution to all of the puzzles is a clear account of what an agent’s
alternatives really are. As far as I can tell, such an account is the most satisfactory solution
since it does not require a reformulation of utilitarianism but is nevertheless compatible with
a world-theoretic formulation and entails a pleasantly unified solution to all the puzzles at
once. It I am right, various proposals for how to formulate utilitarianism could be conjoined
with my account to yield versions of the theory absent of distracting puzzles that have little
to do with evaluating the primary normative results of those theories (that is, for each agent
option, whether that option is morally right, wrong or obligatory).
In order to correctly formulate an account of options, I believe it is helpful to
present an account of the modal term ‘can.’ An option on my account is whatever the agent
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can do in a situation. In Chapter 3, 1 will criticize several interesting accounts of the ‘can’ of
human possibility that yield defective accounts of human options. They all suffer from at
least one of three major difficulties:
1) they do not give the right results about what a person’s options are in fairly
straightforward cases,
2) they do not give the right results in cases involving God and miracles, and the
powers of God and those who can perform miracles, and
3) they provide specific accounts of ‘can’ that cannot be generalized into a scheme for
explaining ‘can’-claims of all sorts.
(1) is a major problem because any view that does not yield the right results in the most
intuitive cases is insupportable. As for (2), I would say that a good test for the general
applicability of an account of ‘can’ is that the account must not fall apart in the face of
questions regarding extraordinary and surprising human actions and abilities, e.g. the
performing of miracles by saints. If it turns out to be analytic on a certain account of ‘can’
that the existence of a miracle-performing saint is impossible, then the account of ‘can’ is
called into question. That is not to say that I believe there is actually anvone, or has ever been
anyone, who can perform a miracle. However, the very meaning of ‘can’-claims should not
rule this out a priori. If we can tell a story about what miracle-workers can do
,
we should also
be able to explain what the words and sentences in the story mean in such a way as to explain
our ability to understand what we were trying to say about miracle-workers.
Finally, (3) is a problem because ‘can’-claims are made in a wide variety of contexts
that seem to imply differences with respect to what is considered possible for an agent in that
context, yet these kinds of claims share a common core feature. The element common to all
sorts of ‘can’-claims is that the agent is considering, in relatively determinate contexts, what
possibilities are accessible to him at that time and with respect to those contexts. In other
words, there appears to be a single common notion of the ‘can’ of power on which an agent
is said to have a particular relation to worlds or classes of worlds. What differs from ‘can’ to
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‘can’ is not this general structure or even the truth-conditions that apply to the structure, but
rather the worlds that are involved (or are within the scope of the ‘can’-claim) and how the
resulting classes of worlds are derived from the truth-conditions of individual uses of ‘can.’
Any account of ‘can' that is specificallv meant as an account of just one of the sorts of ‘can’-
claims mentioned so far should be straightforwardlv extendable to other kinds of ‘can’-
claims. Or, perhaps it is better to say that if one theory of ‘can’ accounts for all of the kinds
of ‘can’-claims within one definition, and another account does not, then other things being
equal, we should prefer the former to the latter. If it were to prove impossible to give a
perfecdv general account of ‘can,’ then it would be reasonable to ignore criticisms of this
thud kind. However, since I think that such a general account has already been tried with
some measure of success (Lewis 1983b; Kratzer 1977), and since the account of ‘can’ and
options I provide shares that virtue, I think that criticisms of this third kind are forceful.
In Chapter 4, I present Kratzer’s account of ‘can’ and argue that it fails for some
fairly basic examples involving the ‘can’ of agent power. I isolate the problem with her
account and present my account of ‘can.’ An option on my account is not a possible world,
but an equivalence class, or a union of many equivalence classes, of possible worlds that
results from imposing a partition over the worlds in scope for the claim. I show that this
adjustment makes the account work for the ‘can’ of agent power. Then I show that on
formal grounds my adjustment should continue to work precisely as Kratzer’s account
worked for all of the cases Kratzer got right originally. To make sure of this, I work through
some of the puzzles Kratzer tackled and show that my modification does not affect her
solutions to those puzzles.
What worlds are in scope for a particular ‘can’-claim and what is the partitioning
relation for that claim? I need an account of the truth-conditions for ‘can’-claims, and so in
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chapter 5 I attempt to provide one. Lewis offered a very convenient format for giving the
truth-conditions for a modal term in “Elusive Knowledge” (Lewis 1999c). There, he
suggested a list of rules that could be applied in a context to yield the worlds relevant to a
particular knowledge claim. After briefly reviewing Lewis’ rules for knowledge, I argue for a
set of rules that determine the scope of a ‘can’-claim and for a different set of rules that
determine the partitioning relation for that claim.
I discuss how applying these rules within the context of my account of ‘can’ resolves
many of the puzzles that I have reviewed throughout this dissertation. This discussion raises
an interesting point: my approach to defining ‘can’ suggests (but does not entail) a certain
answer regarding the famous problem of freedom and determinism. A contexfualist will see
the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists as a debate regarding whether the laws
ofnature are always contextually relevant when evaluating claims about power in an ethical
context. It they are always relevant, then it would seem that lncompatibilism of freedom and
determinism is true, since determinism plus the initial state of the world plus the totahtv of the
laws ot nature entails the single trulv open possibility" for any agent, at any time. But if thev
are not always relevant, then the possibility is left open that a certain claim about what a
person can do may not require that the laws of nature be factored in. Such a claim could be
literallv true, and thus the person might be free to act even though he is in a deterministic
world. I argue mv account does not entail that the totahtv of the laws of nature are always
contextually relevant — in fact, I believe my account generates some (non-decisive) reasons to
think that the laws of nature are not always relevant. I conclude that based on these reasons
as well as others that I can only assume rather than argue for here, the account of options I
give stronglv leans towards compatibihsm. However, I realize that this is not a proof of
compatibilism, and even that some incompatibilists can help themselves to mv notion of an
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option without committing themselves to compatibilism. These incompatibilists would
reject that my view has some of the implications 1 discuss in this chapter.
I conclude my discussion in chapter 6. Here I briefly recount my view and the
puzzles I think it solves. An interesting issue I trv to tackle is how 1 can reconcile the
context-dependence of ‘can’ on my account with my acceptance of realism about claims of
morality. The sort of realism I have in mind is one on which not only are there truths about
rightness and wrongness, but also on which those truths are not very sensitive to elements of
context that we normally take to be morally irrelevant, such as the preferences and tastes of
the agents whose actions we are considering. The sort of realism I want to defend does not
entail that truths about the rightness and wrongness of action van' much depending on the
context and on the agent whose actions are under consideration.
II. Assumptions
Throughout the dissertation I make certain assumptions. Some of these are for
convenience, and others reflect views I hold but will not defend here. The assumptions I
make for convenience I intend to be non-substantiai, that is, I believe (and will argue where
necessary) that my choice of a certain convenient assumption will make my view
substantially easier to express without a great reduction in accuracy. In these sorts of cases, 1
believe that my view would be equally supportable without the simplifying assumption
(though it would be harder to state). Other assumptions I make will clearly have an impact
on the supportability of my various theses. I will make these sorts of assumptions clear, but
do not intend to argue for them in this essay. Where possible, I will indicate how other,
contrary assumptions would impact on my argument.
There are many different ways in which the word ‘can' is used. Sometimes it is used
to describe an object of a certain shape and composition in which you put stuff. Obviously 1
will not here talk about the word ‘can’ used in this way. But even the verb ‘can' is used in
many different ways. Sometimes, it is an epistemic operator: “Johnny can't be the thief - he
was on a plane at the time of the robbery.” At other times, it signals ability: “Fred can't speak
French (lie never learned the language).” More relevant to my interest here is that it can be
used to indicate agent power. “Tammy can't make it to the airport on time (because it is 2pm
now, and her flight leaves at 2:05, and the airport is over 90 miles away).” My focus in this
essay is on the ‘can’ that is used in claims about agent power. 1 will sometimes refer to tins
sort of ‘can’ as the ‘can' ofagent power ox the power-‘can'. Throughout most of this essay, my
general remarks about ‘can’ and ‘can’-claims should be interpreted as claims about the ‘can'
of agent power. A general exception to this is in chapter 4, when I discuss Kratzer’s more
general account of the generic English modal term ‘can,’ and contrast it with my account.
I will often talk about the sorts of ‘can’-claims I have in mind as being situated in a
particularly ethical context. The reason for this is that I believe that the ‘can’ of agent power
itself can have different evaluation conditions depending on context. Ethical contexts
introduce a particular set of rules for evaluating claims made about an agent’s alternatives.
So when I discuss “ ‘can’-claims in ethical contexts” or “ethically relevant ‘can’-claims,” I am
not referring to what you might call the ‘can’ ofethics or the moral ‘can.
'
The most natural
understanding of these is that they refer to the ‘can’ of permissibility — that is, they are
synonyms for morally permissible, as in “ethically speaking, he can and he must save as many
lives as he can.” I am not offering an account of the first instance of ‘can’ in this claim, but of
the second. I am interested in ‘can’-clanns of agent power evaluated in particularly ethical
contexts. References to these kinds of claims should be interpreted accordingly.
Ethical terms such as “morally permissible” and “obligator)’” permit at least two
distinct readings: a subjective one and an objective one. On the subjective reading, an ethical
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claim is one about how the agent sees things - in particular, what alternatives the agent
believes he has, what consequences he believes those alternatives will produce or what values
he assigns those consequences. For example, an agent in a trick}- ethical situation may be
aware of only two options, A and B. He might believe that A is better than B. Consequendv
he chooses A. Subjectively speaking, he did what was best — this notion of doing what was best
is important because it captures a morally relevant fact about the agent: that he was trying to
behave morally. Objectively speaking, though, B might have been better than A, and in fact
another alternative, C, was also in the power of the agent and was better than both A and B.
Here, the notion of objectivity is meant to imply that there are features of the world,
independent of the agent’s beliefs, upon which the values of his options depend. It also
implies that there are features of the world (and especially of the agent and of the context)
that determine what alternatives the agent has whether or not he knows about them. In this
sense of “objectively,” the agent did not do what was objectively morally right. In what
follows, my interest is only in the objective moral terms. My interest is in providing an
account of options that, though contextualist, can provide the foundation for such ethical
theories as utilitarianism. Since the utilitarian theories 1 have m mind involve accounts of
objective moral terms, it is those terms that concern me here.
I will frequently make reference to the possible worlds accessible to an agent at a time.
Lewis (1983c) has shown that de se propositions cannot be analyzed merely using possible
worlds. So, if we want to accurately describe the possibilities for a certain agent,, e.g. the
possibility that I myselfwalk to the store, we must do this in terms of the possible individuals that are
his counterparts relative to a given context. More precisely, where I speak of a possible
world accessible to an agent, I will assume that if the possibility in question is de se that the
reader will understand that I mean a structure containing a possible world, a particular
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(counterpart) individual existing at that world, and a time as members, i.e. a centered possible world.
With that in mind, where it has a substantive effect on a point 1 am making I will make the
distinction and otherwise I will assume that the reader will understand that the possible-
worlds I am considering are centered. It should be apparent that taking centered worlds to
be the alternatives of an agent
1
allows us to express everything one would want to say in a
theory that took possible worlds as alternatives, and more.
I will also assume that I can make use of the machinery of Lewis’ theory of modality
without committing myself to his views on the nature of possible worlds. In particular, I will
assume that I can help myself to Lewis’ theory of subjunctive conditionals (Lewis 1973;
1986c) without committing myself to what has been dubbed ‘Modal Realism,’ a view that
implies that the ontological status of the actual world is the same as the ontological status of
any possible world (Lewis, 1986b). Sometimes I will talk about the counterparts to a certain
individual when discussing the individual’s possibilities. It is my intention that all such
formulations be freely translatable into a view that does not require Lewis’ counterpart theory,
with its particular theorems and implications. To do this, 1 must be sure that all claims I
make about counterparts would have the same truth-values when translated into theories of
de re modality that differ as to the truth of controversial axioms relevant to counterpart
theory. This will not be a problem, since none of my discussion depends on the
controversial theorems of counterpart theory.
I also take no stand here on whether possible worlds are concrete individuals; nor
will I take a stand on whether propositions should be individuated finely or coarsely. (Is the
proposition that two plus two equals four the same proposition as the proposition that either I exist
4 Or, classes of centered worlds. Arguably, theories like Feldman’s assume that individual worlds are the
alternatives of an agent. My own view will entail that equivalence classes of worlds are nghtlv thought of as the
alternatives of an agent.
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or I do not exist? I do not know.) I will not focus on necessary propositions or necessarily
extensionally equivalent ones, and so I trust I will not harbor a situation where the
interpretation of a proposition will affect the truth of what I am discussing. Further, none of
my claims depends on the concreteness or abstractness of mv subject matter, be they worlds
or propositions. I make no further assumptions about the nature of propositions or worlds.
I will also refer on occasion to ‘states of the world at a time.’ Here, too, there are
some simplifying assumptions to be made. For one, I will ignore the issues of worlds (such
as ours!) where the simple concept of something’s occurring ‘at a time’ is rendered relative
by the truth of the physical theory of Special Relativity. In worlds where Relativity is true,
the notion of something’s happening at a time is one that is tied to a reference-frame. This
consideration makes it more difficult to accurately state the concept that plays the same role
in worlds where Relativity is true as the concept of a ‘state of a world at a time.’ However,
since the cases I discuss are ones in which all participants and events are in almost precisely
agreeing reference frames, and since the concept required to stand-in for the concept of the
‘state of a world at a time’ can be stated, and finally because this stand-in concept does not
change the results of the cases I discuss, I ignore this complication.
Other assumptions I make are substantive. While I do not take any stand on the
issue of ‘Modal Realism,’ I will take my commitment to Lewis’ particular analysis ol
subjunctive conditionals seriously — 1 take it that the truth of a particular counterfactual is
sensitive to contextual elements. I also take it for granted that the analysis of a
counterfactual should be carried out in a possible-worlds framework utilizing the appropriate
contextually-sensitive similarity relation. I will assume that there is no world that is ever as
much like the actual world as the actual world is (centering) and that otherwise, there can be
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ties in the closeness of other worlds to the actual world. Lewis’ analyses of ‘might' and
‘would’ fit the bill and so 1 will assume them in what follows.
I will also assume that there is a distinction between subjective probability and objective,
single-case probability. In particular, 1 believe that there are (at least possibly) events that are
chancy (to borrow a term from Lewis). The event, before it happens, has some objective
probability of occurring, and some objective probability of not occurring. An example of an
event that we believe is actually probabilistic in this way is the decay of a radioactive isotope
of uranium. I accept Lewis’ arguments that this sort of probability cannot be analyzed in
terms of actual or possible frequencies of events, and I agree with his reasons for thinking that
these probabilities could exist without anyone to believe anything about them - that is, they
are not subjective probabilities (Lewis 1999b, 227-231).
Finally, I will often write about the value of a given option. I do not assume that
anything is or could possibly be intrinsically good. By ‘value,’ 1 mean to refer only to the
assignment of (real) value numbers, or at the very least, ordinal value rankings (allowing for
ties), to options. What these numbers or rankings represent is not my interest here. Some
forms of utilitarianism take these numbers to be measures of the intrinsic values of the
options. Other forms of utilitarianism are nihilistic
,
that is, they are views on which actions
are evaluated by how much (for example) pleasure they produce, and yet deny that pleasure
is intrinsically good. Others still are subjective value forms of utilitarianism, on which what is
valuable is what the agent values or would value under the appropriate conditions. As I will use
‘value,' nihilism and subjectivism are still theories according to which options are assigned
values and are ranked accordingly. My use of ‘value,’ then, implies nothing important about
my views on intrinsic value.
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CHAPTER 2
CLASSICAL ACT-UTILITARIANISM AND WORLD UTILITARIANISM
To ask what kind of actions we ought to perform, or what kind of conduct is right, is
to ask what kind of effects such action and conduct will produce. Not a single
question in practical Ethics can be answered except by a causal generalisation. All
such questions do, indeed, also involve an ethical judgment proper — the judgment
that certain effects are better, in themselves, than others. But they do assert that
these better things are effects — are causally connected with the actions in question.
Ever}' judgment in practical Ethics may be reduced to the form: This is a cause of
that good thing. — G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, $88.
I. Introduction
Options-based ethical theories are those theories that entail that the moral statuses of
an agent’s alternatives in a given choice situation depend not only on the nature of the
alternative the agent performs, but also on the natures of the alternatives the agent does not.
The most commonly discussed class of options-based ethical theory is utilitarianism. It may
seem natural to suggest that for a large class of ethical theories, what is necessary for
specifying a view in its entirety are the following:
(A) a theory of what is (intrinsically) good, and
(B) a normative theory
A typical sort of utilitarianism is hedonistic {hedonism then being the theory of the good) and
has a normative theory’ that states that the alternative that produces the greatest good is
obligator}7 (a particular sort of maximizing theory of obligation). However, I think that this
schema for putting together ethical theories is missing an important item:
(C) a theory7 of options
“Do the best you can” is a recommendation to achieve some kind ojgood, choosing the best one
ofthe ones available toyou.
The omission of (C) as an independently interesting project for options-based ethical
theories has resulted in a lot of confusion in the literature. The most straightforward
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formulations of act-utilitarianism assume naive notions of actions and alternatives and posit
a vert’ simple causal connection between actions and consequences. Since the defense of
these theories relies on intuitions about what agents can do, some notion of alternatives is
needed. But the naive notions immediately lead to puzzles and objections that require a
robust theory of options.
Many have noticed the puzzles and have offered solutions. 1 think there have been
two sorts of solution, and that both are unsuccessful: (1) patch up the naive notions of
actions, alternatives and consequences (I will use “AAC” as a label for these three concepts)
by proposing conditions on these that avoid the problems, (2) argue that by reworking the
normative theory to not refer to these concepts, the problems can be avoided entirely.
There are many examples in the literature of (1); Feldman has presented a careful, extended
defense of World Utilitiarianism (WU) that can be construed as an attempt to accomplish (2).
1 do not believe that by proposmg ad hoc conditions on AAC we can solve all of the
puzzles that are caused by lack of a clear understanding of what it means to sav that an agent
can do something. And whether or not it is best to specify the theory in terms of those
concepts, I think that there are real puzzles can only be answered bv proposing a theory of
options. Avoiding AAC simply postpones the problems I am interested in — what is it an
agent can do
,
what is accessible to him and how are these doings or resulting outcomes evaluated?
Tricky problems involving objective chance and agent control will arise regardless of the
question of the theory’s terminology.
In this chapter, I present a naive form of utilitarianism. Classical Act-Utilitarianism
(CAU) and puzzles that arise from it. Problems with utilitarianism have tvpicallv fallen into
two categories. In the first category are objections aimed at showing that a certain
formulation of utilitarianism gives the wrong moral evaluation of an action in a given
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circumstance. These objections are common and important, but are not the ones under
consideration here. The puzzles that interest me expose a deeper problem in the
formulation of a utilitarian view. They show that the notions of AAC that are at work in a
given formulation of utilitarianism do not result in a view that, without additional
clarification, gives sensible valuations at all. This second sort of problem is deeper in the
sense that it resists the standard utilitarian move of modifying what is taken to be
(intrinsically) good (a move that can generally be made to skirt objections of the first kind).
We need a good account of options in order to really make sense of an options-based ethical
theory. So even if CAU may seem to be something of a straw-man account of utilitarianism
on account of many historical objections to its accuracy as a theory of moral rightness, I
hope it is clear that 1 am not using the theory to argue that utilitarianism is false. Instead I
am using it as the basis for a discussion of puzzles that will arise on any utilitarian view, no
matter how carefully its theory of the good and normative theory are specified.
I then present Feldman’s World Utilitarianism. Without going into the merits of
Feldman’s view as a way of avoiding talk of actions, alternatives and consequences, and
without going into the merits of Feldman’s view as a way of avoiding certain puzzles in
deontic logic, I consider what Feldman writes about the general question of what is accessible to
ns as agents. His theory offers substantial detail as to what we should say about the options
accessible to an agent. I argue that though he explicitly avoids presenting a full fledged view
of accessibility, many of his proposals seem to imply certain conditions on what sort of view
of accessibility he could accept. I think the views implied in his presentation do not
constitute or suggest a successful account of options. Therefore, 1 conclude that tins view
leaves the puzzles unsolved. 1 consider a few ways to extend Feldman’s remarks that would
imply a more substantial view of options but conclude that those views fail.
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Though my own account of options yields answers to the puzzles presented here, my
goal is neither to defend a particular utilitarian theory nor to defend utilitarianism in general.
Rather, I undertake this project so that options-based ethical theories can be formulated
clearly and coherently — the view 1 defend is broadly compatible with CAU and WU. My view
of options is also compatible with ethical theories that are not consequentialist at all - my
commitment to this sort of theory7 should not be construed as a commitment to utilitarianism
or consequentialism.
II. Classical act-utilitarianism presented
An intuitively pleasing view regarding the moral evaluation of actions is act-
utilitarianism. The fundamental idea behind the view is that in many situations, a person has
more than one action available to him. Each would have different outcomes or
consequences: if one goes to the movies, a sequence of events unfolds that is quite different
from the one that would result if one instead were to go to an amusement park. These
consequences would very- likely involve different levels of enjoyment or benefit for all those
affected by the results of the action performed. If someone has at his disposal two such
alternatives, and if one would result in consequences that are better than the consequences
that would obtam should one perform the other action, then the one with better
consequences is obligatory and the one with worse, impermissible or wrong.
A relatively simple formulation of ClassicalAct-Utilitarianism is:
(CAU) For an agent, S, an action A is morally permissible if, and only if,
i) A is an alternative for S, and
li) for every action B other than A such that B is an alternative for S, the total
consequence of B has a value less than or equal to that of the total
consequence of A
An impermissible (forbidden, wrong) action is one that is not morally permissible and an obligatory
(required) action is one such that all of the agent’s other alternatives have total consequences
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with lower values than its own. Statements of similar views can be found in Bentham,
Sidgwick, Moore, Frankena and Brandt,
1
among others. On such a view, there are three
critical notions involved that deserve some explanation: actions, alternatives and
consequences. In what follows, 1 will present naive accounts of these three critical concepts.
My goal is to illustrate the puzzles that prompted more sophisticated accounts.
A. Actions
The notion of an action is vague and difficult to define. Actions are individual
“doings” of agents. An action is a special kind of event — one with an agent as the subject of
the event. Intuitively, a particular case of driving home is an action, as is a particular case of
hitting a baseball or a particular case of batting one’s eyelashes. Each of these actions is a
particular individual happening and not an act-type. For example, the type of action denoted
by “driving home” is not an action. Driving home is repeatable and can happen in different
places at the same time. An act-token cannot have these features since it is non-repeatable
and localized to a region of space and time. Some actions are referred to only by their tvpes
when we write or speak about them. Doings are not types: they are individual events or
occurrences.' Though the concept of an action is vague, we can avoid the necessity (in part)
of giving a full account by limiting our discussion to events that are clearly actions. Therefore,
I will avoid controversial cases in any of my discussions of actions. (Controversial cases
might include such “actions” as notgoing to the store, and being at home.)
A tricky issue that I cannot deal with fully is that of how actions are to be
individuated. However, since the notion of an alternative cannot be made clear without at
least a word about act-individuation, a minimal account is required. Actions are important
1 Bentham 1843, 16, 35-6; Sidgwick 1901, 411; Moore 1988, 147-148; Frankena 1973, 35; Brandt 1959, 380 382
and 1996, 142-143.
2 See Bergstrom 1971, 238 for a similar discussion of token and “generic” actions (act-types).
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to act-utilitarians primarily because of the consequences they produce. The classical act
utilitarian has a causal account of consequences; that is, consequences are the effects of
actions — consequences are events that depend causally on other events. This indicates that
the act-utilitarian would want an account of act-individuation according to which actions
were individuated finely enough that those with differing causes or effects counted as
different actions.
Giving a suitable account of events and actions is beyond my scope here. But having
noted that actions and consequences are important to classical utilitarian views because of
their causal significance, I am free to utilize a move made by Jeffrey in his formulation of
decision theory". In order to give a unified theory of decision, i.e. one in which the bearers of
desirabilities (the consequences) and the bearers of probabilities (the possible conditions, that is, the
actions and the possible future states) were the same sort of things, Jeffrey proposed that
propositions could be those things (Jeffrey 1965, 48-49). Act-proposit/ons are propositions to the
effect that an agent S does (or tries to do) A; they correspond to the labels of the rows of a
typical Bayesian decision matrix. This move to act-propositions has advantages and comes
at no cost in expressive power for the classical act-utilitarian. There is no loss of expressive
power because for any action or consequence, there is a suitable proposition that describes
it. Consequence-propositions (propositions that describe an outcome) can be the bearers of value-
on my formulation of CAU and act-propositions can be the agent’s alternatives. This is not an
argument designed to generate conclusions about the natures of actions and consequences,
but rather is designed to make the theory easier to manage formally.
There are a few pragmatic advantages to this approach. First, it allows formulations
of utilitarianism to take advantage of the existing Bayesian system for representing decisions
and outcomes. Also, it is useful to represent an agent’s alternatives as being logicallv
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exhaustive in a way that would be more difficult if the alternatives were act-tokens. Our
agent is wondering whether to eat a burger or a sandwich (or nothing). If her alternatives
are understood as propositions, it is easy to describe them in such a way that it is obvious
that her alternatives are logically exhaustive. Though the same result could be achieved with
(classes of) act-tokens, it is simply easier to state using propositions. Finally, since I will be
offering an account of alternatives in terms of classes of possible worlds, developing CAU in
terms of act-propositions will make it easy to later state my results as a solution to the
problems I have presented. My account of options will be stated in a way that is consistent
with the alternatives mentioned in CAU’s normative theory. This is because options will be
a lot like act-propositions — for example, both options and act-propositions can be assigned
intrinsic value functions that are determined by the values of the worlds at which they are
true or are performed.
It might be pointed out that sometimes the particular details of how one eats a burger
can make a difference as to how good that burger-eating experience is — it can affect the
consequences. So, since act-propositions are vague and do not specify all of the details of a
particular act-token, one might conclude that the propositional treatment of actions
inappropriately glosses over a distinction between actions that a utilitarian would care about.
However, the propositional treatment need not make this mistake. For whatever differences
there might be between two ways of eating the burger, they can be described and included in
the list of act-propositions available to the agent in question (if the different ways of eating
the burger are within the control of the agent). In fact, even if we were trying to formulate
the classical act-utilitarian view using individual events for actions and consequences (instead
of representing these in the theorv as propositions), there would still be the analogous thorny
issue that a certain event could happen in many different ways, with different values, while
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remaining the same event. The token event we refer to as “World War 11“ involved the
dropping of nuclear devices on Japan, but this was not a necessary feature of that war. Had
the United States not dropped the nuclear devices, a different number of casualties would
have resulted in that war.' So even if we were to attempt to formulate utilitarianism without
using act-propositions, a related problem of act-individuation arises: how could we, using
actions, formulate an account of alternatives where two alternatives could be the samt action
,
performed in different ways? The real problems of act-individuation will be present whether we
are developing a theory in which we talk about actions as events or one in which we talk
about them as propositions. The point of using act-propositions is merely pragmatic and
does little philosophical work.
As I mentioned before, the classical act-utilitarian is concerned with any distinction
between actions (that we couldperform) or consequences (that we could bring about) that make a
causal difference. What tins means is that in any alternative set, the act-propositions must be
specific enough to individuate the possible actions finely enough for this purpose. We
therefore have a fairly fine-grained notion of act- and consequence- propositions. Two
possible burger-eatings may be two ways the same event could have happened, but we
distinguish them in our act-propositions if their consequences differ (specifically, if the agent could
see to either of the act-propositions, and the consequences of the act-propositions differ in
value). Likewise, two possible following digestions may be two ways the same consequence
(event) could have happened, but we distinguish them m our consequence-propositions if
3 This raises the well-known problem of defining what an event is in such a way that events do not come out as
being overlyfragile. See Lewis 1986d, esp. 250.
24
they differ in value.
4
1 will say that two actions differwhen they would be described by two
different act-propositions, and likewise for consequences.
On this formulation of CAU, then, we distinguish two act- or consequence-
propositions when they are relevantly different for the purposes of describing what is in an
alternative-set for an agent whether or not the two act- or consequence-propositions describe genuinely
different token actions or consequences. Then, in our theory, we can use the short-hand technical
expression “different (differing) actions” (or “different consequences”) to mean “actions
described by differing act-propositions” (likewise for consequences). From this point
forward in my discussion of CAU, when I discuss actions I am referring to the appropriate
act-propositions, and likewise for consequences.
B. Alternatives
An agent’s alternatives in a situation are on this account the act-propositions that describe
what the agent could have done
,
and the alternative set for an agent is the set of all that agent’s
alternatives. Here the alternatives are taken to be a set of act-propositions that differ. In
order that these be genuine alternatives
,
in the intuitive sense, any pair of alternatives from the
set must be mutually exclusive — that is, no two act-propositions in a given set of alternatives
can be performed (made true by the agent) jointly. Furthermore, the alternatives in a given
alternative set must be agent and time identical; that is, each must have the single agent in
question as its author and each must have the same start and end times. Finally, the
4 Note that the fact that the two act- or consequence-propositions differ in value is neither necessary nor
sufficient for determining whether they should be regarded as different, but is merely useful for getting across a
certain point about consequentialism and the sort of theory of action that is viable within the context of that
account. If two act-propositions had same-valued consequence-propositions that would follow, but they were
such that the agent could genuinely and effectively decide between them (and, possibly, other conditions are
met, such as the agent recognizes these two act-propositions as alternatives), then the two act-propositions
should be considered different, even though their values are the same.
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alternative set for a given agent in a situation is exhaustive, that is, that all of the agent’s
alternatives are enumerated in the alternative set, including what the agent actually does.
It is interesting to note that early formulations of act-utilitarianism did not clearly
state the mutual exclusivity requirement for options in an alternative set. A very naive notion
of an alternative is simply: whatever the agent can do in a situation. This sort of “account” of
an alternative immediately runs into Castaneda’s well-known objection (Castaneda 1968).
Assuming only that there are conjunctive actions, he showed that the very naive notion of an
alternative leads to contradictions. To see this, suppose that someone is obligated to
perform the conjunctive action A&B. It follows by CAU that it has the highest utility of any
of its alternatives.
But another principle of deontic logic states that if a person is obliged to do “A&B,”
then he is also obliged to do A, and also obliged to do B. This is Castaneda’s principle (DC):
(DC) ‘X is obligated to do both A and B’ entails ‘X is obligated to do A and X is
obligated to do B’ [subscripts omitted]
This principle is a familiar one from modal logic: from the deontic necessity" of a
conjunction, A&B, one can infer the deontic necessity' of A and of B.
When (DC) is applied to the above case of the obligatory' conjunctive action, A&B, it
follows that A is also obligatory, and that so is B. But this yields a contradiction. For if A is
obligatory, then ever)' one of A’s alternatives must have a lower utility', including the
conjunctive action A&B. But by assumption, A&B is obligatory. And the same
contradiction can be derived with respect to B and the conjunctive action, and finally with
respect to A and B themselves! For if A is obligatory, then by CAU, one of its alternatives,
3 The time-identicality condition is controversial and discussed at length in Aqvist 1969, Bergstrom 1971, and
Prawitz 1970. This issue becomes immensely complicated, though, and so I will avoid as much as possible
examples that force the issue. I find it simplest here to accept the condition, for much the same reasons as
Bergstrom 1971, 240.
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B, must not be. And if B is obligator}-, then by CAU, A must not be. There are many
contradictions to choose from.
Though the very naive view has this problem, once we formulate an account of
alternatives on which they must be mutually exclusive
,
the problem goes away. The
conjunctive action A&B is not an alternative to either of its conjuncts,' and nor can we find a
conjunctive action where the two conjuncts are alternatives (assuming the conjunctive action
really is the performing of both A and B, it follows that A and B are not mutually exclusive,
and hence are not alternatives).
An alternative set is the set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive differing act-
propositions available to a particular agent. The agent’s alternatives are the elements of that
set. An alternative to one action in an alternative set is another, different, action in that same
alternative set.
C. Consequences
Another concept necessary for understanding act-utilitarianism and CAU is that of a
consequence. The consequence of an action is usually understood causally or counterfactually (or
both). Two natural formulations of a consequence are:
(Cl) C is a consequence of A iff C would happen ifthe action A were performed
(C2) C is a consequence of A iff action A causes C to occur
The total consequence of an action will be, very roughly, the collection of ever}7 one of its
relevant consequences. If consequences are taken to be consequence-propositions, then the
total consequence is the conjunction of all the relevant consequence-propositions that
describe what takes place due to an agent’s behavior. Performing an action results in
changes to the future of a world from the moment of action onward that distinguish that
6 So long as the conjunctive action is understood merely as the performing ofboth action A and action B — and if this
is denied, then Castaneda’s objection fails to work anyway, because then the simple inference from the
necessity' of the conjunction A&B to the necessity' of each con|unct would be highly controversial.
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future from the one that would have taken place as the result of a different action. Thus, it
is not easy to determine what parts of the future should be considered parts of the total
consequence of an action. A possible answer would be that the total consequence of an
action A is everything thatA caused, but would not have occurred if one ofA ’s alternatives had been
performed. This is very rough, but it allows that the total consequence of an action may
contain anything, at any time in its future, that is significant and that also differs from what
would have happened had an alternative been performed. This is to avoid e.g. a distant
future war as counting as part of the total consequence of one’s action, when that war would
have happened regardless of what action had been performed. This seems to me the
natural way to extend the counterfactual notion of a consequence so that the notion of a total
consequence is in line with normal usage of the word “consequence.” Similar adjustments
can be made for (C2).
For the purposes of tins discussion, we can limit our attention to those propositions
about what follows the action that are most obviously consequences of the action. If I hide
a candy bar from my brother and it makes him sad, then that he becomes sad is a consequence
of my action, but that there is a thunderstorm two months later that results in two painful deaths is not.
But giving an account of consequences is not the only challenge for CAU. The view
must also explain how the values of the consequences of an action are calculated. 1 am not
referring to the epistemic problem of how we know what the consequences of an action are
7 Note, however, that if one wanted to stray slightly from the intuitive notion of a total consequence and accept
one that departs somewhat from common usage, m which all of the future counted as the total consequence,
regardless of whether some future event would have occurred under all of one’s alternatives, then one could do
so without changing the rankings CAU would entail for any alternative set. For note that if some war, W, with
a sum total of pleasure over pain of —2000, occurred under alternative A and also under alternative B, the
original understanding of “total consequence” would have ignored W. The new understanding of “total
consequence” would have the same result, for in the calculations of the values of the consequences of A and B,
W would end up canceling out —it would be an equal negative on both sides. Note also that this understanding
avoids certain problems with the individuation ofconsequences: for what should we say if after act A, W would end
up causing —2000.1 in value, while after act B, W’ would end up causing —2000.1 1 in value. Is W the same war
as W’? This is a tough question, and this version avoids it.
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but instead to the problem of how exactly we should sum the individual values of all relevant
consequences that follow an action, and how we arrive at a single, univocal value for the total
consequence. Here again I shall present a naive scheme for consequence calculation that
seems to be justified by classic utilitarian texts, with the full understanding that many
alternatives have been presented that may very well avoid problems that the naive version
does not.
We shall let our CAU be a hedonistic view in which the bearers of value are
pleasures and pains. I will assume for this discussion that pleasure has a positive value and
pain a negative value, and that any event has a certain net pleasure plus pain value. This net
value is a consequence’s hedonic value. This implicitly assumes that pleasures and pains are
commensurable, that is, that they can be summed together on a single numeric scale in a
sensible way; intuitively, a pain of -2 is equal and opposite to a pleasure of +2. This scale is one
on which adding a pain of value —1 to a pleasure of value +1 yields a net sum of 0. A
rational agent whose only concern was maximizing hedonic value would be indifferent to the
following two events: an event in which an agent receives +2 in pleasure and —2 in pain, and
an event wherein he receives 0 in pleasure and 0 in pain.
Pleasures and pains vary not onlv in their intensities, but also in their durations. We
can calculate the total hedonic value over a stretch of time in many ways. One way will
appeal to those with a knack for calculus: if you were to graph the pleasure-and-pain curve
over that period of time, with the x-coordinates designating time in seconds, and the y-
coordinates designating the intensity' of the overall pleasure and pain, the net hedonic value
is the integral of the function that describes that curve, over the time interval provided. A
similar and simpler explanation is that if you were to take the average pleasure over the time
interval, and the average pain over the time interval, sum them, and multiply that by the
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duration, you would have the net hedonic value over that interval. Simply put, the hedonic
value of an event is the average intensity of the pleasure plus pain summed over the duration of
the event, times the duration of the event. The hedonic value of a consequence is the sum
of the hedonic values of the events that are a part of that consequence - or to put it in terms
of consequence-propositions, the hedonic value of a conjunction of consequence-
propositions is the sum of the hedonic values of its conjunct consequence-propositions.
s
D. Illustrations
CAU, at first blush, appears to give intuitive and straightforward answers to common
ethical cases. For example, suppose I am at home on some lazy Sunday afternoon, trying to
decide what to do with my day. I come up with the following alternatives: poke myself with
pins from 1pm until 3pm or see a movie during that time. As it happens, the consequences
of these two would be as follows:
Al: poke myself with pins all afternoon cl: experience -120 pain
A2: see a movie c2: experience +240 pleasure
Al and A2 will be alternatives if, for whatever reason (and I invite you to invent your own),
poking myself with pins is not something that is available to me if I see the movie — that is, I
am imagining that these two actions cannot be performed jointly (they are mutually
exclusive). Also, for the sake of this discussion, I am assuming that these are the only
alternatives available; they are exhaustive
,
and since they are also agent-identical, they form an
alternative set. It is worth noting that I have only listed one consequence apiece for A 1 and
A2. Of course, there are many consequences of each action: when Al is performed, billions
8 It is important to note that I am ignoring many serious complications. One complication is double-counting:
how can we guarantee that we do not double-count a particular pleasure or pam when calculating the value of a
consequence? For example, one may plausibly hold that the consequence-proposition thatjoe breaks his leg has a
hedonic value of —2, and also that the consequence-proposition that someone breaks his leg also has a hedonic
value of —2. It seems plausible, though, that it this latter someone is none other than Joe himself, then we should
not count both —2s in our calculation of our consequence. Other complications arise if there are cases in which
a pleasure or pain has an infinite intensity (perhaps this is unlikely), or if the consequences of an action play
forward into a future that is infinitely long (this is an important possibility).
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of oxygen molecules are displaced, thousands of cells die and are distributed into the
environment in a way much different than would have occurred under A2, and so on.
However, the only consequences that matter for the act-utilitarian are those that have a
positive or negative hedonic value. Thus, I only list the consequences that have hedonic
impact in examples of applying CAU (and I am ignoring, for the moment, the many serious
problems around how we sum up the values of all relevant consequences). Since
“experiencing a net hedonic value of +/- ri ’ seems to be an event that is a part of any
consequence with hedonic impact, it is events of this general form that I will list as the
consequences of actions in these examples.
If we suppose that no other events would occur as a consequence of A1 or A2 that
have any positive or negative hedonic value, then it seems clear that CAU implies that A 1 is
morally wrong, and A2 is morally obligator}7 (and morally permissible). Of course,
consequences are rarely so simple. Normally many events that have some positive or
negative hedonic value occur as a result of an action. To apply CAU, sum these hedomcally
significant events for each action and compare the results. It seems intuitive: CAU gives the
answer we expect of an act-utilitarian theory in the example above, and for the examples that
are popular in the literature on act-utilitarianism, it appears to work in just the way the
authors have proposed.
III. Puzzles for classical act-utilitarianism
Although CAU seems quite intuitive, without some clarification of its core concepts,
it simply fails to give determinate, non-contradictory answers in some cases. The problem is
that the naive accounts of AAC are not sufficiently clear for the purpose of formulating a
technically coherent ethical theory. Here, I present two puzzles. I then discuss a few
9 An account of “basic intrinsic value” has been offered that deals with some of the problems regarding value
calculation. See Feldman 1986, 26-36, and below, in my section on Feldman’s WU.
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technical solutions. But CAU does not provide an account of options, and no amount of
toying with its core concepts can by itself solve the puzzles. 1 then present Feldman’s view,
WU. In it, he attempts to sidestep many problems that arise on CAU by avoiding reference
to actions, alternatives and consequences. However, the core issues 1 care about, problems
that plague CAU because no suitable account of options was provided, continue to plague
WU as well. Avoiding the core concepts of CAU simply creates a situation where the same
puzzles about agent options are stated somewhat differently. The diagnosis, I argue, is the
same.
A. A puzzle regarding multiple alternative sets
An interesting objection that focuses on a problem about the notions of actions and
alternatives comes from Feldman (Feldman 1986, 7-10). He imagines a machine with 4
buttons:
(Note: Feldman uses stripes in 2 and 4, where 1 use grey.) The buttons are hooked up in so
that pushing a button will result in pleasure or pain for some innocent people:
al: push button 1 Utility: + 10
a2: push button 2 Utility: +5
a3: push button 3 Utility: -5
a4: push button 4 Utility: -10
a5: push no button Utility: 0
Feldman also supposes that the operator of the machine, I shall call him “Mampulous,” has
formed deeply ingrained habits regarding pushing its buttons. If he were given the option to
push any button
,
he would push button 3. If he were given the option to push eithergrey button
(button 2 or button 4), he would push button 2. If given the option to push a white button
(button 1 or button 3), he would push button 3. If given the option to push a square button, lie
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would push 4. If a round one
,
he would push 3. It is important to note that this list of
preferences is consistent
,
that is, it gives a single ordering of his options as follows: 3, then 2,
then 4, then 1
.
Feldman points out that these counterfactual preferences would yield interesting
results if applied to more general actions. For example, since Manipulous tends to press one
round button instead of another, the consequences ot his “pushing a round button” would
be the same as the consequences of his pushing button 3. Given this, we can apparently list
a number of other act-propositions, and their utilities:
a6: push a round button Utility: -5
a7: push a square button Utility: -10
a8: push a grey button Utility” +5
a9: push a white button Utility: -5
alO: push a button Utility: -5
1’hese utility assignments come from the habitual preferences of the operator. For example,
we know that if he were to push a round button, then he would push button 3, which yields
—5 utility. Therefore, we can say that the utility of a6 is -5, and so on for the others.
An alternative set, as I specified above, is a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
act-propositions for an agent at a time. Given this definition, and the actions al through a 10
above, it would seem as though we can now list four different alternative sets open to
Manipulous at a single given time:
Al: (al
,
a2, a3, a4, a5)
A2: (a5, a6, a7)
A3: (a5, a8, a9)
A4: (a5, a 10)
Flach of these appears to be an exclusive and exhaustive list of alternatives from the list
above. If tins is correct, then it would seem that depending on which alternative set we
consider, we get differing results as to which action is obligator}’. In Al, al is obligatory’,
because of those alternatives, al has the highest utility’. In A2, it would appear that a5 is
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obligator}’. Tn A3, it is a8 and in A4 it is again a5. These results are incompatible. But if our
assumptions so far are true, it follows that depending on which alternative set we take to be
the operator’s set, a different action is obligatory. This outcome can be taken in one of three
ways. 1) CAU is internally inconsistent because it entails in the case above that 3 different
incompatible alternatives are all obligatory. 2) CAU is unavoidably vague, because it
distinguishes multiple alternative sets for a given agent at a given time, and leaves completely
indeterminate which set should be taken as the real one. 3) CAU is incoherent, because by
definition, there is only one alternative set for an agent at a time, and yet CAU entails also
that there are multiple alternative sets for an agent in some cases (probably, in all cases). It is
inconsequential which one of these morals you draw from the argument — in any case, CAU
does not entail anv coherent answer regarding how to correcdy choose the right alternative
set for an agent.
Attempts have been made to solve this problem. Bergstrom (1971, 242-244) poses a
puzzle very similar to Feldman’s and offers two possible solutions (four, really, but the first
two are implausible enough that Bergstrom dismisses them immediately, and they can safely
be ignored). Bergstrom’s strategy in each case is to formulate a principle that would allow us
to figure out what the relevant alternative set is from among a list of competing alternative
sets. If this were successful, then Feldman’s objection could be avoided. CAU would entail
none of the odd consequences I suggested, because there would be some fact of the matter
regarding which alternative set from Al — A4 was the right one for the purposes of CAU.
The first possible solution is that “personalistic criteria” for determining the relevant
alternative set could be used. Different people considering a complicated situation may see
different alternative sets as being available depending on their personal habits, abilities,
proclivities and character. Bergstrom writes,
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For example, if you have a greater power of imagination or a greater tolerance of
complications than 1 have, you may “see” more alternatives than I do in a given case;
if I maintain that a is one of the alternatives but you believe that two performable
versions of a have significantly different consequences, then you might hold that
these versions rather than a are among the alternatives. Again I may insist that a is
an alternative on the ground that although the consequences of the versions of a are
different they are equally valuable, and hence the versions need not be distinguished
(Bergstrom 1971, 246-247).
If we take these personalistic criteria to be partially constitutive of an agent’s relevant
alternative set, we can define an “agent’s alternatives” as the set of alternatives that that agent
believes to be performable by him in a given situation. Bergstrom notes that the agent’s
alternatives, in this sense, might not be exhaustive or exclusive as would be appropriate for a
formal alternative set. To adjust the set so that it forms a proper alternative set, we have to
assume that it would be possible to introduce “innocent rules” that would preserve the
agent’s intuitions about his alternatives as much as possible, but which ensure that the
agent’s alternatives meet the criteria for an alternative set. Bergstrom calls the resulting
alternative set the agent’s subjective alternative set. The solution to the problem, then, is to
identify the relevant alternative set for the agent in a situation as the subjective alternative set
of that agent. If this identification were correct, then Feldman’s objection could be
answered.
However, Bergstrom rejects this proposal. The first reason for this is that if we do
not require anything special of our agent, then this solution appears to lead to results that are
very questionable in the context of a normative ethical theory. A particularly dumb,
unimaginative agent may fail to see an alternative that though he be too dull to distinguish it
in his musings on his situation, is his genuine obligation to perform. Or worse, a thoroughly
vicious, cruel-hearted lout may not even recognize a particular opportunity to do a good
deed and thereby fail to do what he genuinely ought to do. If we accepted these
personalistic criteria, we would get counterintuitive and objectionable results in these cases.
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What might be a plausible criterion for subjective alternative sets, and hence an account of
subjective moral terms, is not similarly plausible as a criterion for objective alternative sets in an
account of objective moral terms. In chapter 1, I mentioned that mv interest in this essay is in
an account of options that can support a theory of the objective concept of moral obligation.
Bergstrom and I both ami to provide an account of alternatives for use in a utilitarian theory
of objective moral terms.
However, it may be possible to avoid this problem by appeal to the alternatives an
idealised agent would see were he placed in the situation of our actual agent. But there are
several problems with tins suggestion, as well. The particular difficultv here is how precisely
to idealize our ideal agent. He cannot simply be made all-knowing, for instance, because
then he might see alternatives that really are not appropriate as alternatives for our lcss-
informed agent. If our ideal agent were all-knowing, she would know the combination to
the bank’s locked safe and be able to open it in an emergency; but our actual agent who
happens not to know this combination would not have “opening the safe” as an alternative.
It would be wrong to claim that the actual agent had the alternative of simply dialing in the
right safe combination in virtue of the fact that the ideal agent would have had this
alternative. Simply making the agent ideally rational would also not solve many of the
problems that arise on the personalistic criteria account; in particular, the case of the vicious
lout above would be unaffected. It is tempting to suggest that the idealized agent is simply a
sort of maximally unencumbered version of the actual agent — he is e.g. not too evil for that to
limit his reasoning capabilities any further than his natural unimaginativeness does. The
problem here is that there are encumbrances that agents have that reasonably limit the
alternatives they can see. A compulsively reclusive person may appropriately never see the
option to sing in front of a crowd of strangers to cheer them up. This encumbrance is
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arguably morally relevant in the situation. Where encumbrances genuinely limit the moral
options an agent has in a given situation, it would be inappropriate to remove them when
considering this agent’s options.
It does seem that the only way to generate an account using personalistic criteria
would be to describe an agent who is ideal in the right way, whose alternative set would be
the relevant one for our actual agent in his situation. I f this worked, then it would solve the
problems raised by Feldman’s objection. However, there are serious problems facing an
idealized agent account, at least for the purposes of an account of objective moral terms, and
like Bergstrom, I am pessimistic about the prospects of solving them. I conclude that the
personalistic criteria solution to Feldman’s objection is not, on its own, satisfactory.
It is worth noting, though, that even if personalistic criteria were not objectionable, it
is not clear how they would resolve the problem with Manipulous and his alternative sets. It
is in fact quirks about Manipulous and his preferences that got us in this mess in the first
place. None of the competing alternative sets that might describe his choice situation can be
preferred on the basis of facts about him and his personality.
Bergstrom’s second attempt at a solution involves what he calls “teleological
criteria.” In this case, the idea is that the most appropriate alternative set for the agent in the
situation is the minimal alternative set that captures all ofthe alternatives that have significantly different
values. Bergstrom presents a case substantially like that presented by Feldman where an agent
has the following competing alternative sets as he is considering what he will do the
following dav:
where —b 1 is the failure to do b 1 ; b 1 is working on a paper tomorrow; b2 is taking
the day off; b3 is rewriting section 2; b4 is going to the theater tomorrow night; b5 is
taking a trip to the country; b6 is staving home and b7 is bringing the family,
B1 = {bl,b2}
B2 = {bl Db3, bl D -b3, b2}
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B3 = {bl, b2 D b5,b2 D -b5}
B4 = {bl PI b4, bl n -b4, b2 H b4, b2 D -b4[
B5 = {bl D b3, bl D -b3, b2 fl b5 D b7, b2 D b5 D -b7}
He offers the following clarification of his suggestion that the relevant alternative set in this
situation is one that in some sense correctly reflects all of the actions that have substantially
differing consequences (differing, that is, in terms of the resulting value):
From a utilitarian or teleological point of view it may be reasonable to say that the
relevant alternative-set for P in S should in some way depend upon the relative value
of the consequences of different actions which are performable by P in S. Consider,
for example, the case described in section 3, and suppose that it is claimed that [Bl
|
is the relevant alternative-set in that case. It seems that two different arguments may
be advanced against this claim from a teleological point of view. First, it might be
held that the claim is normatively misleading. For we may assume as before that the
consequences of [bl] are better than those of [b2], but that the consequences of [b2|
Cl [b5| are better than those of [bl]; it may then be unacceptable from a utilitarian or
teleological point of view to conclude that [bl] ought to be done, which would
follow if [Bl] were the relevant alternative-set. Second, there is a somewhat weaker
objection to the claim that [B
1 ]
is relevant, namely that this claim is normatively
insufficient. By this I mean, very roughly, that [bl] and [b2] are not sufficiently
“specific”; there is too great a different in value between the consequences of
different versions or quasi-versions of these actions (Bergstrom 1971, 248-249).
Bergstrom presents a collection of conditions designed to answer the question of exactly
which alternative set is of the right size and make up to be the relevant one in a particular
case.
His conditions depend on four technical concepts: versions, quasi-versions, U-inconsistency
and expansion (a is an action, A and A’ are alternative sets, P is an agent, S is a situation):
(V) a is a version of tf’iff a is different from but agent and time identical to a ' and it is
logically necessary7 that if a ’ is performed then a is performed
(QV) a is a quasi-version of a ' iff a is a version of
^ ’except that they are not time-
identical
(U) two or more alternative sets are U-inconsistent iff the normative conclusions
which follow when [a maximlxing utilitarian theory7
]
is applied to these
alternatives is inconsistent
(E) an alternative set A’ is an expansion of [a rival alternative set] A iff for every' a, a is
a member of A only if a or some version or quasi-version of a is a member of
A’ (Bergstrom 1971, 242-243, 249)
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Bergstrom then goes on to discuss a somewhat bewildering array of subtly different
principles he might accept. He appears to settle on these:
(Bl) If A is the relevant (alternative] -set for P in S, A’ is another alternative-set for P
in S, and A’ is an expansion of A, then either (i) A and A’ are not U-
inconsistent, or (ii) there exists some alternative-set for P in S which is an
expansion of A’ and which is not U-inconsistent with A.
(B2) If A is the relevant alternative-set for P in S, A’ is another alternative-set for P
m S, A’ is an expansion of A, a is a member of A, the consequences of a are at
least as good as those of any other action in A, and ^ ’and ^ ’’are different
versions or quasi-versions of a which are members of A’, then the consequences
of ’are (at least roughly) equally good as those of a"
(B3) Assumption: exactly one alternative set for P in S meets (Bl) and (B2)
(Bergstrom 1971, 250)
Though he seems quite shy of commitment, my best guess is that this is the trio of principles
he thinks has the best chance to select the right alternative set. (Bl) says roughly that the
relevant alternative set is either U-consistent with every one of its expansions or else it is U-
consistent with some expansion of at least one of its expansions. (B2) says roughly that the
relevant alternative set consists of actions that do not map to multiple versions of
themselves in rival expansion sets such that the rivals themselves have substantially different
values. (B3) is an assumption that is necessary for (Bl) and (B2) to be successful: that only
one among a set of rival alternative sets will meet all the conditions.
Before diving too deep into a review of these principles, let’s take a quick look at
how they are supposed to solve the Manipulous case. Of A1-A4, which alternative set do
Bergstrom’s principles select for him? The answer is supposed to be Al. Since it is the
biggest set, it appears to trivially satisfy (Bl) and (B2) (there are no rival expansions of Al).
The other sets should fail because A 1 is a U-inconsistent expansion of each one (and none
have some other U-consistent expansion). This satishes assumption (B3), and so everything
seems to come out right.
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However, I do not see how e.g. A2 will not also satisfy (Bl) and (B2). Bergstrom
points out that in any case, including that of Manipulous, there is actually an incredible
plethora of alternadve sets available to choose from. For example, let N be a morally neutral
action that takes place immediately following the button pushing. Then, it would seem to
follow that the following alternative set of quasi-versions of A2 is one of Manipulous’
possible alternative sets:
A2’: (a5 & N, a5 & ~N, a6, a7) ln
If you worn' that a simple fix to the account that demands that all rival alternative sets be
time identical (a condition Bergstrom himself appears to reject) would exclude A2’, you can
also imagine that N refers to a morally neutral way of performing a5 (or perhaps better: a morally
neutral concomitant of a5)\ that is, N is a morally neutral proposition, simultaneous with a5,
whose truth or negation is compatible with a5. A2 maps into A2’ in a pretty straightforward
way. Further, A2 now satisfies both (Bl) and (B2). (B2 is the condition that prevents the
relevant set from having an expansion such that different ways of performing the same action
in the expansion would have morally significant differences in outcome value. That is, it
prevents a relevant set from being morally misleading bv masking a moral difference in ways
of performing some action in it.)" However, this means that (B3) is violated: both A2 and
A1 satisfy the requirements. Worse, A1 and A2 are U -inconsistent. This means we are back
at square one: which alternative set is really Manipulous’?
One might think that one of the principles Bergstrom calls “too strong” might come
to the rescue here:
10 This follows the pattern from Bergstrom 1971, 242. I recognize I am ignoring many complications. It is mv
view that the complications I will explicitly raise are sufficient to cast doubt on Bergstrom’s view without the
need to continue searching for more.
11 A sharp reader will catch that in order to satisfy (Bl) (ii), A2’ must itselfhave. an expansion that is U
consistent with A2. This somewhat puzzling condition is trivially satisfied by the very same move that
produced A2’ itself: imagine A2”, an expansion of A2’ formed by adding a morally neutral way of performing
a6. A2” is an expansion of A2’ that is U-consistent with A2.
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(Bl’) IfA is the relevant alternative-set for P in S, A’ is another alternative-set for P
in S, and A’ is an expansion of A, then A and A’ are not U-inconsistent
(Bergstrom 1971,249).
I think this implies that all expansions of an alternative set must be U-consistent with it in
order for it to be the relevant alternative set. I believe 1 know why Bergstrom considers this
principle too strong. In his argument against using unconditionally maximal alternative sets
as the relevant ones for an agent at a time, he notes that an agent might “be more or less
simultaneously confronted with a great many different maximum alternative-sets, and these
would probably sometimes be U-inconsistent.” (Bergstrom 1971,245-246) Let’s try to
make this worry concrete. Suppose we have Manipulous’ Al, in which pushing button / yields
the best outcome. There is no a prion reason to reject the possibility7 that there is a set Al’ of
quasi-versions of the actions in Al, such that every7 course of action available to Manipulous
after pushing button 1 is much worse than many of the alternative courses of action available
to him. If that is possible, then it is possible that (Bl’) will pick out no alternative set for
Manipulous, since every apparent alternative set could be superseded by a U-incompatible
expansion of it. Again, this formulation appears to me to permit a time identical variant
involving versions instead of quasi-versions', perhaps it is always possible to offer an expansion
of an alternative set such that it involves ways of performing its members that would be
morally different. If this is possible
,
then (BL) is too strong to give the right answer, since in
these cases it will entail that no alternative set is relevant for P in S.
Though I do not pretend that this is a complete investigation into Bergstrom’s very
complex and intriguing ideas, my goal was much narrower. I argue that the principles he
presents yield the wrong answers. I also think that the principles and definitions he provides
are so complex that it is difficult to know for sure whether they, or the objections to them,
work. It is enough to motivate an investigation into my alternative answer to the puzzles
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an account that is simpler and yields satisfying answers to even more of the puzzles I care
about.
Ultimately CAU and Bergstrom’s account of alterative set relevance do not solve the
problems raised. In my view, a robust theory of options is the correct way to address these
issues. As I will argue, the differing nature of the puzzles that plague views like CAU beg
not to be handled one by one in an ad hoc manner. A theory of agent power can resolve
them all in a simple, unified way.
B. The objection from indeterminate consequences
In the example I used earlier to show how to apply CAU to simple cases, I suggested
that if I went to the movies I would experience some pleasure, and if instead I stayed home
and poked myself with pins I would experience some pain. Suppose now that in fact I go to
the movies. It seems relatively unproblematic that the consequences of the movie-going
alternative are as I have said — after all, 1 did go to the movies, and that caused a certain
result that had overall good value as suggested in the example. But are the consequences I
have alleged above for the alternative 1 did not perform equally unproblematic? 1 believe that
the answer is “no” and that the consequences of actions not performed are very difficult to
evaluate under CAU.
As I have presented it, CAU has a causal or counterfactual notion of a consequence.
But for my purposes, it does not matter whether consequences are causal results or are
instead (merely) counterfactually dependent on our actions because in either case, the
consequences of actions unperformed have a counterfactual element. To see this clearly,
let’s take the causal notion of a consequence. A consequence, very roughly again, is a state
of affairs caused by an action. My movie-going caused me some pleasure, and so that
pleasure is a consequence of my action. But what can we say about the consequences of
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actions we do not perform? I did not stay home poking myself with needles, so that I stayed
home poking myself with needles had no actual consequences (since that proposition is false) — but
if I had
,
what would the results have been? The usual way of understanding consequences of
alternatives we do not choose according to CAU is that they are what would have been caused by
the unperformed action. It is this counterfactual that causes problems for the naive notion
of a consequence.
In Chapter 1, I mentioned my commitment to Lewis’ theory of counterfactuals, and
part of that commitment is the belief that the truth of a counterfactual largely depends on
the context in which it is evaluated. Since a consequence depends on context, there are two
general ways for problems to turn up: 1) an alternative could have two or more plausible
incompatible consequences, depending on the context; if these consequences were different
in an ethically significant way, then it would be problematic to say exactly how CAU would
evaluate the alternatives in this case; 2) an alternative could be underspecified by any
plausible context in such a way as to yield no interesting states of affairs that would occur as
the result of the alternative, but only many possibilities that might come to pass upon the
performance of an alternative.
To be more specific about my complaint regarding consequences on a view like
CAU, 1 will focus on the issue of agent ability. Agents, though generally in control of many of
their actions, do not usually have control over the fine details of those actions. For example, if
I shoot a basketball, there are many factors that I can control that help to determine whether
I make the shot. I can control whether 1 am facing the basket, whether I jump when 1 take
the shot, the force with which I throw the ball and whether I curl my wrist at the end of the
shot. On the other hand, there are many points of fine-tuning that though I can bring them
about in some loose sense, I cannot control these factors. I cannot control whether I am
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facing .015 degrees off rhe line that runs between me and the basket, as opposed to facing
.016 degrees off that line. I also cannot control whether I toss the ball with a force of 15.01
pounds per square inch of pressure, or instead toss it with a force of 15.02 pounds per
square inch of pressure. Differences in fine-tuning such as these could have an effect on
whether 1 make a particular shot.
Based on these considerations, it is easy to come up with a case that would be very
difficult to evaluate using CAU. Suppose that I am in a basketball shooting contest. I have
the option to take the last shot or to decline. If I decline, I will take home my winnings of
$1,000. If I take the shot, then either of two things could happen. I could miss and not win
any money, or I could make the shot and take home $2,500. Suppose 1 decline and take
home my middling winnings. What does CAU imply I should have done? That depends on
what would have happened had I taken the shot. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be
any fact of the matter about what would have happened in this case. 1’here are many ways I
could have shot the ball — even many ways completely consistent with whatever skill I have in
basketball— that were all in some sense equally available to me; none of them was such that I
could have made it happen, though. Note that this problem is independent of whether
determinism is true, since even if determinism were true, all that would entail is that there is
a fact of the matter about what will happen when a person performs the alternative that is
physically inevitable for him. It does not entail that there is a fact of the matter about what
would have happened consequent on some unperformed alternative.
In cases like the basketball example, CAU does not vield a simple, intuitive result.
Instead it gives no answer as to which alternative is obligatory.
1
" The objection based on
12 Or, perhaps, depending on how the condition on right action is specified, CAU may yield a result. For
example, if a right action is one where no alternative has a higher value, then the argument could be made that
undefined values do not have a higher value than the actually performed alternative, so rhe alternative that is
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these considerations is that CAU does not yield any determinate answer as to what an agent
ought to do in a situation where an unperformed alternative’s consequences have an
undefined value. This problem with CAU is not merely one that affects some limited
domain of fringe cases. Rather, it affects a wide range of cases involving agent ability.
As with the other puzzles discussed so far, there are proposed solutions in the
literature on utilitarianism. Subjective or expected utility versions of utilitarianism, such as
the theory suggested by Jackson (1991), address some analogous issues that arise from
considerations involving probabilities, but they do not address the problem of indeterminate
consequences that arise from the coarse-grained nature of agent abilitv. Perhaps an expected
utility version of utilitarianism could address this latter sort of problem by appeal to
subjective probabilities assigned to e.g. whether the basketball player would make the shot if
he took it. A tvpical expected utility utilitarianism would explain the probabilities in question
as degrees of belief of an agent (or various agents) in the various possible outcomes.
However, without idealizing the agent assigning these subjective probabilities, it is reasonably
clear that objections involving agents with very strange subjective probability’ assignments
would arise. Objective moral rightness should not hinge on these lands of agent beliefs
(particularly when they are irrational or abnormal). But idealizing the agent is also tricky - I
gave reasons above that would apply here as to why ideal-agent versions of such a theory
strike me as problematic. Again, 1 do not really object in principle to some kind of solution
on which the consequences are sets of events or worlds — in fact, my own solution has this
feature. The real challenge, though, is to describe these sets in such a way as to avoid appeal
actually performed would be permissible. Unfortunately, this result seems objectionable as well, for then CAU
would simply almost always entail that what an agent actually does is permissible, and this result seems very
implausible.
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to subjective probability assignments or even in some cases anything that seems like a
probability assignment at all (such as in “fine detail” cases involving agent ability).
In the introduction, 1 introduced a rough distinction between objective and
subjective moral notions. It is clear to me that our everyday moral talk supports both
readings of terms like ‘obligation’ and ‘wrong’ depending on the context. But since my
interest is in the objective notions, it seems to me that attempting to solve the problem of
agent fine-tuning using subjective probabilities for the cases I am interested in will not work.
If the distinction between subjective and objective probabilities is similar to the distinction
between subjective and objective moral terms, it would be natural to think that a world-
theoretic account of objective moral terms would depend on objective probabilities (though
I do not pretend to have offered an argument for that here). My own account depends on
evaluating agent options in terms of classes of worlds. The classes themselves might have
been partitioned because the case involved objective, single-case physical probabilities. But
also, evaluating the closeness of worlds in those classes, as well as evaluating of the values of
those classes, may also depend on some objective measure applied to the classes and their
worlds. Offering an account of what those objective measures would look like is to some
extent outside of the scope of my paper; however, I do address related issues in chapter 5
where 1 offer an account of the truth-conditions for ‘can’-claims involving agent power in
specifically etlncal contexts.
I conclude that what is required to solve the problem of agent fine-tuning is an
account that describes what sorts of sets correspond to consequences and how context and
the nature of the ‘can’-claim involved in the case affects them. This will involve partitioning
worlds into equivalence classes that will in many cases involve applying objective measures
over those worlds. Both the scope of the worlds involved and the partitioning relation itself
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will be determined by principles given by the truth-conditions for ‘can’-claims. Typical
expected utility forms of utilitarianism do not even begin to address the issues raised by the
problem of agent fine-tuning.
Another approach, suggested by Vallentyne (1987), deals with the problems that arise
on indeterminism where objective physical probabilities instead of subjective ones interfere with
the application of the naive notion of a consequence.
Suppose that in an indeterministic world )orge is offered the choice between flipping
or not flipping a coin where the objective physical probability of heads is .5 and of tails is .5.
He decides not to flip. What then is the consequence we assign to the unperformed option
of flipping the coin? Vallentyne’s solution is to allow probabilistic states of affairs be
outcomes. The outcome of flipping would be a state of affaus in which there is a .5
probability of heads and a .5 probability of tails. He distinguishes the consequence or outcome of
an action from the notion of what happens after an action is performed. If Jorge had flipped
the coin and it landed heads, then we should say that the coin landing heads is what happened
but is not the outcome. In terms that will be more familiar after presenting WU, Vallentyne
could have said that outcomes are states of affairs that are accessible but not unavoidable for a
particular agent, while what things happen are simply the states of affairs that occur after an
action, whether or not they are accessible (Vallentvne 1987, 57-59). Where the probabilities
involved in an outcome are determinate, it is then possible to simply calculate the value of
the outcome in the same way as one would calculate the expected utility of an action in
decision theory.
Like much of what Bergstrom suggested, I find Vallentyne’s solution helpful and his
general approach to outcomes is subsumed by my approach to options. However,
Vallentyne’s view lacks preciselv the sorts of details that are needed in order to offer a
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simple, unified solution to all of the puzzles involved with formulating a utilitarian view.
While presenting a potential solution for cases involving determinate objective probabilities,
it does not yield any obvious results for cases involving agent fine-tuning that do no! depend on
such probabilities. Also, as a compatibilist I am committed to thinking that in some cases,
more than one morally relevant outcome is available to an agent even in a deterministic
world. In such a world, the outcome of flipping a coin is e.g. that it lands heads. Vallentyne’s
view handles the problems that arise for agent outcomes under indeterminism but then fails
to offer a view of how we understand outcomes that do not depend on that assumption.
This is not a problem with Vallentyne’s view — rather, it is a reason why the problem of
indeterminate consequences cannot be solved merely by that view. Still, in my account of
options 1 can make use of Vallentyne’s suggestions.
IV. World utilitarianism presented
CAU is based on traditional analyses of actions, alternatives and consequences.
Attempts to add to and fix this view have focused on clarifying those central concepts. The
views discussed so far seem problematic, though, and any one of the particular solutions
seems unfit to resolve all of the puzzles. Each seems ad hoc and fails to give any help for
puzzles that are obviously related to the one it is designed to solve. An alternative approach
to formulating a utilitarian view proposes an account of the conditions for rightness of
action in terms of propositions and worlds. One promise of such an approach is that we
would avoid the problems that arise for views that depend on the notions of actions,
alternatives and consequences. A clear formulation of utilitarianism that starts from
considerations of possible worlds and propositions is Feldman’s World Utilitarianism. 1 will
argue that this view does not resolve or avoid the puzzles discussed so far.
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A simple metaphorical story, whose spirit and many details I have borrowed from a
presentation made by Feldman,'
'
provides a good introduction to WU. Imagine that when
Sally is born, she is put into a crib that contains countless millions of books. These books
are complete descriptions of how the entire history of the universe could go; each book
describes a possible world. For every possible way baby Sally’s life could go, there is a book
that precisely describes exactly that possibility. Notably, even- book is in precise agreement
with every other book as to the details of all descriptions on the pages that lead up to the
baby’s birth (and in fact, these books’ beginnings all accurately describe the actual world up
until the moment of the baby’s birth). But starting with her birth, the books all describe
different worlds, different futures. And whenever the baby acts in such a way as to render
the story in a set of books false, those books are removed from the crib. For example, if
page 100 of a particular book says that Sally chooses oatmeal at 8:00am on a particular day,
but she does not have oatmeal then, then that book is removed from the crib.
14
In fact,
there are probably many books with that detail in them, and they are all removed. Feldman
describes this ongoing process of filtering or discarding possible worlds as time goes by:
As I see it, the set of accessible worlds is constantly shrinking. With even’ passing
choice we have accessible to us only a proper subset of the set of worlds accessible
to us before it. We begin our lives with an enormous set of accessible worlds. As
time goes by, we filter out world after world. As we near death, the set becomes
smaller and smaller. At the end, when no choices remain, nothing is accessible to us
from the real world except the real world itself (Feldman 1986, 21).
This idea has its basis in an intuition about how present choices constrain future choices.
When I was five years old, it was still true that I could have been a fireman by the time 1 was
25, but now that possibility is no longer open to me. Yesterday, it was still a live option for
13 Feldman 1999, personal communication.
14 Feldman 1986, 18-20, discusses the possibility that Sally’s past may not be fixed or constant. I am making the
simplifying assumption that no one can change the past in any interesting way. 1 ignore Feldman’s intriguing
idea here.
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me to wake up today at dawn and exercise, and now at noon that possibility is not accessible
to me. If you imagine that your future is a complex branching structure, whose branching
points are your choices between different possibilities, this intuition seems to make sense.
Whenever you make a choice you prune a little branch, with all of its many sub-branches,
from your remaining options.
Each of the books in Sally’s crib ends with a very simple appendix that is just one
page, and on that page is a number. This number is the value of the world the book
describes. Worlds that are good on balance have positive values and worlds that are bad on
balance have negative ones. At any given time, when Sally acts on one option rather than
another she is effectively picking which worlds remain accessible to her in the future. The
simple idea behind WU is that what Sally should do at any given time is what she does in the
best worlds still accessible to her at that time. This captures the intuitive utilitarian idea that
she should do the best she can.
In order to present WU more precisely, we must get clear on a) Feldman’s informal
notion of accessibility, b) the bearers of value according to WU and c) Feldman’s
formulation of (MO), the condition on morally obligatory action.
A. Accessibility
Before discussing Feldman’s view, it will be useful to introduce a term that will help
keep things clear. In traditional discussions of fan coin-tossing cases where agent power (or
lack thereof) is involved, the term accessibility is sometimes used in such a way that we sat' that
the agent does not have the power to flip the coin heads and that therefore worlds in which
that heflips heads is true are not accessible. Flere, the notion of accessibility is being constrained
by the context of evaluating agent power. However, the agent in the coin-tossing case might
nonetheless end up in a world where he has flipped heads (even though that outcome was
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not accessible to him). I will call worlds in which an agent could still find himself after a
choice situation continuants. There are many continuants for an agent in a choice situation
that are not accessible, in the stronger sense relevant to power, to the agent. In other words,
an agent is subject to forces, probabilities and limits to his abilities that often result in the
agent finding himself in an outcome that his control or powerwas not sufficient to ensure (or
ensure against).
Feldman does not attempt to give a definition or complete account of accessibility.
On his view, this notion is left as a conceptual primitive (Feldman 1986, 17-18). However,
without at least a rough idea of the concept at hand, it would be impossible to evaluate the
plausibility of his account of moral obligation. Feldman offers some formal, and some
informal, details regarding this critical concept.
He regards accessibility as a relation between an agent, a time and two worlds.
Feldman represents this relation like this:
(Accessibility) A s, /, w\ w
which is paraphrased as, “world ad is accessible to agent s of world w at time /.” When a
world is accessible to an agent as of a time, as of that time it is still in the agent’s power to
bring about that world (Feldman 1986, 16). As Feldman acknowledges, this rough
paraphrase is misleading: even the entire system of compossible options in an agent’s life do
not necessarily pick out an individual world (Feldman 1986, 17). An agent cannot bring
about or see to any particular possible w7orld. At most, by tossing books out of the crib, an
agent can ensure that some possible worlds are not brought about. He can also make it the
case that the possible worlds that remain share certain things in common (such as the truth
of certain propositions).
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The time index makes explicit the fact that what is accessible to an agent as of one-
time may not be accessible to him later. For example, if right now I could either stay up and
continue writing or go to bed, then right now there are still worlds accessible to me in which
at lam I am eating some ice cream and also some worlds accessible to me in which at lam 1
am dreaming about chess. If 1 go to sleep at midnight, then as of that time, worlds in which
I am eating ice cream at lam are no longer accessible to me.
Additional detail is needed to clarify this rough account of accessibility. Feldman
offers the following principle that connects accessibility to the states of affairs an agent can
bring about:
(1) If some state of affairs, q, is impossible for / as of /, then no ^-world is accessible
to j' at /
He adds the following conditions as clarifications of (1):
(T) If q is metaphysically impossible, then q occurs in no accessible world
(l”)If q is physically impossible for s as of /, then q occurs in no world accessible to s
as of t
(l”’)If q is impossible for s as of t in virtue of the fact that s lacks the ability, skill or
capacity to see to the occurrence of q, then q occurs in no world accessible to j' as
of/
15
(T)-(l’”) are examples of kinds of impossibility involved in (1). There may be other sorts of
impossibility relevant to agent accessibility - this is left open by Feldman’s account.
It is fairly clear how metaphysical impossibility relates to accessibility of worlds — if
there is no possible world where p, then it follows that there is no accessible world where p.
Though the notion of “physical impossibility” is somewhat vague (in particular, it can sustain
a compatibilist as well as an incompatibihst reading), it is still fairlv clear how the notion of
impossibility is supposed to relate to accessibility: accessible worlds are a subset of the
physically possible ones. (T”) suggests what appears to be the most substantial relationship
15 Feldman 1986, 17. I believe is it safe, in the context of this paper, to translate what Feldman says about states
ofaffairs into talk about propositions.
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between impossibility and accessibility, but unfortunately, since the critical concept of
“seeing to” has not been clarified, this principle runs the risk of empty circularity. My
intuition is that what an agent can “see to” is determined by what is accessible to him (it is
determined by what is in bis power) — clearly this would render (1”’) unhelpfully circular.
Though it is consistent to regard both “seeing to” and “accessibility” as conceptually
primitive, some clarification of these notions has to be provided to make much sense of
(I’”)-
Feldman offers an example regarding two neighbors that might help to explain his
idea of what an agent can “see to” (Feldman 1986, 22). Suppose Paco has a choice as to
whether to work in his garden the following day. His neighbor, Tony, can do nothing to
make Paco work in his garden but also can do nothing to stop Paco (suppose that Tony is
sleeping through the relevant time). For Paco, both a world in which he does work in the
garden and a world in which he does not are accessible to him; he can actualize either of
these worlds. In other words, he can see to the proposition that he works in the garden and
he can also see to the proposition that he does not do so. Suppose that Paco decides not to
work in his garden and stays in all day the next dav. In this case, though a world in which he
did work in his garden was accessible to Paco, such a world was not accessible to Tony. As
Feldman writes, “. .
.
the point is that [Paco| can see to it that he works in his garden, but
[Tony] can’t see to it that [Paco] works in his garden I want to treat the behavior of
others in ]ust the way I treat any event in the natural world. If j' can’t affect the behavior of
another person, s’, and s’ is going to behave in a certain way, then /behaves in that way in
every world accessible to /’ (Feldman 1986, p. 22). Here, Feldman treats “seeing to” as
implying a power to affect someone’s behavior. This implies a causal connection. Perhaps it
is best to understand “seeing to” in this causal wav: an agent sees to p only if he causes p.
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Feldman offers another explanation of this key concept that appears to rule out a
casual interpretation when he discusses agent power. He writes:
When I say, using it as a technical term, that some state of affairs is “in my power” as
of some time, 1 mean that this state of affairs occurs in some possible world
accessible to me as of that time. I formerly thought of this as the “can do”. . . It
now seems to me somewhat misleading to think of this as the “can do”, since many
tilings that are in someone’s power in this sense are not things that he can do. For
example, tomorrow’s sunrise is, in my sense, in your power today. It occurs in a
world now accessible to you. (In fact, it occurs in all of them.) But you don’t make
the sun rise. The sunrise is not something you “do” at all. Thus, [a proposition p
being in the power of agent s as of /] does not express the idea that as of /, s can do
p. Rather, it expresses the idea that, as of /, j can
" see to the occurrence ofp
(Feldman 1986, 23; bold lettering mine).
This is in some ways a surprising clarification. Agent “power” is taken as a technical term
and thus so is “seeing to.” Perhaps more surprisingly, both of those terms have very little to
do with what is commonly thought of as agent power or what Feldman calls agent “can do.”
Rather, it seems that Feldman is appealing to the notion of a continuant for all of these
concepts: a proposition is in the agent’s power iff a world in which it is true is a continuant
for hnn; equivalently, an agent can see to a proposition iff a world in which it is true is a
continuant for him, and an agent sees to a proposition iff the agent is at a world where the
proposition is true. If it is fair to consider (T”) as connecting the notions of “seeing to” and
accessibility, it would seem to be correct then that Feldman’s notion of accessibility is: a
world is accessible to an agent iff that world is a continuant for him. This may seem less
surprising if we take seriously the original baby-with-books metaphor: each of the books
represents a world, and if each book was accessible to the agent in the crib, it was in virtue
of the fact that that book had not yet been cast away
,
and therefore was a continuant for the agent
16 Here, as well as in his explanation of unalterability, Feldman uses the term ‘can’ when expressing his view. I
think this is tncky: in some cases, it seems Feldman is appealing to the everyday notion of ‘can.’ This would be
a problem since nothing Feldman says offers an account of that concept which itself seems to depend on a
notion of accessibility (or some similar concept). If Feldman is instead simply using the term ‘can’ as a way of
referencing his own weaker notion ofpower, then claims like this one, and the one from the discussion of
unalterability, seem unhelpfully circular.
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(regardless of the harder questions of whether the agent could have singled out a particular
book to be the only one left at life’s end merely by throwing other books away, or whether
any proposition in any remaining book is fair game to be said to be within the agent’s power).
On this interpretation of “seeing to,” principle (1 ’”) is in need of clarification.
Consider a case in which an agent may choose to toss a fair coin. Suppose that the coin
lands heads. On Feldman’s account, it would seem appropriate to say that the proposition
that the coin was tossed heads was accessible to the agent — the agent could see to that
proposition in virtue of the fact that it was true at one of his continuants. It looks like
principle (1’”) will have the right result — that is, since it is not impossible for the agent to flip
heads, the flip-heads worlds will consequently not be ruled inaccessible by (1’”). It would be
problematic, though, if this were the case even though the agent does not have the ability,
skill or capacity to flip heads. If so, it would be puzzling that in some situations where an
agent lacks the ability, skill or capacity to see to something it is impossible for him, but other
situations in which he lacks these features it is not impossible for him. This is where the
principle could be usefully clarified. My intuition is that though an agent has the ability, skill
and capacity to flip a coin, it’s not the case that he has the ability, skill or capacity7 to flip it
heads. This intuition is fairly strong for the concepts of ability and skill. But does the agent
have the capacity to flip a coin heads? Here my intuitions could go either way. If we interpret
capacity in a broad way, then perhaps an agent has the capacity to see to anything that might
result from his behavior. This broad of a reading, though, runs the risk of making principle
(T”) vacuous: if q is impossible in virtue of the fact that it’s not true at any continuant of the
agent, then it follows that q is not true at any continuant of the agent. (T”), while puzzling,
does not seem to pose a problem for Feldman.
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I want to highlight some important questions at this point in the exposition. If the
critical concepts of accessibility, power and “seeing to” (and presumably “bringing about” as
well) are technical terms that are in the same broad concept family as that of a continuant,
does Feldman owe us an explanation of how those concepts relate back to the everyday
notions of agent power and ‘can’-claims about agents? Does Feldman’s definition of moral
obligation consequently fail to analyze the everyday notion of obligation in a similar fashion?
I will put these open questions aside for now. Feldman accepts four formal
conditions on accessibility that explain parts of the world-theory behind this relation:
(Cl) the accessibility relation, ./l, is reflexive; that is, the agent’s world is always
accessible to the agent
(C2) A. is symmetric; that is, it in’ is accessible for s at t from in, then in is accessible
for s at t from w’
(C3) A is transitive; that is, if in' is accessible for s at / from w, and in” is accessible for
s at / from in’, then in” is accessible for s at 1 from in
(C4) “the set of accessible worlds never grows”; if in’ is accessible for .r at t from in,
and s existed at an earlier time / ’in in, then yfwas accessible for s at /’from in
(C4) is the formal statement of Feldman’s intuition that the set of worlds available to an
agent is constantly being filtered as time goes by. (Cl) is necessary to preserve the intuition
that what actually happens is accessible to everyone (the actual world is a continuant for
everyT actual agent).
Consider Feldman’s accounts of ‘unalterability’ and ‘power’:
(UA) a proposition p is unalterable for an agent s as of / iff for every" world in’
accessible to s as of t,p is true in in’
(POW) a proposition p is in the power of agent s as of / iff for some world in’
accessible to s as of t,p is true in in’
Ever}- agent sees to those propositions that are unalterable for her and these unalterable
propositions are also in her power. The agent’s accessible worlds are his continuants, and
the propositions true in those worlds are ones he can see to.
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I think that there are problems with tins view of accessibility. Earlier I suggested
that Feldman's account of the coin-tossing case must be that both heads- and tails-worlds are
accessible to the agent at the time of the coin-toss — both sorts of worlds are continuants for
the agent. However, this runs into trouble with Feldman’s claim above that “I want to treat
the behavior of others in just the way 1 treat any event in the natural world. If s can’t affect
the behavior of another person, s’, and j’is going to behave in a certain way, then s’ behaves
in that way in every world accessible to s.” (Feldman 1986, 22 — I’ll refer to tins principle as
FP). So suppose the coin is tossed and actually lands heads. This strikes me as a natural
world event over which the agent had no control (given that he flipped the coin). Thus, it
would seem that Feldman would want to say that there was no world accessible to, or a
continuant of, the agent such that that world was a tails-world.
Though tins would be an acceptable conclusion on a strong, agent “can do” reading
of accessibility (as would the conclusion, note, that flipping heads was also not accessible), I
cannot see how tins can be acceptable for a weak, continuant reading of accessibility. What
justification could we possibly have for saving that an agent, as of the tune of flipping a fair
coin, had no continuants where one of two equally likely outcomes happened.' If the world
itself permits both outcomes, so had better our notion of a continuant. Suppose, for example,
that the agent in question did not flip the coin. In that case, were there continuants in which
he flipped, and thus both heads-worlds and tails-worlds were continuants of hist If so, how
can we explain why his flipping changed what we would say about what continuants he had
before he flipped! If not, how do we explain why not? If he does not in this case have both
heads and tails worlds as continuants, then it would seem he has no flipping worlds at all as
continuants, for heads worlds and tails worlds have no distinction between them that 1 can
see that would imply that they should be treated any differently in terms of accessibility. Of
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course, the agent does have flipping worlds as continuants, and so 1 think this problem with
Feldman’s rough account of accessibility shows that the account (so far as it goes) is false. 1
develop this argument in more detail in what follows under the heading of puzzles regarding
indeterminate consequences and objective chance. There, too, we will see that the result of
dropping Feldman’s suggestion that we hold fixed facts over which the agent has no control
causes still more problems for the view.
I also tend to think that (C4) and the “filtered tree” model of agent accessibility is
mistaken. Such a view seems to have its origins in a picture of what the unfolding of an
objectively probabilistic world would graph to if you graphed probabilistic events onto
nodes of the tree. So, for example, if you had a simple world with just three times and










At the earliest time in this world, four different outcomes are physically possible. But after
the first event resolves itself one way or another, there are only two. This sort of picture
strikes me as wrong for analyzing or describing the context-sensitive notion of agent
accessibility. Each agent choice situation is evaluated in a context that gives the scope and
partitions (described in detail in chapters 4 and 5) of the agent’s continuants. There is
nothing that requires that one scope be a proper subset of another. That would be to
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conflate certain facts about the nature of the physical world (often irrelevant to the context)
with what it means to say an agent can do something. This is of particular importance to a
compatibilist. Suppose determinism is true. That means the world graph has exactly one
branch - there is only one physically possible outcome in such a world. A compatibilist
would not accept that this meant that the agent's continuantgraph had no branches, no choices.
But if the compatibilist’s graph allows for many possible continuants for an agent in some
choice situation, what possible reason would he have for also claiming that the continuants
are aligned in the same time-ordered, branching tree that would only be immediately
reasonable in the case of objective chance events in the world? I cannot see any other
obvious principle that would force a compatibilist to claim that at each subsequent time, the
worlds accessible for any arbitrary, contextually-sensitive ‘can’-claim are a proper subset of
the worlds accessible at a previous time. Perhaps this argument does not get far beyond the
statement of an intuition. Nevertheless, my intuition is that though the requirement to
describe events over time in terms of such a tree is easily explainable in the case of a world
of objective chance, it is not in the case of a context-sensitive accessibility relation that is
compatible with determinism.
Finally, I think it is problematic that Feldman’s view is specified in technical terms
that cannot be used in an account of what we would normally call “agent power” or what
Feldman calls “can do.” Since my own goal is to provide an account of ‘can’ and options,
this means minimally that Feldman’s account will not help me in my goal (or perhaps, his
account will not be compatible with mine). This is most likely not an objection that
Feldman would care about much. I would guess (and it is nothing more than a guess) that
Feldman regards the everyday notions of power and agent “can do” as very complicated and
difficult to analyze. 1 would also guess that Feldman believes he can proceed directly to an
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account of moral obligation without having to get bogged down in those complexities. It he
is right, then it is not important that he fails to give an account of agent power or “can do”
that might be someone’s business, but it is not his. His business is to provide concepts that
can underpin an account of moral obligation. The open question for now is: will Feldman’s
account of moral obligation run into problems because of the way he defined these technical
concepts, or will his account work in spite of the fact that he avoids attempting to analyze
agent power, “can do” or control?
B. Bearers of value
As with CAU, states of affairs are the bearers of value on WU. However, instead of
using states of affairs to give an account of a total consequence, Feldman instead explains the
values of entire possible worlds in terms of the basic intrinsic values of the states of affairs that
are true in those worlds. This allows him to avoid complications with the notion of a
consequence.
In order to be clear on the kind of value he is interested in, and also to avoid certain
technical problems with value calculation, Feldman offers clarifications of what he takes
intrinsic value to be. He also tries to make precise how the value of a possible world is to be
calculated from the states of affairs that are true in it.
Rather than attempting to define intrinsic value, we can perhaps identify the sort of
value we are interested in by means of a condition that intrinsic value meets but that is not
met by other sorts of value (for example, extrinsic value). One interesting condition
proposed by Chisholm is that intrinsic value is the value something necessarily has. Feldman
explains this idea in the following way:
If happiness is intrinsically good, then it is necessary that happiness is intrinsically
good. It can’t )ust be an accident that something is good m itself. Since its intrinsic
goodness derives from its own nature — from what it is per se — and this can’t
change, its intrinsic goodness can’t change, either (Feldman 1986, 28-29).
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Take, for example, the state of affairs that consists in my taking a certain degree of pleasure
in an activity in which I am engaged. It is plausible to assume that this state of affairs is
necessarily one that consists in taking some amount of pleasure (perhaps this pleasure has a
counterpart that differs somewhat in value, but it must at least be a pleasure). Assuming a
simple hedonism, this state of affairs has, necessarily, exactly what it needs in order to he. good
— it is necessarily good if its nature is that of being an innocent pleasure.
The value of a possible world is the sum of the values of the value states in that
world. But this very simple formulation is flawed, as Feldman points out:
. . . we surely do not want to say is that the intrinsic value of a world is equal to the
sum of the intrinsic values of the things that occur in it Suppose, for example,
that there is a world, u>, in which nothing intrinsically bad happens, and in which
“just one” intrinsically good thing happens. Suppose the intrinsically good thing that
happens there is this:
p: Jones is pleased at Noon, January 1
Suppose that the intrinsic value of this state of affairs is exactly +10. It would be
reasonable to suppose, in light of all this, that the intrinsic value of the world as a
whole would also be +10.
Notice that ifp is true at a world, then many other states of affairs related to
p are also true there. For example, consider any conjunction ofp with something
else true at that world, such as:
q: Jones is pleased at Noon, January7 1, and grass is green
| this] seems to have the same intrinsic value as p, and |it| occurs in worlds that p
[does] (Feldman 1986, 29-30).
Ifp and q both occur in the world in question, then the proposal that is under review here
would mistakenly imply that that world has at least z. value of +20.
Feldman’s response to this counting problem is to attempt to specify a condition for
selecting which propositions to count as basic value states. The basic value states are difficult
to characterize exactly. One thing that seems to be true of them is that they are states of
affairs that include nothing more, nor less, than what is valuable (Feldman 1986, 30).
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Intuitively, proposition q above includes a detail irrelevant to what is good. The existential
generalization of p, “someone is pleased at noon, January 1,” does not have enough detail; in
some sense, the basic value states are maximally specific (they are true of only one person, at
one time, and specify the exact degree of goodness or badness).
Feldman points out that to some extent, the difficulty in understanding basic value
states is generated by the fact that different theories of what is intrinsically valuable will
require different sorts of basic value states; that is, if two theories differ with respect to what
is taken to be intrinsically good, then they may also differ with respect to the syntactic forms
of the basic value statements that they entail. For example, according to a view sometimes
referred to as ‘qualified hedonism,’ pleasures have different qualities and the quality of a
pleasure partly determines that intrinsic value of that pleasure (this sort of view is often
attributed to
J.
S. Mill). A proposition like p does not have enough information to be a basic
value state for a qualified hedonism. At minimum, the basic value states that would be
appropriate for that sort of account would have to include information regarding what
quality of pleasure it was that Jones was experiencing.
Another complication that arises for an account of basic value states is how times
delimit the beginnings and endings of a pleasure. For example, if Jones experiences his
pleasure from tl to /2, there is that pleasure, but there are also countless other pleasures that
Jones experiences, such as the one that takes place from just after // until just before t2.
There are countless intervals we could choose and it seems clear that if we added them all
up, Jones’ rather insignificant pleasure would get counted as a boundless infinity of joy. This
would be a mistake.
1
17 Feldman 1986, 31-32. It is tempting to forget this business regarding the values of individual states of affairs
and instead simply let possible worlds be the bearers of intrinsic value. But I have the feeling that Feldman
would say that this gets the order of analysis the wrong way around since intuitively, the complex value of a
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Two approaches for solving this problem come to mind. Feldman’s suggesdon is
that one could imagine a partition on time such that the interval of the partition is the
smallest possible interval of time in which it would make sense to attribute to any sentient
being as having a pleasure in that interval.
I s
Then, a basic value state is understood to be a
state that lasts for one of those units of time. Long pleasures are those that are really many
contiguous basic pleasures that occur for a single agent. Another approach might be to
understand basic value states as ones that are maximal with respect to time. So, Jones’ basic
pleasure in the case ofp is the one such that it occurs in a time interval // to /2, and it is
maximal over that interval — there is no time range starting before tl or ending after t2
during which Jones is feeling this particular pleasure.
1 ’
There is obviously much more that can be said regarding basic value states.
Hopefully the rough account of basic intrinsic value alluded to above is sufficientlv
intelligible for the purposes of understanding Feldman’s account of moral obligation.
C. Moral obligation
Roughly, what it is morally obligatory for an agent to do, as of a time, is what that
agent does in the best world accessible to him as of that time. But since there may be no
single world accessible to the agent that is the best (there could be ties), and since it is
possible that rather than there being a best world there instead be an infinite sequence of
worlds, where every world has some world that is better than it, a more technical
formulation of this account is required. Feldman formulates the account, MO, where ‘MO s.
world is decompositional — the values of worlds break down into smaller bits that themselves genuinely have
value and seem to explain the values of the worlds.
18 Feldman 1986, 32. This suggestion has certain problems; for example, what does this account entail
regarding a pleasure that is only one unit long, but begins halfway through the //th unit of the partition? In order
for the account to work, the partition must be unique (not defined in such a way that it can be ‘fitted’ to
particular pleasures that may be unevenly spaced-out), exclusive and exhaustive.
19 It seems to me that sometimes a person feels two different pleasures at the same time and that an axiological
hedonism should take that into account. If so, then basic value states are much more complicated than p and 1
would say they must involve some propositional content, such as what the agent is pleased about.
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/,/>’ means lp is morally obligatory for s as of f and ‘IV(x)’ represents the intrinsic value of a
proposition jv:
(MO) MO s, t,p is true at w iff
(3 tv) [A s, /, w\ tv 6c p is true at tv’ 6c
~(3tv’) {A s, t, tv’\ iv 6c ~p is true at iv” 6c \\{iv’) > IV(a/)}]
This rather complex formulation can be paraphrased: a certain state of affairs is morally
obligatory for an agent at a particular time if, and only if, as of that time that state of affairs
occurs in some world accessible to that agent, and for ever}’ accessible world better than or
equal in value to that world, the state of affairs occurs there, too. More simply, there is no
accessible world after a certain upper value threshold where the negation ot that state of
affairs occurs.
An immediate objection to (MO) that Feldman considers is that (MO) implies that it
is obligator}' for an agent to see to any proposition that is unalterable for him. So, for
example, if “that the universe ends in heat death” is true in every continuant of an agent,
then that proposition will satisfy (MO). Feldman is willing to swallow that strange
implication. However, I think that if we require that (MO) eventually find its way into an
account of the everyday notion of moral obligation, we should see if there is a way to modify
it to avoid this odd conclusion. Feldman offers a reformulation for exactly this purpose:
(MO*) MO* s, t, p is true at iv iff MO s, t, p is true at tv and a world where ~p is true
is accessible to s as of t (there’s a world w^such that A s, /, tv\ tv and ~p is true at iv)
(Feldman 1986, 43)
The difference between (MO*) and (MO) is simply that (MO*) unplies that unalterable
propositions are not obligations of the agent.
Unfortunately, 1 do not think that this reformulation is much closer to the everyday
notion of moral obligation. I have argued that Feldman’s rough outline of accessibility is
problematic. One of the issues is that it does not make good sense of cases involving
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objective chance. (MO*) suffers because of this. Consider an indeterministic world where a
chance event far in the future determines when the universe will suffer its heat death. In one
outcome of this chance event, the heat death is very close, and billions upon billions of
happy, loving civilizations will meet their ends quite soon. In the other outcome, the heat
death takes place much, much later. (MO*) appears to imply that it is a moral obligation of
the agent to see to a world in which the heat death of the universe occurs much later. (As I
will demonstrate below, much more prosaic cases involving agent control over very precise
actions would have served the same purpose here.) Since 1 do not accept that there can be
any (hard) fact of the matter during the agent’s life as to whether the chance event far in the
future turns out one way rather than another (or granting that both outcomes are equally
probable, that either is more similar to actuality’ than the other), I cannot see any way around
this objection. The agent will have continuants in which the heat death occurs early and
ones in which it occurs late. (MO*) implies he should see to the ones where it occurs later,
and that is a mistake. Again, if Feldman is willing to swallow the unusual implications then
this is not exactly an objection to his view. It shows, though, that his view is not a view
about the everyday notion of moral obligation, power, accessibility or “can do.” It would be
better, I think, to develop a view that could give an account of all of these everyday
concepts, and since that is my goal, I conclude that Feldman’s account so far would not
satisfy my goals.
But let’s put aside this objection for the moment. In order to see how (MO) deals
with actual cases, it will be useful to examine how it is supposed to resolve the puzzles we
encountered with the naive version of CAU. In the case of Manipulous, CAU without
amendment entailed results that were at best counter to our intuitions and at worst were
inconsistent or incoherent. According to WU, Manipulous ought to see to whatever states
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of affairs he sees to in the best worlds still accessible to him as of the time of his choice.
Feldman writes:
In the best accessible world, the operator of the machine evidently presses button
number 1. Since button number 1 is square and [white], it follows that in the best
accessible world he presses a square, [white] button. Hence, my view yields the
correct results. He ought to press square button. He ought to press [a| [white|
button. He ought to press button number 1 (Feldman 1986, 14).
I think the idea is tins: consider all of the many continuants Manipulous has. Suppose it is
true that in all the best of them, Manipulous pushes button number 1. In that case, (MO)
entails that it is obligatory for Manipulous to do so.
You might object that (MO) does not resolve the problem with alternative sets at all.
After all, the various ways of describing what Manipulous does still remain. Don’t those
descriptions describe different states of affairs that the agent could bring about, and don’t
those states of affairs again fall into many different mutually exclusive and exhaustive setsr
Given Manipulous’ preferences, don’t those different alternative sets still result in
inconsistent results for (MO)?
I think Feldman’s answer is tins: whether we describe an agent behavior as “pushing
a grey button” or “pushing button 2” is irrelevant. What matters is what is true at the best
worlds accessible to him: if a proposition, p, is true at the best world, then he should see to it
that p. If that world is a world in which button 2 is pushed, then it is also a world in which a
grey button is pushed and one in which a round button is pushed. Thus, if worlds in which
al, a2, a3 and a4 are true are accessible to Manipulous, (MO) entails that Manipulous should
push button 1.
I do not think that Feldman’s solution of the case of Manipulous is successful.
Setting aside my reasons for thinking that Feldman’s notions of accessibility', “seeing to,”
power and (MO) have problems, the idea that we should identify7 the proposition that an
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agent should see to in virtue of whether that proposition occurs in the best of one of the
agent’s continuants is a mistake.
Consider the following example of the Evil Contrarian (EC). The EC is a person
whose life takes place several years after Manipulous’ own. This person is an expert on
Manipulous’ life. This person is very strongly inclined to undo any good, or bad,
Manipulous may have done. In particular, if Manipulous does something very good that
makes a lot of people happy, the EC is likely to ensure that just a little bit more pain than
that is done during his own lifetime. Likewise, if Manipulous does something very bad and
hurts a lot of people, the EC just might see to it that just a little bit more good than that is
done during Iris lifetime. Of course, the EC continues to have a choice as to what he will do;
he could after all just leave well enough alone, and do nothing to undo the good or bad
Manipulous did. Suppose the world in which these two agents live is very simple and that
their choices make very little moral difference outside their domains of influence. The end
result is that continuants where Manipulous does a lot of good are quite often worse than
continuants where Manipulous does a lot of bad. Take the button-pushing example from
above. If pushing the first button is very good for people in Manipulous’ vicinity, the EC
may very well ensure that continuants where Manipulous pushes the button are worse. It
pushing button 4 is fairly bad locally, the EC may very well see to it that continuants where
Manipulous pushes button 4 are fairly good. (MO) then entails that Manipulous should do
things that are fairly bad, like pushing button 4. This seems wrong: Manipulous should push
button 1 and the EC is subsequently wrong for hurting people. Because (MO) does not
have any way of untangling various agent’s contributions to the value of the world, its
assignments of obligation (or whatever weaker term must be used here to make it clear that
the everyday notion of obligation is not in play) go awry.
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Though this might seem initially to be a simple criticism of (MO)’s normative results,
I think I am pointing out a deeper problem. The reason (MO) evaluates the case this way is
that it fails to make sense of Manipulous’ options — what he can do , what he contributes to
the world that is distinct from what other agents and natural forces contribute. To give you
an idea of what I mean, consider an alternative way of understanding Manipulous’ options:
suppose his options were sets ofpossible worlds corresponding to the propositions that he had
the power to bring about. In this case, it would be possible to disentangle EC’s contributions
from Manipulous’ — while it’s surely possible that the EC exists, it’s also possible (even
likely) that he does not. Therefore, when considering Manipulous’ button-pushing worlds,
the set that corresponds to pushing button 1 might overall be a lot better than the set where he
pushes button 4. EC’s sometime-contributions would be in essence averaged out over the
array of Manipulous’ continuants that (overwhelmingly) did not include his contrarian
influence. Without an adjustment along these lines, I think (MO) will be susceptible to
objections that arise not because the normative theory that underlies Feldman’s intuitions is
flawed, but because the account of accessibility, power and options that has been sketched is
mistaken.
Look at it another way: consider Bergstrom’s suggestion that there are typically
practically limitless expansions of an alterative set that involve versions or quasi-versions of
the elements of the original alternative set. Without anv idea of how to limit the scope of
Manipulous’ accessible worlds or any account of how to group those worlds into meaningful
sets, these expansions that Bergstrom has in mind correspond to a massive array of worlds
where one (or more) of the propositions that Feldman considers in the button-pushing case
is true. Without an account of how to limit the scope of his accessible worlds beyond what
Feldman has already said about “impossibility,” is there any intuitive result to be had where a
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particular button-pushing, whether it be button 1 or 4 or any other, will be the result picked
out by a particular best possible world among Manipulous’ continuants? There are plenty of
worlds where Manipulous pushes button 1, but they differ dramatically in how good they
are. Similarly for the worlds in which any other button is pushed. Feldman could still say
that he should simply do whatever he does in which ever of those worlds is the best, but as I
mentioned above, the best world that is a continuant of Manipulous’ might be best for
reasons that have nothing to do with him and nothing to do with what button he pushes.
Without any way of grouping the worlds accessible to Manipulous along the lines of his
power and control, my claim is that his moral contribution is lost, and consequently the
moral evaluations of his behavior will be counterintuitive.
Feldman’s view seems to entail that it is not even possible to elaborate the decision
matrix for an agent in any meaningful way. You might group Manipulous’ continuants into
relevant sets (propositions), but then which one? Here we are back to the original problem
reviewed by Bergstrom and Feldman that landed us in this discussion in the first place —
which propositions represent the right grouping for Manipulous? Perhaps one might offer a
grouping that lets each worlds one of the “decisions.” This seems hopeless. There would
be many continuants that do not even correspond to an agent choice because they differed
only with respect to the actions of some other agent, or differed onlv with respect to the
result of some probabilistic event. How could such worlds appear in the decision matrix of
our agent? I would argue they should not. The problem of rival partitions remains entirely
unanswered by Feldman — the strategy of avoiding the problem by reformulating the view
without alternative sets leaves important questions unanswered that now appear to matter.
In summary, it is not clear to me that Feldman’s view really does solve the problem
of Manipulous. There are serious problems with the notion of accessibility7 provided, and
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(MO) seems susceptible to criticisms that are caused by the very strategy that was supposed
to steer clear of the problems with CAU: avoid the complex and difficult concepts of agent
“can do” and alternatives.
WU fares little better on the puzzle regarding indeterminate consequences. In the
case of the basketball contest, WU implies that the agent should do whatever he does in the
best world still accessible to him. As I have characterized Feldman’s view, the factors over
which the agent has no control occur in ever)? world accessible to our agent (Feldman 1986,
p. 22, principle FP). Suppose that is true. That would imply that if he had taken the shot
and missed, then he missed in every one of his continuants. That seems very implausible for
reasons that are the same as the ones I gave in the case of the objectively chancy coin toss.
No cogent theory of accessibility or counterfactuals would imply that there was a fact of the
matter about what would have happened in every (closest) possibility where that possibility is
contingent upon things that are either objectively chancy or dependent on such tine
differences in the world that no agent can effectively select between them. But also, the
normative results that come from accepting this seem wrong. Suppose that if the basketball
player does not take the shot, nothing interesting morally speaking happens. If he does take
the shot and misses (assume this is very likely), something very bad happens. But if he takes
the shot and makes it (assume this is very unlikely), something a little bit good happens.
Now suppose he takes and makes the shot. Given our assumptions, Feldman's view implies
that the player should take the shot -- after all, the only worlds where he takes the shot are
ones where he makes it, and some good comes out of making it. My intuition about this
case is that the player should not take the shot. The fact that he happens to make it is
nothing more than a happy accident in the face of (objective) reasons for thinking that this
accident was very unlikely.
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But consider the case in which he does not take the shot. One possibility is that on
Feldman’s view, there is a fact of the matter about what would have happened had the player
taken the shot. Because I think that this case is essentially the same as a case involving
objective chance, 1 find this wholly implausible. If I do not flip a fair coin, there is no fact of
the matter about what would have happened if 1 had flipped it. Nothing in the context and
nothing in the nature of the world could justify that result. The view of counterfactuals I
accept, a view along the lines of Lewis’, also does not imply a univocal result in cases
involving agent control. The similarity relation that orders the worlds by closeness ought to
count two worlds as equally close if they represent two ways an objectively chancy event
(where evert’ chance outcome is of equal probability) could turn out; similarly, that relation
will count two worlds as equally close it they represent two ways an agent behavior could go
where that behavior involves differences in the way the action is carried out that are not
even remotely in the power of the agent to control. Note, too, that the same unpleasant
normative results as before obtain in tins case as well.
I have discussed the consequences for Feldman’s view that come from (1) the
assumption that any event that is out of the agent’s control happens in every world
accessible to that agent, and (2) the assumption that there is a fact of the matter regarding
what would happen if the basketball player were to take the shot when he did not do so
actually. So perhaps these views are ones Feldman would reject. What then should Feldman
say about the consequences for the basketball player’s actions? Perhaps he would say that
the basketball player has continuants where the he does not take the shot, continuants where
he does and misses and continuants where he does and makes it. Then, whatever continuant
is most valuable is the one the agent should see to. This seems to be the right tiling to say
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about the agent’s continuants and the resulting method for evaluating the agent’s behavior
sounds like (MO).
However, this solution runs into trouble immediately. First, a world in which he
shoots and makes it might be best, but it is certainly not one he can ensure in any meaningful
way. Worse, suppose that the chance" of Ins making it is vanishingly small. Suppose further
that if he does not take the shot, then nothing morally relevant happens — there is no change
in the course of the world as far as intrinsic value goes. But if he takes the shot and makes
it, +1000 value results. If he misses, -1000000 value results. Then, (MO) implies the he is
obligated to take the shot and obligated to make it — after all, on the view as we’ve restated it,
there is a continuant for the player where he makes the shot, and that continuant is the most
valuable one. Regardless of how little chance there is of his making the shot (and regardless
of how bad the consequences of not making it are), (MO) then implies he should take the
shot. This is a bad result. If there is a tiny chance he would make it and something pretty
good will happen, and an overwhelming chance that he would not and something truly
gruesome would happen, I would like a normative theory- to say that he should not take the
shot. The problem for Feldman’s view can be stated as a dilemma. We can impose
apparendy ad hoc assumptions that resolve the indeterminacy of what happens by picking
resolutions that line up with what actually happens or by picking some consideration on the
basis of which we can claim that there is some fact of the matter about what would have
happened in any arbitrary- case. On tins horn of the dilemma, the problem is that the
account of accessibility- that results is wrong and depends on views about counterfactuals
20 Not subjective chance or subjective probability (dependent on the agent’s beliefs). The sort of chance or
probability being invoked here involves some kind of objective measure being applied to the possibilities
accessible to the agent. In the case of single-case objective probabilities, that measure is objective chance. In
the case of agent control, I would argue the measure is still objective and based on physical facts about agent
neurology, musculature, etc. I tackle some related issues in chapter 5.
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that I cannot accept. The other horn of the dilemma results when we reject the ad hoc
assumptions and allow that the agent has continuants that allow e.g. both outcomes of a
chancy event to be accessible (in the loose sense) to the agent. The problem on this horn is
that (MO) yields the wrong normative results.
Feldman has presented an intriguing view of obligation based on a framework of
possible worlds. I have strong sympathy for this approach and in fact my own view of
options borrows elements of this framework. However, I believe the view as stated has
some problems and cannot resolve the puzzles with CAU. There are other puzzles, too, that
1 would like to solve that affect both CAU and WU alike.
V. Puzzles for utilitarian views
A. Puzzle about how knowledge affects what you can do
Feldman himself raises a puzzle about knowledge that arises on Ins account
(Feldman 1986, 24-25). Alejandra, a bank manager in midtown Manhattan, receives a
disturbing phone call. She is informed that a massive nuclear weapon has been placed
inside the bank vault. If the device is not deactivated, an entire city block will be wiped out
and thousands will be killed. The bomb squad tells her that if she can let them in, they will
be able to deactivate the bomb. Unfortunately Alejandra does not know the 48-digit
combination to the vault. She is standing right near the keypad. Her arms are working fine,
even though she is very nervous. Yet, she cannot open the safe: she does not know the
combination. But in another sense she can open the safe. Her fingers are perfectly capable
of punching any particular 48-digit combinations in the amount of time she has. If she can
punch one of these combinations, she can punch any of them: none is any harder to punch
than the others, and one of them is the right combination. It seems to follow that she can
punch the correct combination.
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If this is true, then (MO) yields the result that Alejandra is morally obligated to open
the safe. A world in which she opens the safe is accessible to her — a safe-opening world is
among her continuants — and that world is a lot better than worlds in which she does not
open the safe or does not even try. Yet, this is absurd: she may be obligated to try but she
cannot be obligated to open the safe! After all, she doesn’t know the combination, and
guessing is about as likely to produce the desired result as spitting in the wind is.
The plausible response is that WU implies that opening the safe is “impossible” for
Alejandra. Consider Feldman’s condition (!’”):
(l’”)If q is impossible for s as of / in virtue of the fact that s lacks the ability, skill or
capacity to see to the occurrence of q, then q occurs in no world accessible to s as of
t
Alejandra does not have the ability, skill or capacity to open the safe: in tins sense it is
“impossible” for her. But if it is not impossible for her in the sense that it is not even
accessible to her (is not one of her continuants), then we arrive at a conclusion that seems
wrong: she is morally obligated to open the safe. On the other hand, if we assume that it is
impossible for her to open the safe in the requisite sense, then (MO) yields the result that
she should not even try.
-1
But tins, too, seems wrong. In a logically similar case, the lock
has only 100 different possible combinations. Considering that it seems plausible to say that
she could get lucky, and considering how much worse the bad consequences are than the
good ones, it would seem that she should dial some combination.
There are other ways to achieve this sort of undefined or counterintuitive result.
Suppose Alejandra does not even try to open the vault. Clearly there was still an accessible
world in which she tried to open the vault. What should we say about the character of the
future of worlds in which she does try? A vast minority of those tty -worlds are worlds in
21 Or it easily could: just make the outcome a little bit worse if she tries and fails than if she does not try at all.
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which she opens the safe and a vast majority are worlds in which she does not open the safe.
Yet, there are some worlds in which she succeeds. Here, (MO) again implies the
unacceptable result that Alejandra is obligated to open the safe. The only way around that
conclusion then would be to suppose that Alejandra fails to open the safe in every one of her
continuants in which she tried (resolving the indeterminacy of the result she would achieve
by asserting that there is some fact of the matter about what would have happened had she
tried), and this does not seem plausible to me. And again, supposing that facts about what
would have happened could be accounted for somehow, with a slight modification to the
case, (MO) again yields the wrong results. Suppose she tries and miraculously, she succeeds
in opening the safe. But now suppose that if she had tried and failed, a much, much worse
outcome would have prevailed than if she had not tried at all. Given the overwhelming
odds, it would seem she shouldn’t have tried in that situation. Yet, holding fixed what would
have happened if she tried, (MO) would seem to imply that she should have tried. This
again seems like a mistake.
B. Puzzle about how objective probability affects what you can do
Suppose God presents himself to you. He hands you a billion-sided die. After
assuring you that the die is completely fair and that the chance of rolling any particular side
of the die is the same, he makes the following statements:
If you roll a 1 on the die, the world will be made better by 100 intrinsic value points.
If you roll any other number, the world will be made worse by 1000 intrinsic value
points.
If you do not roll the die, nothing will happen.
The question God puts to you is: will you roll the die? It might seem as though you are
morally obligated to do this according to (MO): after all, there is an extension of this world
that seems just as possible as any other, where you roll the die and it lands on 1 — the world
seems to be in some sense perfectly accessible to you. As of the time just before you roll the
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die, there are possible worlds better than those available if you do not roll the die that are
still within your reach according to the laws of nature, and actions that you seem perfectly
free to perform and are capable of performing lead (in some possibilities!) to those worlds.
This die-roll is probabilistic in a way the agent cannot control. As I have argued, this entails
that there are continuants for the agent on which any one of the die faces lands face-up. If
this is so, (MO) yields the unacceptable result that you should roll the die in this case. That
seems clearly wrong to me: with the values and probabilities as they are, you should not roll
the die.
Again, if we suppose that there is some fact of the matter about what would have
happened had you rolled (a supposition I reject), bad results continue to follow from (MO)
along the lines of the pattern that is by now fairly predictable. Let’s change the case slightly:
rolling a 1 is bad, and any other number is good. Suppose you roll a 1 . Alow what would the
correct normative theory say about your obligations? (MO) would presumably imply that it
was wrong to roll. But is that correct? The right answer, as far as I can tell, is that it was
obligatory (or at least permissible) for you to roll in this modified case.
(MO) does not handle cases of objective chance very well. CALI fares no better here
or m the puzzle above: in either case, a version of the puzzle from indeterminate
consequences would seem to apply.
C. Puzzle about how bodily control affects what you can do, redux
Suppose that you were again presented with a die, but that this time, the outcome of
the die roll was not probabilistic in any objective sense, but was directly, deterministically
related to the precise way in which you rolled the die. So, if you were to roll the die in way
A, it would land 1; if you were to roll it in way B, it would land 2, etc. Suppose further that
the difference between A, B and the rest are incredibly minute. For example, suppose that
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the only difference between rolling the die in way A and way B is that the die leaves your
lingers at .01 microns per hour faster under way B than when you roll the die in way A.
Again, God presents you with the option to roll or not to roll, with the same possible
outcomes.
Intuitively, you should not roll. The reason for this is that there is no way you can
control the die with enough accuracv to make it land on the number you are after. And yet,
rolling the die in way A is one of the many ways that you are perfectlv free to roll, and you
are certainly capable of doing so; thus in some sense, a world in which the desired outcome
takes place is available to vou if you do roll the die whereas it is not if you do not.
Suppose you did not roll the die, and just as promised, the status quo was
maintained. Did you do the right thing? World utilitarianism entails that this was the right
thing to do if, and only if, had you rolled the die, a world might have resulted that would not
have been better (only one such world need be your continuant for this to be true). But
here, whether some world in which some good result occurred depends on whether you
could have rolled the die in some particular way. Presumably, the subtle differences between
these ways are so tiny that no agent can plausibly be assumed to have reliable control over
them. If this is so, then as with the basketball shooting case, we find that WU may imply
that you should roll the die. The dilemma regarding the assumption of facts about what
would have happened in chancy situations, or situations involving lack of knowledge or
control, holds for every example considered so far.
The puzzles I have presented raise important questions for CAU and WU. It is not
as though they affect the fringe evaluations of action, that is, those evaluations of action that
deal with bizarre cases and unusual circumstances. Instead, the issues of agent control,
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knowledge and (if our world is indeed objectively probabilistic) probability affect even fairly
usual judgments about moral rightness.
I believe that a good approach to solving these problems is to get clear on the
notions of ‘can’ and accessibility. Though these concepts may be unanalyzablc primitives,
more can be said about their formal characteristics and context-sensitive truth conditions.
In the following chapters, I criticize existing accounts of ‘can’ that have been offered
primarily in the pursuit of a solution to the problem offree-mil. Then, I present my own
account of ‘can’ and options.
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CHAPTER 3
EXISTING ACCOUNTS OF ‘CAN’
Without an account of options, CAU and WU fail to offer convincing evaluations of
several puzzles involving agent alternatives and consequences. Unfortunately, not enough
work has been done to formulate a suitable account of the ‘can’ of agent power. I will here
consider two existing accounts of ‘can’ from the literature on the problem of freedom and
determinism. They are unsuccessful or in need of further refinement. Then I will consider a
pair of accounts of moral rightness and freedom (concepts whose analysis might well give a clue
as to how we should analyze ‘can’) to which 1 have no serious objection except that each
would reqmre a great deal more elaboration in order to be acceptable. In the next chapter, I
will offer my own account that is in essence just such an elaboration and argue that it is well-
suited for my goal of supporting an options-based normative ethical theory.
I. Constraints on a Reasonable Account of ‘Can’
A rough but intuitive account of freedom is that one is free to do something when he does it
and he could have done otherwise. In ethics, particularly in formulations of utilitarianism, the
notion of what an agent ought to do is closely related to his alternatives. A rough but intuitive
account of moral obligation is that one is obliged to do something, M, when nothing else he could have
done would lead to consequences asgood as the consequences to which A. would lead. Many forms of
utilitarianism are extensions and clarifications of this general account of obligation.
The notion of what one could have done otherwise is related to the general notion of
what one can do. For this reason, many philosophers who attempt to address the problem of
freedom and determinism do so by offering an account of ‘can’ and then spelling out the
implications of that account for the truth of incompatibilism or compatibilism. In doing so
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they implicitly and only partially answer the related question of how we can specify and
distinguish the alternatives an agent has in a situation.
It is worth dwelling on what would count as a successful account of ‘can.’ By having a
clear measure for the success of such an account, we can better evaluate the plausibility of
the proposals we will be considering.
First, it would be ideal if an account of ‘can’ could be perfectly general. I take it as a
basic assumption that what possibilities are implicitly included in the scope
1
of any given use
of ‘can’ is in part a matter of context — the scope of a ‘can’-claim is context-dependent. The
scope of a ‘can’-claim is also dependent on the nanire of the claim itself. Claims about legal
options naturallv invoke accessibility relations that differ generally from those invoked by
claims about ethical options. Below I will distinguish between the context of a ‘can’-claim,
which is roughly a set of presupposed propositions, and the kind of ‘can’-claim being made.
Both of these affect the scope of a claim about what a person can do.
Some philosophers have tried to give an account of ‘can’ that would work for a
particular kind of claim and for the various contexts in which that kind of claim is made. So,
for example, both Ayer’s conditional account and Lehrer’s world-theoretic account of ‘can’
are implicitly restricted to moral or more general kinds of responsibility-based situations.
Neither is explicitly an account of what one can do legally speaking, i.e. what one can do in a
situation given the restrictions of the law. It would seem to me, then, that if an account of
‘can’ is to be maximally successful, it should either be general enough to be extended directly
to all of the normal uses of ‘can’ or else it should be clear how one could generalize the
account so that it met this criterion. Though ‘can’-clanns are context-dependent and also
1
I use ‘scope’ here in the following way: The meaning of ‘can,’ as I am using the term, is not context
dependent. Rather, the meaning is fixed, and in a context with a particular accessibility relation for this use of
‘can,’ the scope of ‘can’ is the class of all accessible possible worlds as determined by that accessibility relation
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dependent on their kind, it seems plausible that there is a single meaning of ‘can ’
2
and that the
scope of a ‘can’-claim will depend on these factors in a generally specifiable way. It may turn
out that this assumption is false and that our use of ‘can’ is simply too diverse (even when
restricting our attention to these sorts of modal, agent-possibilitv claims) to be explained by
a single analysis or account. But given the goals of theoretical elegance and simplicity, we
should not give up hope until we either encounter a decisive reason why the project cannot
work or else meet with continued failure in trying to formulate such an account. I will refer
to criticisms of existing accounts of ‘can’ that derive from pointing out that such existing
accounts cannot be generalized as criticisms of inflexibility.
An account of ‘can’ should not only apply naturally to usual ‘can’-claims but should
also yield correct evaluations for unusual claims about agent power. For example, a
successful account of ‘can’ should explain what we mean when we talk about what athletes
can do under adverse conditions and about what one can do when the stakes and risks are
high. It should also extend to cases involving strange but conceivable situations. We should
be able to talk intelligibly about what beings on a different planet could do. Further, I think
we should have an account of ‘can’ that gives natural truth valuations for claims of what
miracle-workers and possible beings who live in worlds with different laws of nature could
do.' It is even possible that non-material beings exist, and it should at least be in principle
possible to speak trulv about what such beings could do. I will say that any account of can
that cannot accommodate these sorts of extensions can be criticized on the basis of non-
accommodation.
2 A single meaning that covers all of the modal uses of ‘can’ that I am concerned with, including the ‘can’ of
general agent possibility and the ‘can’ of agent power in ethical contexts.
3 It may turn out that this is necessary for an account of ‘can,’ for ‘can’-claims are often embedded in
counterfactual claims that would be analyzed in terms of worlds that differ from our own in various ways.
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Finally, and this probably goes without saying, an account of ‘can’ must not be
subject to criticisms that show that the account does not give the right results for intuitively
clear cases. A criticism of this sort I call a simple criticism.
In tins chapter, I will show that noteworthy accounts and analyses of ‘can’ are open
to at least one of the sorts of criticisms I have discussed. Other accounts have been offered
that avoid these sorts of objections and are suggestive of the view 1 will defend in the next
chapter. I evaluate a pair of such accounts and conclude that they are too underdeveloped
to be acceptable. 1 use these partial accounts as an introduction to my own.
II. Conditional accounts of ‘can’
Perhaps the most commonly advanced compatibilist account of ‘can’ is the
conditional account. Roughly, proponents of this sort of account suggest that what one can
do is what one would have done ifone had so chosen. There are two important elements common
to anv usual formulation of a conditional account of ‘can’: (1) ‘can’-claims are analyzed as
counterfactuals of some kind {would, might), and (2) the counterfactual is of a particular sort,
where the successful action (or at least the successful genuine attempt os trying) of the agent is
counterfactually dependent on the agent’s having a particular state of mind described bv use
of an effort verb {tty, choose, will, elect, etc.). Many different accounts can be generated with this
recipe. Here I shall focus on only one such formulation:
(CC) S can doA iff S would doA if S chose to doA
First, I will motivate accounts like (CC) by discussing examples that show that it is a
compatibilist notion of ‘can’ — on this account, people often have more than one option for
action, even supposing that determinism is true. (CC) is appealing because if it were true, it
would go a long way towards putting to rest worries that people might not be responsible for
what they do, given that determinism of some kind seems plausible and indeterminism
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appears to be no better than determinism where freedom is concerned.
4
But I will argue that
(CC) is false for reasons that have been exhaustively discussed in the literature. In terms I
presented above, these criticisms are simple criticisms of (CC). Though I will not argue for it
here, 1 believe that criticisms of (CC) are, with only slight modificadons, criticisms of any
usual conditional account of ‘can’ that has the two elements I listed above (with one possible
class of exceptions that I discuss briefly). I therefore reject the conditional account of ‘can.’
(CC) and formulations like it are compatibilist: (CC) entails that a person might have
several alternatives for action in a given situation even if determinism were true. To see tins,
consider an example of a person considering whether to take a walk in the rain or stay inside
instead. In a deterministic world, the history of the world at any time conjoined with the
laws of nature entail whether the agent in question takes a walk in the rain. Suppose in fact
that it is determined that the agent will take a walk in the rain. Even though it is physically
necessary that the agent will take the walk, (CC) still vields the result that the agent also could
have stayed indoors. Given that the agent had decided to stay indoors, the agent would have
(other things being equal); there is no reason to suppose that had she made this different
choice, something would have prevented her from staving indoors. The reason this is
consistent with determinism is relatively clear: the counterfactual in question is supposing
that a different state of affairs had taken place before the time of the proposed action — in this
instance, the state of affairs of the agent deciding to stay indoors. In that possibility, even
granting determinism, there is nothing that would entail that she would take the walk
(indeed, conditional on this different initial state, determinism might entail that she stay
indoors) because the initial state of affairs would have been different.
4
I believe that many arguments to the effect that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility can be
modified in trivial ways to turn them into ones that would show with equal strength that indeterminism of the
plausible sort is also incompatible with moral responsibility. 1 will not argue this point here.
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Proponents of (CC) also point out that it appears to generate intuitively plausible-
results in the sorts of cases where we commonly hold that people are not free with respect to
their actions. Ayer discusses the case of the person who is psychologically compelled to steal
and who is intuitively not free not to steal (Ayer 1982, 20-22). The problem with the worst
sorts of kleptomaniacs is that even when they decide not to steal, they are powerless in the
face of the compulsion to steal and do so anyway. Similar things may be said of the worst
cases of addiction. A heroin addict may decide repeatedly not to inject himself with heroin,
and yet even after having made the decision, might do so anyway. In these sorts of cases, it
seems plausible to say that the agent is not free with respect to his actions. (CC) yields that
very- result, for in those cases it is not true that if e.g. the heroin addict chose not to shoot up,
that he would not shoot up. (CC) also seems to give the right results in cases involving
external restraint. In Locke’s famous example of the person considering whether to leave a
room that has been locked without his knowledge, we want to say that the person is not free
to leave the room. This is the result (CC) entails, since it is not the case that he would have
left the room had he so chosen.
Unfortunately, though it has these advantages, (CC) is false. To show this, I present
a famous formal argument that has been attributed to Chisholm and refined by Lehrer
(Lehrer 1982, 43). The fundamental intuition behind any argument against (CC) is that the
truth of a particular (CC) -conditional (“Johann would have eaten the beetle if he had so
chosen”) is not sufficient to guarantee the truth of the related ‘can’-claim (“Johann could
have eaten the beetle”) — that is, it seems easy to invent cases where a (CC)-conditional is
true of an agent but it is also clear that the agent cannot perform the action in question. The
3 Of course, there are many degrees of severity of psychological disorder, and many degrees to which one can
be addicted to a drug. To the extent that (CC) is plausible, it would appear to get these sorts of cases right
When an addiction is mild enough that we would say that the agent would not take a drug if he chose not to, it
is also plausible to say that the agent was free not to take the drug, and this is precisely the result (CC) yields
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formula that can be used to generate these counterexamples is: invent a case where though it
is true that the agent would do A if she had chosen, her performing that action is intuitively
impossible!'
The formal argument runs as follows. Suppose it were true, in a case where Maria
did not in fact lift her arm, that
(A) Maria would lift her arm at time t, if she so chose
and also true that
(B) Maria can lift her arm at time t, onlv if she so chose
There is nothing obviously wrong with assuming that these two premises are consistent: the
first is to be read as stating that the act of choosing would, for Maria in this situation, be
causally sufficient for her to lift her arm. The next claim, that Maria’s choice might be
necessary in order for her to have the power to perform this action, though it might seem
somewhat odd (simply because the causal efficacy of the act of choosing itself tends not to
be generally contextually relevant), appears compatible with the first claim. And though the
claim seems initially strange, this appearance can be cleared up by considering that e.g. Maria
might be very insecure, and if she did not actually make the choice she would be unable to go
through with the act. There appears nothing contradictor
}
7 about the conjunction of (A) and
(B).
6 The normal sorts of counterexamples are cases in which it is impossible for the agent to choose to do
something, but where if the agent had so chosen, the agent would have succeeded in her action. However, due
to a point made by Neil Schaefer, it is clear to me that one must be careful here. Consider the following
condition: S can do A only if S can choose to do A. Suppose we were to argue that it is the failure of this
condition that is operative in the counterexamples. This would land us in trouble. The word ‘can’ appears on
both sides of die conditional, and therefore can be expanded without limit as a series of conditions such as, S
can do A iff S can choose to choose to choose to. . . do A. I have no view as to whether this expansion is
vicious, but it is certainly wiser to avoid having to prove that it is not. This can be accomplished by focusing
on examples where intuitively, the agent simply cannot perform the action in question, though it is clear that if
the agent had chosen to perform the action she would have been successful. Nearly evert’ example from
Chisholm and Lehrer fits this latter pattern (cases involving psychological compulsion, addiction and phobia
being just as plausible to me as cases where agents are rendered unable to perform various actions because of
other maladies, such as comas — see Schaefer 1998, 19), without the need for an explicit condition such as the
dangerous one noted above.
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If we grant this, though, then the falsity of (CC) follows almost directly. For
consider that Maria did not actually choose to lift her arm in the case considered - so we
have
(C) Maria does not choose to lift her arm at time t
The conjunction of (B) and (C) entails,
(D) Maria cannot lift her arm at time t
So if we are right about the consistency of (A) and (B), it would seem that (A) & (B) 6c (C) 6c
(D) are consistent: that Maria did not lift her hand (C) is consistent with (A) and (B), and (D)
follows from (B) and (C). But since (CC) conjoined with (A) entails that Maria can lift her
arm, (CC) is not consistent with (A) & (B) 6c (C) 6c (D). Thus, if we accept that there are
possibly cases in which (A), (B), (C) and (D) hold, we must reject (CC), and tins is precisely
what Lehrer does.
Aune has suggested that this sort of formal argument cannot show that (CC) is false
without significant additional support that he believes cannot be found (Aune 1982, 39-41).
He writes,
. . .1 would obviously reject the idea, on which Lehrer’s argument hinges, that ‘S will
do X, if C’ is consistent with ‘S cannot do X, if not-C’ and ‘not-C’. For me, ‘S will
do X, if C’ is supposed to mean ‘S can do X’; and since the special suppositions ‘S
cannot do X, if not-C’ and ‘not-C’ immediately entail ‘S cannot do X’, I would never
grant that ‘S will do X, if C’ is consistent with them (Aune 1982, 40).
The logical point here is simply that anyone who was already convinced of (CC) would take
Lehrer’s argument as a reductio against the consistency of (A) 6c (B) 6c (C) 6c (D). What
Lehrer’s argument needs is support for this consistency claim that is stronger or more
plausible than the intuition that (CC) is true in the first place.
Aune considers three ways of supporting the consistency claim. The first is an
obvious non-starter: that the mere logical consistency of the statement forms used in
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Lehrer’s argument guarantee the consistency of the conjunction. Here, the correct rebuttal
is that the sort of consistency we are interested in is semantic, and that the mere logical
consistency of the statement forms does not guarantee consistency. Aune points out that, if
it did, you could prove a whole host of odd consistency claims, such as, the consistency of
‘X is a male sibling’ and ‘X is not a brother’ (P and ~Q, respectively; Aune 1982, 40).
The second sort of support he considers is that perhaps Lehrer believes that the
statements are intuitively consistent, and that this intuition is stronger than the intuition that
(CC) is true. And again, Aune makes short work of tins suggestion by noting that such an
argument is hopeless, since after all, one would expect precisely these intuitions to be found
in those who already agree with Lehrer’s conclusion, and one would expect to find precisely the
opposite intuitions in those who support (CC).
Thus, if Lehrer is going to support his consistency claim, he had better have a non-
trivial argument for it. Aune believes Lehrer does in fact offer one:
[Lehrer] argues that if [(A)] is a causal conditional, then it is consistent with [(B)] and
[(C)] because ‘it is logically possible that some condition which is a sufficient
condition to cause a person to do something should be a necessary condition of his
being able to do it, and that the condition should fail to occur.’ This argument is
extremely weak because the sort of condition those defending the hypothetical
analysis of ‘could’ actually propose are states of willing, choosing, or undertaking to
do something; and no basis has been established, by Lehrer or anyone else, for
thinking that one may be rendered unable to do other than what one does do by the
mere fact that one does not will, choose, or undertake to do other than what one is
doing (Aune 1982, 40-41).
The simplest reading of Aune’s complaint is as an objection to the plausibility of (B) — why
would the fact that Maria does not choose to lift her hand imply that she cannot? Lehrer has
asserted that it is logically possible that such an entailment exist for a particular agent in a
particular situation — but, this alleged possibility is obscure enough that someone who
supported (CC) might legitimately claim not to see how the alleged possibility is possible at
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all. And if the alleged possibility is impossible, then Lehrer’s argument is unsound, since (A)
& (B) & (C) & (D) are not compatible after all (since (B) is impossible).
I believe that Aune’s formal point is correct. Lehrer’s argument cannot demonstrate
the falsity of (CC) without some substantive support. But 1 believe Aune has
underestimated the wealth of support Lehrer and others have provided for the consistency
claim. This support comes in the form of thought experiments about what we would say in
certain sorts of concrete cases involving agent power.
Lehrer offers the case of the sugar bowl as an example. He writes,
Suppose that [Mary is] offered a bowl of candy and in the bowl are small round red
sugar balls. [Mary does] not choose to take one of the red sugar balls because [she
has] a pathological aversion to such candy. (Perhaps they remind |her| of drops of
blood and. .
.)
It is logically consistent to suppose that if [she] had chosen to take the
red sugar ball, [she] would have taken one, but, not so choosing, [she is] utterly
unable to touch one. [She] can take a red candy ball only if [she] so [chooses], but
[her] pathological aversion being what it is, [she] could not possibly bring [herself] so
to choose. [She] could do it only if [she] chose to, and [she does] not (Lehrer 1982,
44).
This can be read as an attempt to illustrate a situation where (B) is true. Aune’s likely
objection to such a line of reasoning is anticipated by Lehrer:
Aune might reply that it is my pathological state of mind that renders me unable to
perform the acdon, and, therefore, that my choosing to perform the act is not a
necessary condition of my being able to perform it. However, such causal
conditionals always contain an implicit reference to the surrounding circumstances,
and, in the circumstances under consideration, my not choosing to take the candy
ball is a necessary condition of my being unable to take it (Lehrer 1982, 44-45).
Aune’s objection focuses on the strangeness of (B), the claim that Maria could have
performed the action only if she had so chosen. Why, one might ask, couldn’t some other
conditions have been sufficient for Maria to have the relevant powers, rather than her
choosing? For example, what if she had suddenly and inexplicably lost her fear of bloodr Is
it not true of Maria that she could have performed the action if she had lost her fear of
blood, even if she had not chosen to take a sugar ball?
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Lehrer’s response is subtle and, I think, sufficient to answer this objection. His point
is not that in every situation, or that even in normal situations, conditionals like (B) are true of
agents and their options. Rather, Ins point is that it is logically possible that such a
conditional be true of an agent. His examples are attempts to flesh out that possibility claim.
The possibility claim Lehrer wishes to defend is:
(LP) it is broadly logically possible that: (A), and only if Maria chooses, then it is power-
relatively-possible that Maria lift her arm and take a sugar ball
Lehrer’s point about the “surrounding conditions” is, I believe, a point about the inner
possibility statement here. In the context of evaluating Maria’s actions, it may be relevant to
Maria’s power to act that she has certain fears and certain character traits. The fact that, in
some sense of “possible,” it is possible for her to lose those fears is irrelevant here because
those possibilities are ruled-out by the power evaluation context of the original ‘can’-claim —
it is of moral note that she has these fears because they render certain of her prima facie
options impossible in the sense relevant to this context ofevaluating Maria's power. If Lehrer is right,
Aune’s point that there is some sense of “possible” on which Maria could perform the
action even if she did not actually will to do it is moot. For though this may be true for some
sense of “possible,” it is not true for the sense relevant to this particular moral decision (after
all, she can't lose her fear of blood, can’t choose to take a sugar ball and hence can’t take a
sugar ball, in the relevant sense of ‘can’).
The plausibility of the defense of this intuition is proportional to the plausibility of
the examples Lehrer and others have provided. And since 1 agree that if Maria’s fears or
character traits are sufficiently pathological, we might indeed say that she could only perform
7 Lehrer refers to “logical possibility,” but the sort of possibility’ in question here is something more like agent
possibility. That is, it is possible in a sense that we arrive at after holding fixed certain features of the sort of
world we live in, and holding fixed certain facts about human beings (such as the sort of psychology and
abilities we have).
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the suggested action if she chose to do so, I tend to think that Lehrer’s examples do support
the formal argument. Thus, though I find Aune’s objection very instructive, I must
conclude it is unsuccessful.
Another line of objection open to Aune is that Lehrer is committing the fallacy of
equivocation in his uses of “can” or “choose” (Aune 1970, 78-79). He might argue that the
sense of “choose” in which I do not choose to take a sugar ball is not the same sense of
“choose” that would correctly describe the condition necessary for me to have the power to
take the sugar ball (the sense of “can” in statements (A) and (B) are not the same). Or, he
might say instead that the sense of “could” under consideration in Lehrer’s claim that the
agent is “unable” to take a sugar ball is not the sense that is relevant for the question of
agent responsibility and power — that is, the sense relevant in an analysis like (CC).
I, however, find the example compelling, and do not believe that there is any
equivocation that reduces the power of the argument. It seems to me that an agent might (a)
be unable to do something, in the sense relevant to agent power, and (b) be such that only
the psychological effect of choosing that action herself would give the agent the power to
perform the act in question (other imagined changes to the agent being either choice-
enabling, or otherwise, agency-destroying), and (c) not have performed the act in question.
Examples like these from Chisholm and Lehrer adopt the well-known formula of presenting
cases where an agent cannot choose something, but would do that thing it she did so
choose. These cases have always seemed convincing to me, since intuitively an agent is not
free if she is not free to choosef The cases also support Lehrer’s formal argument, and
demonstrate that (CC) is false.
8 And though I will not argue it here, I believe there is a way to state this point that does not run afoul of
Schaefer’s technical objection presented in an earlier footnote.
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Though I think the arguments given show (CC) is false, it is still worth pointing out
that (CC) cannot easily be crafted into a general account of ‘can.’ For this reason, I would
criticize the conditional account of ‘can’ as being inflexible. The easiest way to see this
inflexibility is by way of an examination of how counterfactuals like (CC) vary according to
context and according to the nature of the claim being made. Suppose, for example, that
millions of lives would be lost if Theresa acceded to the demands of a man with a gun to her
head by pulling a particular lever. Consider this ‘can’-claim about Theresa:
(Cl) Theresa could have ignored the gunman’s demand to pull the lever
Though 1 am not sure what we should say in this kind of case, my temptation is to say that
(Cl) is true. However, if we van- the context wildly, and consider a case where the same
claim is made, but the only thing that would happen if the lever were pulled would be that
some whipped cream would be provided to the gunman, my temptation changes. In this
new example, I would say that (Cl) is false. Sometimes, people cannot resist life-threatening
coercion when nothing is on the line. This poses a problem for (CC) as an interpretation of
the ‘can’ involved here. The reason for this is that (CC)-like claims do not appear to vary
with context in the same way that generic ‘can’-claims do. For the counterfactual involved in
(CC), a pretty narrow range of contextual facts make a difference for how we order the
worlds and determine the truth-value of the claim. When making a claim about what would
happen if an agent chose to do something, it seems obvious that factors such as external
impediment and the presence of factors that would make an accident more likely could make
a difference. Also, facts about the mental constitution of the agent could make a difference:
is the agent the victim of a pathological psychological condition related to the action? Is the
agent the victim of an addiction related to the action? Generally, conditions that affect the
connection between the agent’s will and his successful carrying out of his will will be relevant to
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counterfactuals like (CC). But other conditions that intuitively affect the disposition of a
‘can’-claim, such as what is at stake or certain pieces of knowledge the agent may not have,
or whether the claim is aimed at determining the moral responsibility of an agent, do not
appear to affect the evaluation of (CC)-like claims." Therefore, I think that (CC)-like claims
all suffer from a land of inflexibility that makes them unsuitable as analyses of ‘can’-claims.
These claims are not sensitive to all of the kinds of factors to which ‘can’-claims are
sensitive. Part of the problem stems from the fact that the antecedent of the counterfactual
strongly influences the counterfactual’s world-ordering, narrowly circumscribing the sorts of
considerations that could affect its truth-value.
A related problem is that (CC)-like conditionals only have a hope of analyzing one of
two important categories of ‘can’-claims and no hope of analyzing the other. What I have in
mind is that there are restrictive and non-restrictive uses of ‘can.’ For example, when 1 am
discussing the ‘can’ of agent power as it is used in contexts involving moral responsibility, I
am thinking of claims like the following:
(CL1) Tony can resist the temptation to punch Joey in the face
In this usage, the power-‘can’ has a moral flavor because the context and nature of the claim
are ethical — the sorts of things that make this claim true are facts that are relevant for
evaluating an agent’s control over his actions, and facts that are relevant in determining the
agent’s psychological state and abilities. It is true, in this sense, that:
(CL2) Tony can punch joey in the face
Obviously, he is tempted. He need but let his inhibitions and worries about what’s best go,
and undoubtedly, joey will be less likely to make a joke about Tony’s mom again. This sense
of ‘can’ I am calling non-restrictive for reasons that will be obvious in a moment.
' Lewis makes part of this point in Lewis 1983b, where he discusses at length just how sensitive ‘can’-claims are
to context shifts.
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But there is another category of ‘can’-claim that we might call a moral ‘can. ’ When
people use ‘can’ in this sense, CL2 is false and:
(CL3) Tony cannot punch Joey in the face
is true. In fact:
(CL4) Tony must resist the urge to punch Joey in the face
is true as well. Roughly, these claims say that the only actions accessible to Tony are the
ones where he does what’s right. This sort of ‘can’-claim is not equivalent to any power-‘can’
claim. The restrictive ‘can’-claim is just as natural as the non-restrictive variety. However, I do
not see how (CC) could possibly provide an analysis of the restrictive ‘can’-claims.
Consider a legally restrictive claim like:
(CL5) Tony cannot wait until July to pay his Federal taxes
The only actions legally available to Tony are ones where he pays on time. In this sort of
restrictive legal claim, what is relevant is how Tony’s actions fare when judged by their
conformance to a legal standard. (CC)-hke claims cannot capture this sort of conformance
condition because the antecedent of those counterfactuals specifies that the conformance
standard for (CC)-like claims is that the agent’s activated effort would result in an action — that
is, the actions are judged as available by the loose, non-restrictive standard of whether the
agent’s psychology and situation are such that his will can be effective. This standard for
evaluating what possibilities are accessible to the agent does not seem well-suited for use in
an account of restrictive ‘can’-claims. (CC) is not flexible enough to yield a general account
of ‘can.’
And yet, after all this, I must admit there is a ray of hope for those who would offer
a conditional account of ‘can’ that is not inflexible and not vulnerable to Chisholm’s
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objections, though I cannot myself see how to complete such an account. I digress briefly to
elaborate on what 1 have in mind.
I accept a contextuahst account of counterfactuals, and so there is a degree to which
an account like (CC) could be flexible in the same way any other account of ‘can’ would have
to be: the truth of a (CC) -conditional would depend on assumptions and facts that arc
presupposed by the use of such a conditional. Perhaps, too, the kind of (CC)-conditional
being considered could introduce the same semantic influence on the world ordering as the
kind of ‘can’-claim introduces to the semantics determining the scope of those claims. In
fact, one might start to wonder whether (CC) could in the end be defended by someone who
took my own analysis of the truth-conditions of ‘can’-claims in the next two chapters, and
claimed that this was the semantics behind the use of the (CC)-conditionals. One might
imagine offering an account by completing the following schema:
(CC*) S can do A iff something-
1
would be the case if something-2
Perhaps an account of ‘can’ based on this schema could be successful precisely because the
scope and ordering of the relevant counterfactual is sensitive to context and the kind of
claim being made.
Let’s work backwards for a moment: suppose my dissertation is successful, and I
correctly identify the truth-conditions for the use of ‘can’-claims in moral contexts. These
considerations are (or determine the reading of) something- 1
.
Then, what you can do is
dependent on the connection between something- / and something-2, and this is in part a matter
of context. So if we can identify something-2 in such a way that were it true, we would
intuitively judge someone as being free, (CC*) might be made to work after all. Perhaps, too,
the different sorts of ‘can,’ such as the legal or etiquettical sorts, could be ones in which the
somethings were varied in the appropriate ways. This account could accommodate the
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intuition that ‘can’-claims have a strength index, like belief claims do, so that it is not simply
the case that S can do A., but rather, that S can-to-degree-n do A. The ordering of the possible
worlds in the counterfactual analysis might yield just such a result.
An example is called for here. Consider the following account:
(CC’) S can doA iff: if the world slightly favored A, then it would be physically possible
for S to do A
It is possible for us now to take full advantage of the truth-conditions of ‘can’ 1 will offer
later in fleshing out this notion of slight favoring. We can say that a world slightly favors an act
A, relative to actuality, when that world has slighdy different laws of nature or a slightly
different past, such that the performance of A by S in that world is rendered easier. The
performance of A by S in a world w is easier than the same performance in a different world,
when in w, there are fewer obstacles, impediments, or preventative features than in the other
world. The degree to which we are allowed to vary the laws and the past is sensitive to the
same considerations that are relevant to ‘can’-claims in my own analysis. Thus the notion of
a slight favoring is vague and sensitive to context and the nature of the claim being made. For
example, in contexts involving very high stakes, worlds are allowed to favor an action only
slightly more than actuality. Or, in cases involving irresistible psychological compulsion,
worlds are again restricted in the extent to which they are permitted to favor actions
prevented by the agent’s pathological dispositions.
One nice feature of (CC’) is that it subsumes the correct results of the original (CC): that
the agent would choose to do the action in question (where actually he did not) is one way
for a world to slightly favor performing that action. Also, performing an action entails that it is
physically possible to perform it. It seems to me that this implies that every case for which
(CC) yields the correct result, (CC’) will also yield the correct result. Note that this does not
entail the (CC’) subsumes the incorrect results of (CC): the mere fact that choosing can be a
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way for a world to slightly favor the chosen action does not mean that choosing is necessary
for that world to slightly favor the chosen action (though it is sufficient).
(CC’) is not equivalent to a possibility analysis of ‘can’ of the sort Lehrer and I offer.
On (CC’), the truth of the counterfactual hinges on the closest mrld(s) meeting the condition
stated, while in a possibility analysis, no world ordering is imposed, and the presence of a
suitable world (or set of worlds) anywhere in the relevant accessibility relation will make the
‘can’-claim true. It is possible to use accounts like (CC’) to generate relative possibility claims
,
such as clamis about degrees of agent power that are based on the ordering of the worlds
imposed by (CC’), while it is not obvious how a simple possibility analysis would yield
similar results.
(CC’), though vague, seems to give some of the same good results as (CC) in cases of
psychological compulsion and addiction and is a compatibilist notion of ‘can.’ The degree to
which a person is addicted to a drug changes the degree to which you would have to change
a nearby world to make it possible for an addicted agent to not use the drug on a given
occasion. If the case and context rule out the degree of change that would be necessary to
free the agent of his addiction, then the closest world that slighdy favored the agent not
taking the drug would be a world where the agent took the drug anyway. In that case, the
agent cannot refrain from taking the drug. And this same sort of reasoning applies to Maria
and the sugar balls without modification — this case is now subsumed under the general case
of psychological compulsion and addiction. The reason (CC) could not subsume the wide
range of these sorts of cases was because of its strong dependence in the counterfactual
specifically on the agent’s choosing (or willing, or trying). In some ways, (CC’) is a better
account than (CC).
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But (CC’) is still very problematic and the details of its formulation are in need of
much more elaboration than I have given. First, (CC’) is still so vague as to be empty: just
about any (CC’) claim has a chance of being true when the notion of slight favoring is left so
loose. (CC’) then runs the risk of being trivial, and therefore of not being capable of
analyzing false ‘can’-claims. But there are some deeper problems as well. On (CC’), a world
need only be actually physically possible in order for the relevant ‘can’-claim to be true. But
this immediately results in the conclusion that agents can bring about accidents that are not
intuitively in their power to bring about. For example, the fact that it is physically possible
that a coin lands heads in a given flip would entail that the agent had the power toflip the coin so
it lands heads-up. But this seems to be false. It also entails that the agent in the safe-case from
chapter 2 (Alejandra) can open the safe, when intuitively she cannot. It is also not clear to
me that (CC’) escapes the inflexibility problem of failing to analvze restrictive ‘can’-claims.
Thus I will end my digression with a few notes. (CC’), or some conditional analysis
that is more explicitly based on a treatment of the context and nature of the relevant ‘can’-
claims does not seem to me to be out of the question. However, there are some serious
challenges that would have to be met. Can an antecedent be found that is sufficiently well-
defined to avoid triviality, but general enough to allow the flexibility of a possibility account
of ‘can’? Can such an account offer a treatment of legal, restrictive ‘can’-claims?
My primary goal was to show that (CC) is not a plausible account of ‘can.' My case
against (CC) rests primarily on the formal argument and the recipe for counterexamples
most clearly articulated by Chisholm.
III. Lehrer’s account of ‘can’
Another approach to formulating an account of ‘can’ makes use of the notion of
accessible possible worlds. Roughly, an agent can do what he docs in those worlds still
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accessible to him. Lehrer offers a novel account of ‘can’ along these lines and discusses
variations that are worth review. I will argue that Lehrer’s analyses of variant accounts of
‘can’ are flawed and that his own final account is vulnerable to serious objections. 1 spend
extra space reviewing Lehrer’s proposals because his mistakes are instructive, and lessons
learned here will be reviewed in my own account of ‘can.’
After criticizing conditional accounts, Lehrer considers an interesting suggestion
(one that bears some resemblance to a proposal offered by Austin 1979, 180): that what one
can do in a situation is whatever is not blocked by lack of necessary conditions:
(LI) S could have done Al at tn only if no necessary condition for S doing s\ at tn was
lacking (Lehrer 1976, 253)
Lehrer claims that this formulation is incorrect because it is overly restrictive. He writes:
. . .imagine that I leave the fingers of my left hand relaxed at t,r From the simple fact that
I do this, it would be peculiar to suppose that 1 could not have clenched my fingers into
a fist instead. Yet, there is a certain muscle in my arm, flexor digitorum profundus to be
precise, that must be flexed for my hand to be so clenched, and that muscle is, in fact,
unflexed. The flexing of that muscle is a necessary condition of my clenching my fingers
into a fist, and that condition is unfulfilled. Hence, according to the proposal it would
follow that I could not have clenched my fist because a necessary condition was lacking
(Lehrer 1976, 253).
It is not possible to fairly evaluate Lehrer’s criticism without first addressing an unusual
omission in Lehrer’s (LI). Lehrer points out earlier in his essay that power-‘can’ clams are
double time-indexed: when one makes a claim about what a person can do, there are two
time references implicit in the claim. The first time index is a pointer to the time as ofwhen
the agent is claimed to have the requisitepower or abilities and the second index is to the time when the
act in question would beperformed (Lehrer 1976, 242-243). “S can do A” must be explicidy
formulated as “S can, as of tl, do A at t2” in order to be adequately precise. In (LI),
however, there is an important ambiguity that Lehrer does not clear up. Should (LI) be
formulated as:
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have doneM at /„ only if no necessary' condition for S
doing A. at tu was lacking at t1
or:
(LI”) S could, as of tH, have done A at t„ only if no necessary condition for S doingA
at t„ was lacking at
(LI ”) appears to be completely vacuous: of course you cannot, as of the very time of action,
perform an action at that time when a necessary condition for doing so is at the very time of
action not present. However, (LL) also seems invulnerable to Lehrer’s criticism. If, by the time
shortly before one is to clench one’s fist, one does not have flexor digitorum profundus flexed,
and having this muscle flexed at that time is necessary for clenching one’s fist by tn, then as of
that time, it is no longerpossible to have one's hand clenched by tj
1
Both (1.1’) and (LI”) seem
unworthy targets for Lehrer’s criticisms, so I am left with a puzzle.
Lehrer’s additional remarks shed some light on how we should interpret his
objection:
Some necessary condition is lacking for any action, or even any attempt to act, when that
action does not in fact occur. Moreover, if we suppose that there is always some
antecedent condition that determines what occurs and what does not occur, then we also
obtain the conclusion that whenever a person does not perform an action, then some
antecedent necessary7 condition for performing the action is lacking. The antecedent
condition determining that the action does not occur is sufficient for the nonoccurrence
of the action. Therefore, the nonoccurrence of the antecedent condition is a necessary
condition for the occurrence of the action. The crux of the foregoing is that when we
say that a person could have done something he did not do, we should not, and I believe
do not, thereby affirm that every antecedent necessary7 condition for his performing the
action is fulfilled.
12
10 These seem the most likely candidates, but there are others, as well.
11 Lehrer 1976. Lehrer’s remarks on 243 and in an insertion on 270 assure us that ‘can’ and ‘could have’ claims
are different only in the pastness of the time index of the action, here t„.
12 Lehrer 1976, 253. I believe any initial plausibility of the first sentence evaporates when you consider actions
that could be performed in many different ways. Failures involve the absence of sufficient conditions, surely. It
is much more controversial to conclude that the conjunction of all of the necessary conditions for an action are
sufficient for the action. This issue throws us into deep complications because different conditions for
performing an action become necessary at different times. It may be true that as of the time of the action, the
dungs necessary then for performing the action then are sufficient for performing the action (perhaps). It does
not follow, though, that at some time before the action, the things necessary then for performing the action later
are sufficient for the action occurring later. For example, as of a minute before clenching my fist, there are
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These remarks suggest that Lehrer’s point is a logical one about determinism: in a
deterministic world, there is always a sufficient condition for what happens, and it is necessary
that that condition not occur (that it be lacking) in order for something else to happen instead.
Therefore, if determinism is true, then either (LI) is true and no one can do anything other
than what he actually does (because he lacks a necessary condition for doing any of these
other things, and (LI) is true), or (LI) is false because it implies that no one can do anything
other than what he actually does. Lehrer argues for a compatibilist account of ‘can’ and so it
is appropriate that he opts for the latter and rejects (LI) (though it is worth pointing out that
Lehrer does not offer the incompatibilist any reason to believe that he is right to proceed as
he does).
If this is the correct interpretation of Lehrer’s remarks, then it does not matter
whether he meant (LL) or (LI”), and his explanation of the hand-flexing case may have been
somewhat misleading. The point is not one having to do with the connection between a
particular flexing and a particular action, either in time or as a constitutive action. Rather,
the point is that in a deterministic world, the initial state of the world conjoined with the
laws of nature are the sufficient and necessary conditions for everything that happens, and
the sufficient and necessary conditions for the fact that what does not happen, does not
happen.
Clearly an incompatibilist would find Lehrer’s rejection of (LI) problematic;
arguably, Lehrer simply is not addressing incompatibilist concerns in his paper, and so tins
does not matter. But I think that Lehrer’s reasons for rejecting (LI) in any form are
conditions necessary then for my clenching my fist a minute later. But clearly these conditions, even if all of
them are met, are not sufficient for my clenching my fist later (and I think only hard facts can count as genuine
conditions for action in the sense relevant here).
100
contentious not only to an incompatibilist but also to a compatibilist. A contextualist
compatibilist may justly ask: in (LI), just what sort of necessity is intended in the phrase “no
necessary condition”? If Lehrer means physical necessity
1
' here, then the contextualist might
indeed reject (LI), but opt for a variation of (LI) that involved whatever sort of necessity7 is
relevantfor 'can -claims in the appropriate context
,
which the compatibilist would argue is not a sort
of necessity that is equivalent to physical necessity7 . Then, the compatibilist might say
something very natural, namely, that (LI) (in this modified form) is in fact true and a form of
(LI) that involved physical necessity7 is simply irrelevant to many ‘can’-claims, such as those
involved in claims about agent power, responsibility7 or moral rightness. In one sense,
Lehrer might be right in his reasons for rejecting (LI), but that sense is rather trivial and of
interest neither to incompatibilists nor to compatibilists.
Lehrer and I agree though that (LI), in any form, cannot be a satisfactory7 analysis of
the ‘can’ of agent power. My reason for thinking this is quite different from Lehrer’s. It
seems to me that (LI) cannot be an analysis of the ‘can’ of agent power simply because it is
not an analysis at all — it is merely the specification of the necessary conditions for the truth of
statements like “S can do A at t.” Further, I would claim that this particular specification of
the necessary conditions is empty of any interesting content; the formulation of (LI) is
uninteresting because it merely states that it is a necessary condition of “S can as of tl do A
at t2” that no necessary condition for the truth of a statement like “S does A at t2” is lacking.
This appears to be a platitude.
14 What we really want to know is, what does it take to have
the power to do something, i.e. what are the sufficient conditions for ‘can’-claims? (We also
13 II is also possible he meant logical necessity, but it would be very hard to justify the claim that LI would be
false under that reading.
14Actually, if you play with the many different combinations of time-indices you could assign to precisificarions
of the LI principle, you can generate some platitudes as well as some obviously false versions of the principle.
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want to know: what exactly do we lack when we “lack the conditions necessary to do action
A”? And, what sense of necessary is relevant to ‘can’-claims?)
The next candidate account Lehrer considers, however, is neither trivial nor
uninteresting. He proceeds with his account in a way similar to Lewis in “Elusive
Knowledge” (Lewis 1999c). Consider an agent as of tl: for tins agent, there are infinitely
many possible worlds where he is acting at some later time, t2. This first-cut set of possible
worlds (really, the first-cut set of centered possible worlds) is the combinatorially-legal set of
worlds restricted, arguably, only by facts about the agent’s past and the past of his world.
That is, it is the set of all the logically possible futures for this agent as of tl. Clearly, such a
set is not the appropriate set ofpossible alternatives for our agent — in some worlds in this first-
cut set, the agent recreates the universe in his own image, literally: he makes ever}7 human
being look just like him. In other first-cut worlds, all existing matter turns into
undifferentiable gunk in the year 2008 A.D. And so on. So the question Lehrer poses is:
what are the criteria for limiting the alternative set to the possible worlds that are legitimate
continuations for our agent? This may yield an account of our agent’s alternatives.
The limiting conditions Lehrer lists are:
(1) the worlds accessible to the agent have the same laws of nature as the actual
world”
(2) the worlds accessible to the agent are minimally different from the actual world
(3) the worlds accessible to the agent have no differences whatsoever that bestow an
advantage to the agent forperforming the relevant act, where this advantage is one the agent
actually lacks (Lehrer 1976, 254)
The idea behind (1) seems to be the intuitive one: that worlds having different laws from
ours are not ones that seem legitimate as ones the agent could bring about.
11
(2) is meant to
13 Better would be: the worlds accessible to the agent have the same laws of nature as the agent’s world. We
do, after all, make ‘can’-claims about possible agents, and counterfactual ‘can’-claims about actual agents.
16 This point may be intuitive, but I believe it to be false or at best misleading. Lehrer does not offer much
discussion of this controversial point; see Lewis 1981. The point should not be ignored because the question
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rule out worlds that differ dramatically from the actual world — presumably, worlds with very
different pasts would be examples of worlds with a kind of difference from actuality that
would be gratuitous and would therefore disqualify those worlds from the final alternative
set. (It is not at all clear that a world with a minimally different present, such as an agent
acting slightly differently, would have anvthing that could count as a minimally different past if
the world had the same laws ofnature as the actual world)
The third condition is quite novel. Lehrer writes:
I f, for example, 1 am chained to a wall from which 1 am anxious to move, but do not
because I am chained, we can find a possible world with the same laws, minimally
changed to accommodate my moving from the room, namely, a possible world in which
I am not chained. But it hardly follows that 1 could have moved from the room in the
actual world. In the possible world I have an advantage I lack in the actual world, to wit,
of being unchained. That possible world is not accessible to me (Lehrer 1976, 254).
The motivation behind this third condition is to avoid counting among the agent’s genuine
alternatives worlds where the agent does things that are possible only because of a difference
that is minimal but nonetheless illegitimate. Lehrer’s account then depends on a fairly
surprising identification: the illegitimate differences, after application of the first two
conditions, are precisely those where the agent has some advantage he would not otherwise
have had.
Lehrer’s first official formulation of the theory is:
(L2) ‘S could (at t) have doneA at tf is true in IF if and only if there is a possible world
w having the same laws as the actual world If and only minimally different from If so
that ‘
S
does A at tf is true in w in such a way that S has no advantage at /, for doingA at
tu in w that he lacks in If
7
,
and tn is past in W
of whether the laws of nature are always a part of the context of ‘can’-claims of various kinds is at the heart of
the question of whether any compatibilist account of freedom is true, I believe.
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This account of ‘can’ is supposed to get around Lehrer’s initial objection in his case of
leaving the room though chained. In that case, he claims that (1,2) correctly implies that it is
not true that the agent could have left the room, because doing so would require moving to a
world (given that the world is already restricted by having the same laws as ours and being
minimally different from the actual world) where he had an advantage, i.e. that of being
unchained.
1
Lehrer is quick to point out that this account falls to a fairly simple objection. He
considers a case where I have promised to repay a loan at a particular bank on Friday
between 1:00pm and 2:00pm. On Thursday I was in town, near enough to the bank to get
there by Friday, with the money I needed to pay back the loan. Unfortunately, early Friday
morning a tornado swept into town and demolished the bank where I promised to repay the
loan. Lehrer believes that in this case, it is not true that as of Thursday I could have repaid
the loan as promised. However, (L2) implies that I could have done so: there is a world,
minimally different from the actual world, where I repaid the loan as promised, with no
advantage as of Thursday to my domg so — namely, a world in which the tornado took a
slightly different course on Friday morning and narrowly missed the bank. The apparent
problem with (L2), writes Lehrer, is that the advantages restriction, condition (3),
. . .is too weak because the possible worlds in which L does A at /„ may all be ones
which bestow some advantage upon S at some time subsequent to /, which he lacks
at that time in the actual world. On the other hand, if we required instead that S
have no advantages at any time up to tn for doing A at /, in a possible world
17 To some extent I am merely playing along here because I find all of this highly contentious. For example,
why is it that the only world Lehrer considers where I make it out of my bonds is one in which I am not
chamed at all? What about a world in which by a fluke, when I test my bonds, they shatter because of a freak
natural phenomenon? Is this a world m which I have an advantage I don’t have in the actual world? I just do
not know what Lehrer would say about this case. Clearly we want to say that it is not the case that the agent
could have left the room though chained, even if his leaving was enabled by a freak accident of nature occurring
right at the time of action. What is very unclear is whether we have any way of deciding whether such
accidents of nature are advantages. We often succeed, or fail, at things that we can do only because of just such
accidents of nature; thus it would seem Lehrer must classify some such accidents as advantages, and others not.
But how?
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accessible to him which he lacks at those times in the actual world, the restriction
would be too strong. For some advantages a person acquires subsequent to /, may be
a consequence of what he does from /, to tn (Lehrer 1976, 256).
To work around this perceived problem, Lehrer adopts as his final analysis of ‘can’ a subtler
version of (L2):
(L2’):
(1) ‘S could (at /,) have done A at t’ is true in the actual world IF7 if and only if there
is a possible world u> having the same laws as IF7 and minimally different from W
so that ‘S doesA at is true in u> in such a way that any advantage S has in w for
doingA at /„ which he lacks in W is admissible for S from IF7 and tn is past.
(2) An advantage S lacks in IF’ is admissible for S from If” if and only if either (a)
the advantage results from S doing something B at t
j (/,
— I — Q when he has no
additional advantage for doing B at /• in w which he lacks in W or (b) the
advantage results from S doing something C at tk (/, < tk < /J when S has no
additional advantages for doing C at tk in n> which he lacks in IF7 except those
advantages admissible to S from W resulting from what 5 does prior to tk
(Lehrer 1976, 257).
(L2’) is even more complicated than it might look at first glance, because in the conditions
for admissibility in (2), the notion of admissibility is mentioned in (Id). But this is no
philosophical fauxpax. Lehrer intends the account to be recursive. The time element in (b) in
effect allows that admissible advantages may arise from earlier advantages admissible because
they arose out of what the agent had done between the time of power
1
and the time of
action. Lehrer writes,
Thus our analysis is recursive over times. A scenario satisfies the restriction
concerning advantages only if what the person does at t
:
to obtain advantages for
doingA at tn does not require any additional advantages at 6 which he lacks in the
actual world, and what he does at the next moment, /,+ 1 to obtain advantages tor
doingA at does not require any additional advantages at /,+ 1 except those resulting
from what he does at t„ and so forth (Lehrer 1976, 258).
Lehrer intends for the admissibility condition to allow just the right sorts of
advantages to affect the set of worlds that is accessible to the agent. His condition at its
18 Please note that I am using the expression “time of power” here and below as a technical expression. The
“time of power” of the action is the first of the two time indexes listed: it is the time as of which the agent is
said to have the power to do the action in question. The second time index is the “time of action.”
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simplest allows just those advantages that arise between the time of power and the time of
action that are the result of the agent’s own behavior. The recursion clause ensures that this
behavior be admissible, in the sense that behaving this way does not require any additional
advantages, except those that arose from the agent’s own behavior. And so on.
The new account avoids the bank destruction counter-example, claims Lehrer. You
cannot make your payment at the bank as promised, and (1-2’) has this implication since
(L2’) prohibits the non-admissible advantage of the tornado taking a different route at am
time between the time of power and the time of action. This advantage is inadmissible since
it does not result from anything you did. (L2’) is the account Lehrer argues is the correct
account of ‘can.’
Lehrer’s analyses of (L2) and (L2’) are flawed, and (L2’) is not the correct account of
‘can.’ I begin my discussion by noting that (L2) is not flawed for the reason Lehrer gives.
Though it does seem natural to say that as of the time of power, the agent could not have
paid as promised, I think that this is stncdy speaking false. I am responsible for providing
an explanation of why this is false and why it seemed natural m the first place. 1 must also
provide an account of why even though the agent could have paid as of the time of power,
he is not morally wrong for not paying the money when the time comes to do so.
As of the time of power, I claim the agent in question can still pay at the bank as
promised. Lehrer’s story is that the event that happens between the time of power and the
time of action is a tornado whose course changed during the time between the ascription of
power and the action itself. Whether determinism is true at this world is not relevant (and
my arguments later in discussions of my account of ‘can’ and its implications will bear on
this) since Lehrer and I do agree on our compatibilism of ‘can’ and determinism. He
suggests that the agent cannot at the time of power repay as promised because the tornado
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actually rips the bank apart. Why does this seem plausible? The most obvious answer relies
on a principle that suggests that anything that actually happens that the agent cannot prevent
is true in every world accessible to the agent. This principle places a substantial and
unwarranted emphasis on actuality in the evaluation of what an agent can do. There is a
general question about context at issue here: when we are evaluating the question of whether
an agent can do something, what facts about the future should be heldfixed, that is, taken as
part of the background assumptions in the evaluation? I think that some facts about the
actual future are relevant, and some are not. It is difficult to see how to hold a compatibilist
view at all, in fact, if you hold that all future facts not in your control are held fixed in every
possibility accessible to you — the laws of nature and just about every microphysical fact
about your world would then have to be held fixed. So, if some actual future facts are not
relevant to the context, then in that context, it may be that some worlds that make up the
options of the agent are ones where the parts of the future the agent cannot control do differ.
Consider a case where an Olympic athlete is about to attempt a high-jump that he
usually has no problems with. One minute before he jumps, someone in a particular context
notes, “he can make this jump.” Let us suppose that he is right. Now, in the minute leading
up to the jump, a series of events takes place — the wind direction shifts slightly, the humidity
of the air increases a bit, the ground gets slightly cooler, and so on. Let us further suppose
that none of these events individually would have led to the jump being missed, but together
they cause the jumper to fail to achieve the height he needs to make it. Now that the jump
has failed, was itfalse (holding the double time-indexes of the original claim fixed, remember)
that (in the context of the original statement!) “he can make this jump”? 1 say that the
answer is “no.” Is it now false that (in the context of the original statement!) “he [could have
made] this jump”? Again, I say that the answer is “no.” He could, at the time of power,
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have made the jump, regardless of the time at which we evaluate that claim. This case is
analogous to the bank payment case in the details relevant to the evaluation of the ‘can’
claims involved.
Please note that I have intentionally closed-off a slippery way out of this analogy. In
a similar case to the one described above, the agent unwisely drank a fifth of vodka in the
minute leading up to his jump, thereby ruining his chances to make the jump (where here his
chances were ruined because of something that was under his control). Here it would be
justified to point out that the difference between the high-jump case and the bank
destruction case is that in the high-jump case there were no events out of the agent's control that
led to his failing the high-jump, and that only because these factors were in the agent’s
control could he really still have made the jump. This would be an important disanalogy
with the bank case, where I am claiming he could still have made the payment and where the
factors that rendered him incapable of making that payment at a later time were not in his
control. But in my particular description of the high-jump case, the jumper’s failure was
caused by several factors that were not, individually or jointly, under the jumper’s control.
And when the case is put this way, it is very difficult to try to then insist that then he really
could not have made the jump. For nearly every failed jump, for nearly every failed attempt at
anything that we try wholeheartedly to do, is in fact caused by a series of small events that are
neither individually nor collectively in the agent’s control. For example, no one can control
his hand so well that he will make his next shot at darts, even when it is the case that he can
make his next shot. To claim that in every such failed attempt the actor could not have succeeded
is to misunderstand ordinary ‘can’-claims. I believe the case of making payment at the bank
is analogous to the fust high-jump case.
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To be clear, I am rejecting the claim that all facts about the actual world and its
future over which the agent has no control are always held fixed and are always relevant to
the evaluation of ‘can’-claims about that agent. 1 am specifically not making the stronger
claim that facts about the actual future never affect the evaluation of ‘can’-claims. 1 am also
not making any sort of claim about which kinds of facts about the future do, and which do
not, affect the evaluation of ‘can’-claims. One can come up with many examples of both
sorts of cases. In cases of ordinary, temporary, or ‘trivial’ failures, such as the those of the
high-jumper above, the failures will tvpically be the result of a combination of small factors
that are individually outside of the control of the agent, such that their combined effects
render the agent’s efforts futile as of the time of action. Yet I do not wish to say that all of
these cases are ones where the agent cannot perform the action in question. The strongest
reason for this is that since I believe that nearly all cases involve these individually
uncontrollable factors, the implication of a principle that treats all such facts as relevant to
the context is that there are vastly fewer things that we can do than we normally think there
are. It would generally be very difficult to argue a compatibilist position if such a principle
were true. Assuming determinism, there would be a description of the world in terms of
very minute events, such as the bonding of certain electrons and the decaying of certain
isotopes, where it seems implausible to claim that a person can see to anv such event’s non-
occurrence. But holding all such events fixed immediately commits you to a single, fully
specified future, with no available alternative actions for anyone (or at least an
indeterministic set of such futures such that physics entails that nothing is responsible for
whether a quantum objective physical probability resolves one way rather than another). As
1 am arguing a compatibilist position, 1 clearly cannot accept such a result.
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In other sorts of cases, however, it is correct to say that facts about the future are
relevant to whether an agent can perform an action. For example, suppose that
unbeknownst to James, the bus he is going to take to his Friday meeting will break down due
to a missed maintenance on the bus. Further, suppose that as of the time of power, earlier
Friday morning, there is no longer any way for James to plan for any other way to get to the
meeting. Perhaps it is correct to say then that James could not, as of Friday morning, make
it to the meeting. This fact about the future breakdown of the bus does somehow seem
relevant to the question of whether James can do as he plans. How can we distinguish
between facts about the future that do, and those that do not, matter for the evaluation of
the agent’s actions? It is not clear to me. One thing that is notable about the case involving
the bus is that an existing condition of the bus that is normally contextually relevant to evaluations
regarding its performance was the cause of the bus’ failure. And above, though it may be the
case that the tornado that would hit the bank has some probability of hitting or not hitting
the bank, it is not tins probability (and also, not the truth or falsity of determinism at that
world) that makes me think that the fact that it does hit the bank is not relevant to the
evaluation of the ‘can’-claim involving paying the money back at the bank that day. For as I
stated above, I think that the case gets analyzed the same way whether determinism is true or
not. So I cannot reallv answer the question of how facts about the future get involved with
‘can’-claim evaluations. It strikes me that in Lehrer’s case, he got that one wrong, and that
the agent still could have paid the money back up until very close to the time that the
tornado struck. Though I cannot demonstrate the truth of this intuition, I have offered
some reasons for thinking that not eve/y fact about the future is relevant to the evaluation of
‘can’-claims.
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The initial plausibility of the claim that the money cannot be repaid as of Thursday is
due to the fact that it is pretty- clear that the agent does nothing wrong in failing to repay the
money. After all, when he went to try to do so, he found the bank was no longer there.
How then do I reconcile this with my claim that in fact he could have repaid the money as of
Thursday?
My answer is that the time between power and action leaves open at least two
different ways for possibilities to become closed-off for an agent. The first way for a
possibility to become closed-off for an agent is for the agent to do something that directly
leads to that possibility being eliminated. When the agent acts this way, the agent is morally
wrong for rendering himself unable to do what must be done (and tins is in fact the way
most morally significant failures to do what we must come about).' The second possibility7
is that an event occurs that prevents the agent from doing what (as of an earlier time it
would be appropriate to say) he must,'
1
" and that this event is not within the control of the
agent. In this sort of case, as in the bank destruction case, the agent is not morally wrong in
failing to pay as promised. This is because by the time the opportunity for action had come
about, it was no longer the case that he could have paid as promised. That is, our normal evaluation
that the agent was not at fault reflected that at some point, there was a double time-indexed
can claim true of the agent to the effect that he could no longer repay. 1 am arguing that
though this became true of the agent before he could repay, it was not true as early as
Thursday in this case.
19 Please note that I am not suggesting that the things that occur between the time of power and the time of
action never are relevant to the evaluation of what an agent can do at the time of power. In fact, I believe that
sometimes they are relevant, just as I think that sometimes the laws of nature are relevant to the evaluation of
‘can’-claims. Like Lewis regarding the laws of nature, and for parallel reasons, I think that future actual facts
('future, from the standpoint of the time of power) sometimes are, and sometimes are not, relevant to the sorts
of evaluations I have in mind.
20 It is certainly natural to say that one’s obligations change over time.
This highlights (a) the need to he clear on the double time-index implicit in ‘can'
claims, (b) the vagueness of our usual ‘can’-claims, where we do not distinguish the time
indexes, and (c) the additional vagueness in our evaluations of ‘can’-claims where the time of
power and the time of action are far apart in time relative to the sort of action being
considered. Our usual use of ‘can’-claims is not as precise as we might like. Once we have
gotten clear about the double-time index involved in such claims, we need to have an
explanation that can support both the account of ‘can’ we want to defend and the normal
evaluations we make using such claims. I believe my explanation is successful on both
counts, and this belief will be defended in the next chapter when I present mv account of
‘can.’
Thus, 1 have discharged my responsibilities. My explanation of why it is true that as
of the earlier time, the agent still could have paid as promised at the bank is that nothing had
yet intervened to prevent it from happening. The ‘soft fact’ as of the earlier time that the
tornado would destroy the bank is irrelevant in this particular case. It seems natural to think
otherwise because our ordinary ‘can’-talk is quite vague as far as time indices go, and 1 would
say that nearly all of our ‘can’-claims are evaluated with the implicit assumption that the time
of power and the time of action are fairly close together, and that nothing out of the
ordinary will occur between them. Finally, there is a nearby ‘can’-claim that explains the
agent’s non-culpability for non-payment at the bank (and also explains why we say, in our
vague way, that “he couldn’t pay as promised”): there is some time, t, between the original
time of power and the time of action, when the agent no longer can repay as promised. By the
time thefulfillment ofthe promise is at issue, the agent can no longerfulfill it, and this was not due to
something the agent could at any time have controlled. My somewhat unusual evaluation of
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the early ‘can’-claim is compatible with our normal moral evaluations of the agent’s failure to
repay in this case.
Also note that if 1 am wrong, and my intuition about ‘can’-claims and future facts is
not defensible, that Lehrer’s (L2) is then still not wrong for the reasons Lehrergives. After all, if it
is the case that we do count events in the future that an agent cannot control as happening in
every possibility accessible to the agent, then Lehrer’s claim that there is a nearby world where
the agent does pay the bank with no advantage as of Thursday (because the advantage, the
tornado going off-course, takes place between the time of power Thursday and the time of
repayment Friday) is falser
1
For in that world, the agent does have an advantage as of Thursday
that he lacks in the actual world: the advantage that as of Thursday, it is the case that a
tornado will not hit the bank before the payback time on Friday." This follows from the fact that
we are assuming that I am mistaken in my assertion about what we should say about the
impact the actual future has on the truth of ‘can’-clatms. In this case, the uncontrollable
events in the actual future are held fixed — are true in every possibility accessible to the agent —
and have a significant role in the truth of the ‘can’-claims at issue. If this is correct, then (L2)
gives the right answer in this case
,
i.e. that the agent cannot repay as of Thursday. In essence,
then, my suggestion about the interpretation of ‘can’-claims poses a dilemma for Lehrer:
either I am right, and therefore (L2) is not wrong for Lehrer’s given reasons, or, I am wrong,
and (L2) is thus not wrong for Lehrer’s given reasons.
21 Indeed, at what time exactly does the tornado’s missing the bank occur? At what time does any non-occurrence
take place?
22 There is a way out for Lehrer here: he could insist that advantages have to be hard facts. There would still be
difficult problems to work out, such as the correct times to assign to non-occurrences of events, but at least
this avenue of response seems promising. However, the possibility that determinism is true at the agent’s
world somewhat reduces the promise of this solution. For then if would seem that as of 1 hursday, there were
true hard facts such that they entailed that the tornado goes off-course on Friday and therefore, again, no
advantage between Thursday and Friday that wasn’t already present on Thursday.
Whether Lehrer is right to reject (1,2) for the reasons he does is not of overwhelming
importance since (L2) and (L2’) are false for other independent reasons as well. The first
reason is merely a complaint: without an account of the vague term “advantage,” (1,2) in any
form threatens to be vacuous. In what sense, exacdy, is the path of a tornado an advantage
to me if it misses a bank? It is unclear how to judge what sorts of events can be considered
advantages for our actions and how they bear on ‘can’-clatms regarding our actions.
Borrowing from the literature on causation, what if instead of a tornado hitting the bank, it
was a tactical missile, and the only reason the missile hit the bank was because of the failure
of a particular anti-missile missile. Would the proper functioning of the anti-missile missile
have been an illicit advantage to the agent? Lehrer must say ‘yes’ (I think), but without an
account, it is not clear to me how this answer can be explained. The converse sorts of
concerns are relevant here as well. When I prepare to flex my hand, there are many things to
enable this act that must happen that are completely out of my control. Certain chemical
reactions must occur. Certain neurons must fire with correct timing and coordination. So,
upon deciding to flex my hand, I start a chain of events, and somewhere in that chain, before
the flexing has happened, a certain reaction that is not in my control must take place, and it
does. Is this reaction an illicit advantage? Lehrer must say no (I tlrink), but again it would be
helpful if there were an account of what constitutes the sort of advantage Lehrer is
interested in."
1
Beyond this gripe, (L2) in any form seems to me to be susceptible to objections of
inflexibility and non-accommodation : it is not clear to me how (L2) can be extended to provide a
23 Horgan has offered the more pointed cnticism that Lehrer’s notion of an advantage is unfit for use in a
definition of ‘can’, since advantage is to be itself analyzed in terms of ‘can’. Lehrer can and does respond that
he can take the notion of advantage as a pnmitive. Doing so, I think, leaves him vulnerable to my gripe that
primitive or not, he owes us a lot more of an explanation of this concept that is so crucial to his analysis. See
Horgan 1977, 409-410, Lehrer 1981, 34-36.
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general analysis of ‘can’-claims, and it seems that (L2) in any form cannot be extended to
fairly unusual, but I would argue sensible, claims about the powers of unusual agents. One
fairly esoteric concern here is that claims about what God and miracle-workers can do are
not correctly analyzed by (L2) in any form. (L2) explicidy includes the condition that the
laws of nature of the world of evaluation are held fixed. This condition would render false
many interesting claims about what a miracle-worker could do. And when applied to God’s
power, it seems the analysis would immediately give false results — that is, it would, if we
could make sense of the difficult notion of God being in or bound to a particular world
(because otherwise, which world’s laws would we hold fixed for Godr). Some may be
suspicious of the hope that a single account of ‘can’ could apply both to mortals and to God
and miracle workers. However, if such a unified account could be provided, 1 would argue
this to be an advantage it would have over (1.2).
The account is overly inflexible: there is little hope that it could be turned into a
general account of ‘can’-claims, and in particular, of restrictive ‘can’-claims. It is not clear that
the ‘can’ of legal possibility can be covered by an account that merely generalizes (L2). An
obvious attempt is to consider the reading of (1.2) where ‘advantage’ is understood as ‘legal
advantage.’ But this is not right at all. Consider a case where the law forbids you from
dumping yard clippings at the waste-only dump in your town. You cannot legally do this.
However, there is a world minimally different from the actual world, where you have no
additional legal advantages, where you do dump your yard clippings at the waste-only dump.
Thus the account would imply that legally you can do this. Intuitively, the goal was to restrict
our worlds to ones where the law was always abided-by, rather than ones that did not differ with respect to
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individual legal advantage. The problem is that without simply superimposing the right sort of
account over Lehrer’s, his account cannot make sense of more general ‘can’-claims.
-4
Finally, it seems as though (L2) in any form is open to a serious simple objection.
Normally, we do not think of people as having the power to affect the outcomes of games
of genuine chance, such as the flipping of a fair coin (some may also require: in an
indeterministic world). In particular, though one might flip heads, we do not say that he can
flip heads - he does not have the power to determine the outcome, although he can flip the coin,
and the coin might turn up heads. But Lehrer’s (1,2) generally allows that people can flip the
coin heads, and they can flip it tails. This is because, as of the time somewhat before the coin
lands one way or another, there is a possible world that is insignificantly different from the
actual world (differing, say, in a nearly undetectable fact about ambient air pressure, or the
length of one of the flipper’s fingernails), where the coin lands heads. There is also a similar
world where the coin lands tails. And all of these worlds are equivalent as far as agent
advantage goes (on any remotely usual understanding of ‘advantage,’ I think). (L2) yields the
result, then, that any particular agent in question can (here, the ‘can’ of agent power) flip a
fair com heads; since agents cannot do this, (L2) is false. Likewise for (L2’)T
24 The other obvious possible generalization, that instead of holding fixed the laws of nature in the worlds we
consider, we hold fixed the laws of the land, is a non-starter. What is needed is an account that somehow
restricts the worlds under consideration to those where the agent is somehow bound by the laws of the land —
in such a set of worlds, does the agent ever do X? If so, X is legally possible, it not, not. But now, the account
under consideration is no longer an extension of Lehrer’s, and is rather a primitive version of my own.
2:> It might be possible for Lehrer to claim that a slight difference in air pressure would count as an inadmissible
advantage and would therefore render the claim that the agent could have flipped tails false. However, it is easy
to change the example slightly and make the advantage admissible by having it come from the agent himself.
Thus if the only difference between the two worlds is that the agent flipped it a little harder in one of them, the
advantage to flipping heads then seems to be one that is admissible for him by the rules presented by Lehrer.
Then, again, we can say Lehrer’s account wrongly implies the agent could have flipped heads. The only wav
out is for Lehrer to offer the natural response: that the only admissible advantages are the ones that the agent can
bring about. But here we have reached an inevitable vicious circularity in the account, as it is precisely agent
power (what he can do) that Lehrer is trying to analyze.
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I conclude that Lehrer’s account of ‘can’ is false. At the very least, the notion of
‘advantage’ is in dire need of clarification, and, there are many ways that an account of ‘can’
could be more flexible and accommodating of our usage.
IV. Unger’s and Hawthorne’s accounts of moral terms and freedom
Unger (1996) presents a sketch of a contextualist account of moral terms such as
“right” and “obligatory,” and Hawthorne (2001) describes how to use the structure of Lewis’
(1999c) account of knowledge to formulate a contextualist account of freedom. Both
presentations are too exploratory to properly be called “accounts,” but a quick review here
will be valuable since my own account of ‘can’ will be a more detailed elaboration of the
Lewis-Hawthorne strategy. 1 will begin with a brief discussion of Unger’s proposals
Unger offers what he calls a multi-dimensional context-sensitive semantics for moral terms
(Unger 1996, 162). Words such as “rightness” and “goodness” are context-sensitive and it is
this sensitivity that fixes their use as specifically moral, as opposed to legal or prudential, in a
particular situation. The context is responsible for selecting the standard by which a claim
will be evaluated, and in the cases we will focus on, that standard is a moral one. The multi-
dimensional aspect of the view comes from the fact that there are many different moral
features of a particular situation that can be stressed in a particular moral evaluation:
Because the moral terms have a ////////-dimensional context-sensitive semantics, in
making moral judgments they may be used to play up just certain of the morally
significant aspects of some conduct (or some agent, or whatever) and, in the process,
to play down all the other significant features. So, when happily making a moral
judgment with the words, “Your behavior was good,” beyond having it that
morality’s selected as the standard, we may select which of its ethical dimensions
count (much) in reckoning how well your conduct conforms to morality (Unger 1996,
164).
26 The general drift of this limited review of Unger’s notion of multi-dimensional context-sensitive semantics
comes from Feldman, 1998, which is a much more developed and thorough account of the serious issues
facing Unger’s project.
Unger goes on to say that it is the context of the evaluation that sets the selected moral
features of a given evaluation, so the multi-dimensional aspect is another way in which moral
claims are context-sensitive. Beyond placing some outer boundaries on what sorts of
flexibility moral claims can have," explaining that the scoring scale for a particular bit of
conduct is itself context-sensitive along similar dimensions as those already discussed, and
enumerating some of the moral dimensions,-9 Unger does not offer much more detail
regarding the account.
In considering whether Unger’s account could be used as the basis for a context-
sensitive account of ‘can,’ two issues are immediately raised. The first is that Unger’s view is
not developed in enough detail to allow for an easy or fruitful extension into a general
account of ‘can’ — one might well quip that all Unger has really said is that moral terms are
very context-sensitive. In order to offer a satisfactory account of the semantics of moral
terms, Unger would have to provide more information regarding what aspects of the context
can change the status of moral evaluations and what aspects cannot. Further, such an
account must give some explanation of the dynamics of context and the effect of those
dynamics on moral evaluation. One way of offering this sort of semantics can be found in
Lewis (1999c), where he provides some rules governing the semantics of knowledge claims,
and in Lewis (1983b), where he provides some examples of the dynamics of possibility
claims as well as some general framework for understanding those dynamics.
The second concern is that insofar as Unger has claimed that moral terms are very
context-sensitive, we might doubt the plausibility7 of the account. Consider why Unger
27 Moral claims can only occupy one context at a time, and it might be the case that just as the Alps cannot be
considered flat in any context, so also brutal, pointless, unmotivated murders cannot be considered ‘good’ in
any context; Unger 1996, 166.
28 In one context, a particular value score can be counted as high, and in another context, that same score can
count as low; Unger 1996, 169.
29 Such as the “Primary Value” of avoiding needless suffering, and presumably other Rossian pnma facie duties,
and the “Secondary Value” of knowing and being motivated by the proper concerns; Unger 1996, 31-32.
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regards it as necessary to offer such a flexible account of moral terms: he has argued
extensively that our commonplace judgments of the moral propriety of certain ordinary
behaviors conflict dramadcally with the moral evaluations we seem compelled to offer when
our attention is directed to some of the morally relevant features of such behaviors. An
example:
The Envelope. In your mailbox, there’s something from (the U.S. Committee for)
UNICEF. After reading it through, you correctly believe that, unless you soon send in a
check for $100, then, instead of each living many more years, over thirty more children
will die soon. But, you throw the material in your trash basket, including the convenient
return envelope provided, you send nothing, and, instead of living many years, over
thirty more children soon die than would have had you sent in the requested $100
(Unger 1996, 9).
Unger believes that both our usual judgments of your behavior in The Envelope (that it is not
seriously morally wrong for you to behave this way, on this occasion) and those judgments
issued by a more reflective, stringent moral examination (that it is seriously morally wrong
for you to behave this way, on this occasion) are tme. His explanation of this apparent
inconsistency is that the lenient judgments are issued in normal conversational contexts and
are true in those contexts (though they would be false in stringent contexts), while the
demanding judgments are issued in unusual, philosophical contexts and are true in those
contexts (though they would be false in lenient contexts).
My intuitions about The Envelope and the moral judgments people make about the
agent’s behavior in that case differ significantly from Unger’s. I think that rather than try to
reconcile the obviously inconsistent judgments in this case, what we must do is determine
whether the ordinary judgments are defensible in the face of the morally salient facts that are
brought to light in serious reflections on the example. There really is a conflict between the
two judgments and moral sensitivity requires that we tty- to discover which is true.
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A particular example of where I think Unger goes afoul of ordinary intuitions about
moral evaluation is where he stresses the multi-dimensional aspect of his account. Unger
enumerates a partial list of ethical features that might be relevant in evaluating a particular
action. But he suggests that the truth of moral evaluations then depends on which of these
factors is brought most vividly to the minds of those discussing the action. More natural is
to suppose that there is a fact of the matter about which of these features is present and the
degree to which they positively or negatively affect the moral evaluation, and to conclude
that the correct answer in this case is the result of applying a scoring to all of them, weighted
appropriately (but not-very-context-sensitively).
My problem with Unger’s outline of an account is due to the fact that moral contexts
of evaluation are not as context-sensitive as Unger supposes. Another way to make this
point is to say that though there is a very wide range of contexts of evaluation of the
goodness or badness of an agent or his actions, the subset of the contexts where that
evaluation is particularly moral is relatively small. Perhaps there’s “nothing wrong” with not
sending $100 to UNICEF, but there may very well be something morally wrong with not doing
so. Since we are attempting to get at the meanings of the usual, commonplace terms of
morality, and ‘can’ (as opposed to the meanings of some technical terms with the same
spellings), it is useful to consider some every day sorts of judgments regarding those terms in
bringing out our lnnutions. For example, suppose you were talking with someone about the
fact that he did not send $100 to UNICEF, and he tells you that though it may have been
somewhat cavalier of him to throw away the envelope, there was nothing wrong with it. But
you object strenuously. You point out that he just threw away the lives of 30 small children
and that there is no moral relevance to whether those children are far away and hard to
picture. You remind him that he certainly would not have consented to watch 30 children
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right here die, when all he would have to do is sign a check for a nearly inconsequential dollar
amount to save them. Now we can ask ourselves: have you and your friend )ust now
disagreed with each other? 1 think the ordinary answer is, “yes.” This leaves Unger with
some explaining to do, since on his account the answer must be “no.”
Of course, Unger might have in mind some such explanation — earlier in this very
chapter, I used a similar strategy: 1 explained away the awkwardness of certain forward-
looking ‘can’-claims I wanted to make by referencing a technicality regarding double time-
indexed ‘can’-claims and the vagueness of our intuitions surrounding them. However, I do
not think anything Unger has said can be interpreted this way. I would argue that ordinary
moral claims and disagreements are correctly analyzed in a less context-sensitive way than
Unger requires. Where I call upon a subtle technicality that is actually present in our
everyday ‘can’-claims as a reason for the confusion about how the future affects the truth of
present ‘can’-claims (the technicality in question being the double-time-indexed nature of
‘can’-claims), I do not see any similar technicality for Unger to call upon in defense of
whatever work-around he has in mind for analyzing what look like straightforward moral
disagreements. To be fair, since Unger has not presented a complete account of the context-
sensitivity' of moral terms, what I have said here does not constitute an objection. However,
by presenting Unger’s useful idea that these terms are context-sensitive in certain general
ways, as well as by noting where I find limits to that idea, I have made some progress
towards outlining my own view. I now turn to Hawthorne’s discussion of a context-
sensitive account of freedom.
Hawthorne proposes a contextualist account of freedom that is a direct adaptation of
Lewis’ account of knowledge claims from “Elusive Knowledge.” It is easy to outline lus
general strategy by considering an example: Suppose that you wake up 10 minutes before
you have to go to work, and are lying in bed trying to decide whether to get up or sleep the
extra 10 minutes. Let’s say you actually get up and do not sleep the extra 10 minutes. Could
you have instead stayed in bed and enjoyed that litde bit of extra sleep r If you are not one
of those people who can never get back to sleep when they wake up, the natural answer is
yes, you could have slept the extra 10 minutes. You were free to get up and free to stay in
bed.
But now consider that every one of your decisions is actually nothing more than the
coordinated firings ot neurons throughout your brain. Those firings are the results of
chemical reactions over which you appear to have no control: the chemicals got into the
state they were in right before you woke up by means of a causal history that extends back in
time not only into your sleep state, but far back before you were born. If determinism is
true, wasn’t your decision to get up forced by causal factors beyond your control? It
determinism is not true, shouldn’t we think of your decision as being forced by a probabilistic
process outside of your control, or else random if considered to be essentially the result of
billions of chance events? If determinism is true, you were not free to stay in bed — the only
possibility open to you was getting up; if determinism is false, whatever you did was the
result of some process outside of your control.
Telling two different stories about your behavior (and about how your behavior is
evaluated) results in two opposing conclusions about your freedom. The usual,
commonsense conclusion that you are free in that situation seems right; but when presented
with a skeptical challenge, the skeptical conclusion that you are not free seems more
plausible. Which one is correct? Like Unger, Hawthorne wants to make the argument that
both conclusions are correct. It is the different contexts in which the evaluations are made
that cause the apparently contradictory statements to be consistent after all.
Proceeding in a way that directly parallels Lewis’ approach, Hawthorne considers the
myriad of causal factors that are relevant to your behavior for some given action. Some of
these might be explicitly or implicitly a part of the context — if we are evaluating whether
Joachim is free to have lunch or skip it, we might for example explicitly mention that he has
not had any food for a long while, and we might implicitly accept certain facts about human
physiology, in particular the workings of the digestive system. Other causal factors, such as a
particular state of a particular neuron in Joachim’s brain that is related to cognition, might be
ignored, freedom to have done otherwise, according to Hawthorne, is then a matter of
one’s action not being determined by the properly considered causal explainers, as
determined by context. Formally,
(H) S does x freely only if S’s action is free from causal explainers beyond S’s
control — Psst! — apart from those causal explainers that we are properly
ignoring (Hawthorne 2001, 68).
It is worth noting in passing some of the ways in which this account is not similar to Lewis’.
One obvious difference is that (H) is not a biconditional and gives therefore only the
necessary conditions for free action, while Lewis’ account is a biconditional that gives the
necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge/ Another departure is that in (H), the
causal explainers do not seem to be possibilia, the collection of all of the possible causal
explainers for an action, but rather some actual collection, while Lewis accounts for
knowledge in terms of accessibility to possible worlds. Finally, there is a potential for
circularity in (H) that does not seem to be a problem for Lewis’ account: defining ‘free’ in
terms of ‘control’ will require an account of ‘control’ that does not itself depend on an
already understood account of freedom. Since I am tempted to understand ‘control’ in
terms of options, this would be a problem for me. However, 1 realize it may not be a
30 Lewis’ account: S knows that P iff S’s evidence eliminates every possibility in which not-P — Psst! — except
for those possibilities that we are properly ignoring. Lewis 1999c, 425.
problem for Hawthorne - we would have to see what his account of ‘control’ is before we
could make that determination.
Setting aside these differences, we have an account of free action that is very similar
to Lewis’ account of knowledge. In many contexts, this account would yield the result that
people are free with respect to their actions even if determinism was true. This is because in
those contexts, not every causal explainer would be attended to — some would be properh
ignored. Though Hawthorne does not say much about why ‘freedom from causal
explainers’ has much to do with freedom, I imagine he might say something like the following:
with these causal factors out of consideration, the action is no longer completely explainable by
the events that came before it. Perhaps this is roughly equivalent to a more traditional way
of putting the point, which would be that the initial state of affairs (the parts of it still in
consideration) conjoined with the laws of nature (those laws still not being properly ignored)
may no longer entail that the agent act as he did.
In a brief footnote, Hawthorne considers a variation of the view that would yield an
even more robust compatibilism than (H). Rather than understanding freedom in terms of
causal explainers that we do properly ignore, it is possible to understand freedom in terms of
causal explainers it would be proper to ignore-.
(H') S does x freely only if S’s action is free from causal explainers beyond S’s
control — Psst! — apart from those causal explainers that it would be proper to
ignore (Hawthorne 2001, 68 and footnote 7).
The difference between (H) and (H’) is the scope of causal explainers over which the rules of
propriety7 are to range. In (H), you take the causal explainers that are in fact ignored, and
you then add those ones that are not properly ignored back into the context. In (H’), on the
other hand, you consider all of the causal explainers, ignored or not, and add back those
ones ignored that are not properly ignored, and also remove those causal explainers (even ones
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not ignored) that if ignored, would be properly so, from the context. (H’) is “more
compatibilist” than (H): in a deterministic world, (H’) entails that many more actions are free
than (H) does. This is because there will be many cases where (H) would entail that an
action is not free, because certain causal explainers are in fact not being ignored, where in
those very cases (H’) would entail that that action is free, because // ignored, those explainers
would be properly so ignored.
In order to determine whether Hawthorne’s strategy can be successful, we would
have to consider the particular rules of propriety that he believes are in effect in moral
contexts. Just as in Lewis’ account, it is these rules that form the basis for evaluating the
cases and give the truth-conditions (I mentioned earlier that the meanings of these modal
terms are not affected by the context; so really, it is the scope that is being determined,
though the term “semantics” might be most convenient) for the concept of “freedom.”
Hawthorne does not offer any detail as to what he thinks these rules should be, but he does
outline three broad strategies, two of which seem wrongheaded.
The first strategy he discusses is a consequentralist one and the second is a roughly
Kantian one. Roughly, he suggests that the rules of propriety are those that would, if we
attended to them, produce the most happiness overall, or would produce the highest level of
people treating each other as ends-in-themselves as opposed to as mere means (Hawthorne
2001, 71-72). If tins were correct, then the rules that determined the proper causal factors
involved in discussions of freedom could be said to track happiness or diginity - that is, what is
relevant to discussions of freedom is whatever makes us happiest or most dignified (as a
rule) to be so relevant. I find this, even in broad outline, objectionable. Though 1 agree that
in some sense, what is relevant to freedom has to be relevant to morality as well, 1 think
Hawthorne has confused two distinct ideas. One idea is that the contextual sensitivity of the
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term “free” is closely related to the contextual sensitivity of terms like “morally right.”
There are features of context that typically do, and others that typically do not, lend
themselves to evaluations in both cases of free action and moral action. While this idea is
correct, the second idea, that it is by applying a particular moral theory7 to these rules
themselves that we get answers as to the propriety or impropriety? of those rules, is not
correct. Moral evaluation and evaluation of free action depend on the contextually sensitive
meanings or scopes of the terms used in those evaluations, which in turn depend on the rules
of propriety for using those terms — not the other way around.
The remaining strategy Hawthorne discusses is the descriptive one, used by Lewis,
that proceeds from close examination of how we actually make these sorts of evaluations. A
strategy along these lines seems the most promising but is unfortunately not developed by
Hawthorne here. Hawthorne does not offer any detail as to the rules of propriety7 he thinks
are relevant to evaluations of free action or moral behavior. Because of this, it is not
possible to meaningfully criticize or defend his outline.
V. Conclusion
The two sorts of views of ‘can’ 1 have presented here are subject to criticisms that I
cannot see how to avoid. Unger and Hawthorne have made some progress in determining
to what extent, and in what way, context can play a role in evaluations that are closely related
to claims about what people can do. In the next chapter, I present my view of ‘can’ in detail,
using Ivratzer’s (1977) work on ‘can’ as my basis.
126
CHAPTER 4
FRAMEWORK FOR AN ACCOUNT OF ‘CAN’
In chapters 4 and 5, I offer an account of ‘can’ in two parts. In the first part, I
present the formal framework for a general account of ‘can.’ Here, I start with my
formulation of Kratzer’s analysis of the general English modal word, ‘can,’ and offer
modifications to deal with the ‘can’ of agent power. In the next chapter I will present some
of the factors that determine the scope and partitions of ‘can’ in ethical contexts — that
presentation is loosely based on Lewis’ account of knowledge in Lewis 1999c.
I. Kratzer and the ‘can’ of general permission and ability
Suppose special agent )ack Bauer is on the trail of a terrorist who has bombed a
national landmark. He investigates a man named Franc and discovers two very reliable
witnesses who claim that Franc was near the building at the time of the bombing. After
some consideration. Jack claims:
1 . Franc could be the bomber.
Consider another case: you and your mom are having lunch and she discovers that you do
not intend to file your taxes by April 15th. As any good mother would do, she chastises you:
2. You must pay your taxes bv April 15th.
Finally, consider a case where Hulk Hogan, a famous WWF wrestler, comes out of
retirement to compete for the world championship. Knowing as you do that Hogan is
massive and always stays in very good shape (and more importantly, has strong ties to the
people who write the scripts for WWF matches), you claim:
3. The Hulkster can win the championship.
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Each of these uses of ‘can’ or ‘must’ appears to have a different connotation — the
first ‘can’ seems epistemic, the second legal and the third based on ability. Kratzer points
out that each of the claims has a paraphrase that makes these readings clear:
1’. Franc could be the bomber, in view of the evidence.
2’. You must pay your taxes by April 1 5th, in view of what the law requires.
3’. The Flulkster can win the championship, in view ofhis abilities.
These “in view of’ clauses make the meanings of these ‘can’-claims
1
more explicit. Since the
“in view of’ versions of the claims appear to mean the same thing as the claims without
those clauses, it is natural to assume that the ‘can’ in 1 -3 can be decomposed into at least two
parts. The first part is the kernel of meaning of any ‘can’-claim, and the second part is the
limiting clause provided by context in 1-3 and provided explicitly in l’-3’. So, Kratzer takes
the instances of ‘can’ and ‘must’ in 1 ’-3’ to express the kernel of meaning that is common to
all of these uses of ‘can.’ She concludes that generally, a limiting clause of some kind is
provided by the context or can be found explicitly in the claim itself (Kratzer 1977, 340-1).
But what is the kernel of meaning common to these ‘can’-claims? Saying that
something ‘can’ be the case entails that it is compatible with whatever is relevant in this
context, and likewise, saying that something ‘must’ be the case entails that it is necessitated by
whatever is relevant in this context. Since I have formulated other accounts of ‘can’ in this
paper in terms of accessibility or accessibility-like relations, I will formulate Kratzer’s
account in terms of accessibility as well:
W: the class of all possible worlds,
w, v: possible worlds in W,
c: the context of utterance^
1 From here on out, ‘can’-claims should be taken as a shorthand for “’can’-claims and ‘must’-claims.”
2 A small technical detail: to simplify the expression of this and my own view, while still permitting the view to
make sense for ‘can’-claims embedded in other modals, I assume that the context of utterance, c, is a particular
context at a particular world. Then, in the following definition of the function fc(w), w is a world that may be








: the accessibility relation relevant to context c,





Must: “it must be that p” is true in context c, iff for for all v such that wRcv, v GE the
set of possible worlds where p.
Can: “ it can be that p” is true in context c, iff for some v such that wRcv, v GE the set
of possible worlds where p,
5
Less formally, p must hold at w means that p holds in every world accessible from w;
similarly, p can hold at w means that p holds in some world accessible from w. The set of
accessible worlds is the set of worlds where ever)- proposition in the context set is true — I’ll
abbreviate the claim that an accessible world is such that everyproposition in the context set is true at it
by saying that an accessible world is consistent with the context set. In general, I will say a world
is consistent with a set of propositions when all of those propositions are true at that world.
So take a statement like 1 The clause, “in view of the evidence,” selects a set of
propositions as the context set — in this case, it is the set of propositions that are believed to
a greater or lesser degree based on the investigation so far. The claim that Franc could be
the bomber, then, means that there is a world that is consistent with all of the evidence in
which Franc is the bomber. Likewise in 2’, there is no world that is consistent with what the
law provides but where you also do not pay your taxes (for the law provides that everyone
pays his taxes by April 15
th
). Legally speaking, you must not pay your taxes late.
4 The context set is a set of propositions that includes the conversational background as well as any other tacts
that are relevant to the context of utterance of a power ‘can’-claim. There are many context sets assigned to
every world — every context of utterance for an arbitrary proposition p can have its own context set. I could
complicate the syntax of the account by indexing fc(w) by p, and in that way give an explicitly indexed reference
to each context set. It is somewhat easier to read, however, if we just interpret fc(w) as an arbitrary one, where
implicitly it is the one relevant to an arbitrary contextually bound utterance of p.
4 Kratzer 1991 gives this definition on 642.
3 For Kratzer’s translation of her account into an account based on an accessibility relation, see Kratzer 1991,
642.
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I have temporarily ignored a complication with the account involving inconsistent
context sets. I believe that the ‘can’ of agent power presents a challenge to Kratzer’s
formulation even in its simplest form and that the challenge is best met by adding a new
formal feature to the account. Once I have outlined my own view, I will return to the issue
of inconsistent context sets.
II. The ‘can’ of agent power
Although I can swim, I do not believe that I can swim right now because there is no
sufficiently large body of liquid nearby. The ‘can’ used in the first part of the sentence is the
‘can’ of ability: I learned how to swim when I was a kid, and I still know how. What’s more,
1 am currently in acceptable physical shape, and I am not restrained or injured. In view of
these things, I can swim.
But the second ‘can’ in the sentence is being used differently from the first. The
most noticeable hint that this second is the ‘can’ of agent power is the time-indexing of the
claim. In view of my abilities I can swim, but in view of my location at tins tame, I cannot
now swim. So we have:
4. I can swim, in view of my abilities.
5. I cannot (now) swim, in view of my location (now).
The set of propositions describing my abilities is consistent with a world in which I am
swimming — in particular, such a world would contain a nearby pool of sufficiently warm
water in which I have a desire to swim. However, the set of propositions describing my
current location, in particular the fact that no suitable body of water is nearby, is not
consistent with a world in which I am swimming now — my taking a swim is ruled out in
those worlds by the lack of a place to swim. So far, Kratzer’s account can be applied directly
to examples involving the ‘can’ of agent power.
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However, things become somewhat less clear when we focus our attention on
power-‘can’ claims that involve the notions of chance or control. Consider a typical case
involving chance: flipping a coin. Although 1 can flip this quarter, 1 do not believe that I can
flip it so it lands heads up. So, we have this pair of apparently true propositions:
6. 1 can flip a quarter.
7. It is not the case that 1 can flip heads on a quarter.
Though it is fairly clear that 6 is logically compatible
1
with the context set, it is not clear how
Kratzer’s account handles 7. While there are some senses of ‘can’ in which it would be
appropriate to say that an agent can flip a coin heads (for example, a sense of ‘can’ that is
closely related to the notion of a continuant), the sense of ‘can’ under discussion here, in both
6 and 7, is the one relevant to agent power— for this reading, it seems to me that 7 is
reasonably uncontroversial. According to Kratzer, a necessary condition for the truth of 7 is
that it not be logically compatible with the context set that I flip heads on a quarter. That is, the
proposition, “1 flip heads” would have to be logically incompatible with the set of
propositions that is explicidy or implicitly “in view” for this claim. Another way to put this
point would be that there is no world left in which 1 flip heads after I have filtered out all the
worlds where some proposition from the context set is false (keeping only those worlds
where those propositions are true). However, tins appears to be false. The easiest way to
see why this cannot be right is to consider that in the case presented, whether the coin lands
heads or tails is supposed to be a genuine matter of (objective) chance. If that is true, and is
6 When I say a proposition p is logically compatible with a set P of propositions, what I mean is that, for a set O
of propositions that includes ever)’ element of P, but also includes p, the set of worlds such that every
proposition ofj2 is true at it is non-null (some world is such that every proposition inQ is true in it); similarly,
p is logically incompatible with P iff no world that is consistent with P is a p-world (no world is such that every
proposition of^ is true in it).
accepted as part of the context set, then it is logically consistent with the context set that the
coin land heads and logically consistent with the context set that the coin land tails.
We should consider a natural response to my criticism - perhaps there is some
proposition that is a part of the context set that does somehow exclude worlds in which I
flip heads. For example, perhaps the following proposition is assumed in the context:
(C) I do not have control over whether the coin lands heads.
(C) might appear to be compatible with the proposition that I flip heads or I flip tails, but not
with the proposition that I flip beads and not with the proposition that I flip tails. I believe that
(C) is true, and I believe that it may very well be assumed in the context under consideration.
However, 1 do not believe that propositions like (C) can be the basis for an inconsistent
between “I flip heads” and the context set. The reason (C) cannot serve tins role in
Ivratzer’s account is that the notion of control is a modal notion that depends on the notion
ofpower — on my view, the analysis of control is to be carried out in terms ofpower, that is, in
terms of the truth of certain ‘can’-claims. If this is correct, (C) cannot be considered the part
of the context set in an analysis or account of ‘can’-claims. An account of ‘can’ that depended
on propositions whose truth in turn depended on whether someone could do something
would be circular. I would argue that the appropriate order of dependency is that the notion
ofpower is prior, and that of control is dependent on it. I have control over whether x ory, or
whether x or nof-x, when x and y, or x and not-x, are within my power.
But suppose Kratzer had in mind some other order of explanation — suppose for
example that she took “control” as a primitive. In that case, the problem would not be that
7
1 am not invoking the logical fallacy that possibly (p v q) D (possiblyp & possibly q). Instead 1 am making a point
about what a context permits in claims about genuine objective chances. If a part of the context is the fact that
whetherp is a matter of genuine objective chance, and both p (e.g. flipping heads) and q (e.g. flipping tails) have
non-zero objective chances (and this is an accepted part of the context), then it is both the case thatp is logically
consistent with the context set and that q is logically consistent with the context set.
this solution was circular, it would be rather that it depended on the introduction of an
unexplained primitive. Without a substantial explanation of how we would understand this
primitive notion of control, this sort of strategy seems hopeless.
Still, another problem with (C) as an answer to the criticism is simply that (C) is not
in fact logically incompatible with “1 flip heads.” That is, the proposition expressed by “I do
not have control over whether I flip heads and 1 m fact do flip heads” is a logically possible
one (in fact, it is a true proposition in every case that I accidentally flip heads in a coin toss).
(C) may be incompatible with “I can flip heads” - tins possible response on behalf of Kratzer
1 consider next.
Perhaps propositions about objective probabilities themselves can be used to solve
the problem. For example:
(P) There is an objective chance of .5 that the coin lands heads, and .5 that it lands
tails
One might argue that tins sort of truth is incompatible with any claim about one’s power to
toss a coin so that it would land on one side rather than the other. That is, (P) (just as (C)
above) may be incompatible with the proposition that J can flip heads. This would be a subtle
mistake. Whether (P) is incompatible with the proposition that 1 can flip heads is irrelevant on
Ivratzer’s account. In order to help her account, (P) would have to be incompatible not with
the claim that 1 can flip heads, but rather with the clann that Iflip heads - the ‘can ’-claim is
analyzed in terms of the incompatibility of (P) (a part of the context set) and the proposition
to which the modal operator is applied, i.e. that 1 do flip heads. I cannot see any reason to
say that (P) (or (C)) and the proposition expressed by “I flip heads” are logically
incompatible, and so I have to conclude that this proposition also furnishes no reason to
think Kratzer’s account can explain the truth of 7.
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In personal communication, Phillip Bncker suggested an elegant argument that
shows that no particular addition to the context set along the lines of (P) or (C) could help
Ivratzer’s account. Suppose there were some addition (A) to the context set that would
allow Kratzer’s account to evaluate both 6 and 7 as true. The only way Kratzer’s account
could yield a true value for 7 would be if the context set were logically incompatible with
flipping heads — that is, no flip-heads worlds would be accessible. However, it would also be
logically incompatible with the expanded context set that I flip tails — tails worlds and heads
worlds are perfectly similar as far as agent power goes, so it would seem natural to say that if
heads worlds are inconsistent with the context set, then so are tails worlds. But if no head-
flipping worlds and no tails-flipping worlds are consistent with the context set, it would
follow that no coin-flipping worlds are either, since a coin- flipping world entails a heads-
flipping world or a tails-flipping world. Thus, 6 would be false. Contradiction: we assumed
that both 6 and 7 would be evaluated true. The conclusion is that our assumption that
adding (A) to the context set would enable Kratzer’s account to evaluate 6 and 7 as true was
mistaken. No such addition to Kratzer’s account can possibly yield the right results for 6
and 7.
Another possible way for Ivratzer’s account to handle my worries may work as
follows. Consider the case where I cannot swim because there are no suitable bodies of
water nearby. In that case, some elements of the context set were incompatible with the
proposition that I now swim. The fact that the nearest body of water is hours away by means
of most available forms of transportation is incompatible with the proposition that I swim
now in the strict sense that, granting the context set, there is no accessible world where I
swim now. But perhaps when I evaluated the coin-flipping case, I was too strict about the
incompatibility there bemg logical, and the coin-flipping case actually works just like the
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swimming case if we merely interpret compatibility in a suitably broad way. 1 think this
amounts to suggesting that in the coin-flipping case, perhaps there are worlds where the
context set is true and it is also true that I flip heads, but those flip-heads worlds are “thrown
out” for some other reason. In one sense this strategy is hopeless and in another sense it
will work just fine. The sense in which it will “work just fine” is that I myself will propose
an account of why we should say that an agent cannot flip heads, and my account will
depend on the fact that “flipping heads” is in some important sense not accessible to, or
available for, the agent — the problem is that in order to do this, I propose a substantially
different account from Kratzer, and this would hardly help explain how to repair her
account.
Kratzer’s account itself cannot benefit from this proposed strategy. The problem is
that the swimming case and coin-flipping case are quite different as regards exactly why a
certain option is not available to an agent. In the swimming case, there is a pretty
straightforward incompatibility between the proposition that the nearest body of water is
very far away and the proposition that I swim right now — my swimming now is physically
ruled out by the distance of suitable water. It is not as though there are lots of swimming
worlds that are contextually appropriate continuations of this world, and I simply cannot
pick which one comes to pass. However, in the case of the coin flip, while the intuition
remains that there is an “incompatibility” between the physical state of things (and our
understanding of the physics of the case at hand) and my power to flip heads, 1 simply do not
see any way to spell out an incompatibility between the context and myflipping heads. That is,
here there do appear to be many flipping worlds that are contextually appropriate
continuations of this world (that is, they are accessible in the sense that they are not inconsistent
with the context — and this is the sense of accessible explicitly at work in Kratzer’s account).
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The problem is that they are not options because the agent cannot decide between them - he
cannot pick which ofthen? comes to pass. This failure to have the power to decide between
cannot be explained in terms of logical incompatibility between the propositions and the
context set.
It may be useful to make some general observations in light of these objections and
my responses to them. In all of the examples of Kratzer’s theory working at its best, it is
possible for someone appropriately informed about the propositions that make up the
context of utterance to explain the (nearly) deductive argument that proves the ‘can’-claim is
correct. For example, if you objected that you have no compulsion to pay your taxes on
tame, an informed observer could note, “Well, the context includes the proposition thatyon
payyour taxes by April /5 , and the proposition that you pay your taxes later than that is logically
incompatible with it, and therefore, it really is true (in view of these things) that you must
pay your taxes by April 15
th
.” In a case involving chance or control, no such explanation is
possible. The best an informed observer could offer is, “You do not have the musculature
and fine-motor coordination to control how the coin would land. You also lack knowledge
of the ambient air conditions that would be necessary to have that level of control. Tins is
inconsistent in a general way with claims about your power to flip heads, even though it is
not incompatible with the proposition thatyou flip heads — which you may accidentally do,
after all.” The question that needs answering is really: how do claims about your musculature,
fine-motor coordination and knowledge of prevailing conditions work to show that flipping
heads is not an option for you, even though the proposition thatyou flip heads is not logically (or
even physically) incompatible with them? It is this question I must answer.
It is worth pointing out that it is not, strictly speaking, an objection to Kratzer’s
account that it cannot handle the sort of ‘can’-clanns I have in mind. To see why, consider
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that the syntactic form of agent power ‘can’-claims is something like “agent A can [verb
phrase].” This sort of ‘can’-claim is quite different in form than the ones Kratzer considers,
where the ‘can’ in question takes a proposition as an argument. Consider these two claims:
(k) It can be the case that Veronica flips the coin beads.
(k’) Veronica can flip the coin heads.
A natural evaluation of these, 1 think, is that (k) is true while (k’) is false. Kratzer’s account
handles (k) just fine — after all, on no very natural reading of (k) is it a claim about agent
power. The point of my new account of ‘can’ then is that it will provide a more general
account of ‘can’ than Kratzer’s did — it turns out that with some modifications, an account
much like Kratzer’s can handle both the sorts of claims she had in mind and claims about
agent power, all within a single framework. This would satisfy7 both the desire to solve
puzzles about interpreting claims involving agent power as well as the desire to give a
maximally general, formal theory of ‘can’-claims.
What sort of context set is involved in claims about agent power? The varieties of
contexts and sorts of claims that can be made about agent power vary from ones involving
nothing more than brute physical strength and opportunity to exert it to ones involving
ethical considerations and knowledge of facts necessary to influence the values of outcomes.
Generally, power claims assume propositions about agent ability, certain physical facts,
potentially including laws of nature, and facts about human physiology and human
psychology. In what follows, I propose my own formulation of ‘can’ based on Kratzer’s
framework, and I will try to clarify the context sets relevant to a large class of ethical claims
in some detail in the next chapter.
III. My account of power
In the treatments of ‘can’ discussed so far, a person’s options are defined with
respect to an accessibility-Uke relation between that agent (or the world of that agent) and
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certain possible worlds. The options or alternatives are then these possible worlds, or are
propositions true at those worlds. My treatment differs in that 1 assume that the
fundamental relation that describes a person’s options is between the person and certain sets
ofpossible worlds
f
I will not call this relation “accessibility,” since the conventions for using
that term are entrenched. I will call the relation I have in mind
“
availability Options are
certain sets of worlds that are available to the agent. It is noteworthy that my account reduces
to Kratzer’s under certain conditions. In particular, my account reduces to Ivratzer’s for the
sorts of ‘can’-claims she considers because in those cases, a particular set of worlds is a
perfecdy good stand-in for an individual world in Ivratzer’s analysis. That is, there will be a
cell, or union of cells, in a partitioning of the accessible worlds such that that cell or union
plays the same role as an individual world did in Ivratzer’s account.
My account begins just as Kratzer’s does: 1 note that given a context set, many
worlds will be excluded from accessibility. I will call the accessible worlds the world scope —
the world scope is the set of worlds that are consistent with the context set. I accept
Ivratzer’s account of how context plays into the determination of world scope — there is an
implicit or explicit background, a set of propositions, such that worlds that satisfy all of them
are accessible and ones that do not, are not. In the next chapter, I will go into more detail
about world scope and the principles and truth-conditions that determine it. In general, the
context sets for claims about agent power in ethical contexts are more agent independent than
other sorts of contexts — that is, they can include propositions even though none of the
agents in the conversation have explicitly noted those propositions. Also, the context sets
8
These sets of possible worlds are not likely to be propositions because they are too “small” or non-
homogenous — they are sets of possible worlds with very littie natural similarity. I mention this only to show
that even if Kratzer’s account is interpreted in such a way that the agent’s options are understood as propositions
that meet the accessibility requirements given in (Can), her account and my account do not identify the same
sets of worlds as options. Though I dunk it is clear that her account and mine differ, this may help head off a
confusion regarding the similarity of our accounts for those who identify propositions with sets of possible
worlds and then note that Kratzer’s account can be interpreted in such a way that options are propositions.
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for claims about agent power in ethical contexts are more rigid than other sorts of contexts —
that is, these contexts often legitimately resist expansion by prohibiting the inclusion of
propositions that would relax them.
Putting aside world scope for a moment, I would like to consider the notion of
resolution as it is used in computer imaging applications. The resolution of an image can be
expressed in pixels per inch (or in printing applications, dots per inch). The higher the
resolution of an image, the more pixels per unit of measurement are available to represent
that image. So a high-resolution image typically has a greater level of detail than a low-
resolution image — you can express e.g. a circle in much smoother arcs if you have more
pixels per inch at your disposal to draw that circle.
Metaphorically, the notion of resolution can be used to describe a part of the human
condition as it pertains to the acts we perform. All in all, we are large, fumbling creatures.
Our actions lack precision even when we are being as careful as we can be. Where precision
really matters, such as in laser eye surgery7 or making computer chips the size of a pin head,
we generally rely on machines. You can think of our acts as having very low resolution — if
we want to shake hands, we do not aim for a particular point in space to get our hands to
meet; instead we just toss our hands out there, aiming at a fairly large area somewhere above
our waists and below our shoulders, and then correct along the way until we meet.
Suppose that when you were to act, you were presented with a series ot pictures of
what you were considering doing, and you pointed at the one you wanted to do - that
selection process would let you perform the act depicted in the picture. Now, suppose that
each picture was very high resolution — each one had sharp lines and detailed positions of
eyery item in the picture. So, a picture where you were shaking hands depicted exactly
1
Somewhat contra Lewis 1983b, and somewhat more along the lines of Hawthorne 2001, in his consideration
of a kind of ‘ideal counterfactual’ regarding what it would be proper to ignore as regards causal explainers
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where your hands were, to the nanometer. In such a case, you would presumably be
confronted with a very large array of pictures to choose from - you can shake hands in very
many different ways, if you can pick the exact position your hand will be in when you do it.
A /^resolution version of this choice would look much different. One of the pictures
would have big, pixilated skin-colored blocks where clearly your right hand was involved, but
the details of where it was exactly when it touched your partner would be lost. What other
pictures might you see? Presumably you would also see a blocky, sharp-edged picture in
which your hands were somewhere closer to your body, and never got extended at all — this
would depict the option of ‘not shaking hands.’ Here, the set of pictures you would see
presented to you would be a much smaller array of very blocky, vague, low resolution
pictures that captured just the highest level description of what you could do. You might
only have 2 or 3 pictures to choose from.
Consider the world scope for a particular context. Even considering certain
simplifications that might legitimately be made to reduce the number of contextually
accessible worlds, the world scope is an impressively large array of worlds. These worlds
might be characterized as a spectrum of worlds — in view of the similarities and differences
between the worlds (similarities specific to a context of claims about agent power), they
make up reasonably coherent ‘bands’ of gross similarities, and have fairly graceful (in many
cases, perhaps not all) band blend regions where there is some vagueness as to which ‘band’
a particular world belongs. For example, one of the bands might be one in which you are
shaking hands — all of the worlds here have a stronger similarity to each other than they do
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to worlds in which you do not extend your hand at all — a stronger similarity, that is, in this
context}"
The formal construct that is best suited to describe the metaphors 1 have offered so
far is that of an equivalence relation. Generally, an equivalence relation partitions a class into
equivalence classes. The equivalence classes are classes of elements such that the elements all
bear the equivalence relation to ever)7 other member of their equivalence class, and bear the
equivalence relation to no member of any other equivalence class. So, if you partition a
world scope by means of a similarity relation relative to the context of agent power, you are
in essence grouping worlds into what I was calling “bands,” such that the worlds in each
band are exclusively and exhaustively similar to each other in the contextually relevant way.
The fuzziness of the lines that divide bands of the spectra does not correspond to vagueness
regarding which worlds belong to which cells or which partition is imposed by which
context — rather, the fuzziness corresponds to the fact that there can be indeterminacy
regarding which context governs our current ‘can’-claims." In particular, the overarching
context of agentpower evaluation may give the fairlv stable grouping into the large bands, and
then smaller differences in the context, such as whether it is a context of moral evaluation as
well, would resolve the border disputes between grossly defined bands.
So, for a particular context, the similarity relation is set and the partition over the
worlds is drawn sharply. The resolution of the partitions can be understood simply as how




It seems apparent that it is not on the basis of some generic overall notion of ‘similarity’ that this statement
comes out true.
11 This clarification was offered by Chris Potts. He points out that there are conversational moves that are
designed to help us determine which context is ours. If you ask me whether my grandfather is bald, I might
reply, “Do you mean Kojak-bald or Picard-bald?” Here, I am attempting to determine what standard we
accept for baldness, and thus what context we are in.
12
I’ll use “cell” as shorthand for an equivalence class that is a member of a particular partition- The naturalness
of a given partition depends on how well the partition does when measured on the standard of relevant.
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resolution limit case is where each cell includes one world only - in this case, the resolution
is maximized, and the partition entails that every world difference is sufficient for it being
truly dissimilar from its companion worlds. The minimum resolution limit case is where the
worlds are all similar in the relevant way — the context and meaning of the claim in
consideration allows for no relevant distinction between the accessible worlds.
The notion of modal resolution and the partitioning of the world scope are described
well by Yalcin (2007). Here, he explains these concepts in the course of developing an
account of epistemic modals:
A distinction - e.g., the distinction between rain and no rain in Topeka — may be
represented by a line through logical space, one can ing it into two regions, the rainy
and the rain-free. Suppose we collect all of the distinctions an agent takes note of...
relative to some broad project of inquiry. That supplies us with an array of lines
through logical space. Drawing them all at once, we then have a partition 11 of logical
space, a division of logical space into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive regions.
We can then try saying this: the distinctions that an agent takes note of are the ones
that ‘carve according to the lines’ of 11. The distinctions that an agent fails to take are
those whose lines depart from the lines of 11. Pursuing this visual metaphor, call such
a partition a modal resolution. It represents the agent’s ‘modal acuity’ as pertains to the
project of inquiry in question, capturing only the level of specificity the agent may be
said to be aware of in a broad sense A picture may help.
Visibility at a resolution
Fig. 3
p, a Il-visible proposition q, a Il-invisible proposition
objective similarity between members of its cells. In the context of agent power or moral evaluation, I assume
that the partitioning relations are very' natural, and so the interesting metric to watch is how finely one partition
is cut relative to another.
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Here we see that p respects the grid imposed over logical space by our resolution 11 .
Hence it is visible with respect to 11. Not so for q, which cuts through the grid. Say a
proposition p is ll-visible just in case each cell of 11 either implies (is a subset of) p or
contradicts (is disjoint from) p. (Yalcin 2007, 16-17)
Yalcin’s account is described in terms of “modal acuity” and the specificity that an agent may
be aware oj in a particular context. On an account such as mine, the moral or agent-power
context is determined more by objective features of the world and the physical abilities of
the agents involved than by states of the agent’s mind or beliefs. Therefore, I spell out the
notion of modal resolution in terms of certain objectivefacts, as well as the conversational
context, that carve the world scope. Later, and in the next chapter, it is these facts that I will
try to enumerate. I will then explain how they affect the world scope partition.
LJnlike other accounts, 1 identify an agent’s options as the equivalence classes or
muons ofequivalence classes inside the partitioned world scope — that is, an agent’s options are
sets of possible worlds, limited now in two distinct ways by context. The fust way the
options are limited by context has been discussed at length - the initial world scope
accessible to the agent is limited by the context set and the meaning of the ‘can’-claim
involved. The second, more novel, way in which the options are limited is by the contextual
imposition of a partition on the world scope. In simpler terms, the context sorts the
accessible worlds into units (classes) of similar worlds. These units are an agent’s options.
The options are what the agent has the power to do; they are what he can do, in context.
Like Yalcin, I identify the appropriate units as ones that carve out one or more equivalence
classes along the joints given by the partition. Propositions about what occurs that carve the
scope in other ways are invisible to the agent in the sense described by Yalcin — such
propositions are not available to the agent and are consequently not options of his.
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It is important to me that this view reduce to Kratzer’s in the sorts of cases she
describes, and so I will briefly digress to attempt to show that it does. Consider one of
Kratzer’s cases: that of proposition 1 about Franc the bomber. In view of what we know.
Franc could be the bomber. There is a set of possible worlds in which all of the evidence we
have collected thus far is true. In at least one of those possible worlds, Franc is the bomber.
Here, the worlds are partitioned along the lines of all of the available evidence in the case —
where a bit of evidence would allow two worlds but sort them differently (because of, say, a
different implication of the evidence in each case), a line can be drawn into the partition. In
that case, Franc bombs the target worlds find themselves in one partition cell (or union of cells),
while Joe bombs the target worlds tmd themselves in a different partition cell (or union of cells),
and so on. If Franc must have done it, then all the worlds allowed by the evidence are ones in
which Franc did it, and so it follows that all the worlds of all the cells of the partition are also
ones in which Franc did it. If Franc could have done it, then there is a cell in which all of the
worlds of that cell are ones in which Franc did it, but there is also at least once cell of the
partition where someone else (or no one) did it. The similarity relation for the partition is
determined by the in mew of clause of the ‘can’-claim, as well as the fact that here, it is the
agent involved in the bombing that is at issue. The modal resolution divides the world scope
in such a way that there will be a union of cells such that the set of worlds of that union is a
perfect stand-in for what in Kratzer’s account would have been an individual world, e.g. the
world where Franc did it, the world where Joe did it, and so on.
My view gives the same answer as Kratzer’s here. Franc could have been the
bomber because in the partitioned world scope that satisfies the context set, there is a
partition-visible set of possible worlds that is uniform with respect to who did it, and Franc
was the one. The notion of ‘option’ here, while not syntactically appropriate for cases
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involving not human action but rather general states of affairs, should be considered the
same (technically speaking) as the notion of ‘possibility’ when used in tins context. It is a
possibility that Franc was the bomber. I believe mv account reduces to Kratzer’s along
similar lines for all of the cases presented so far. My tentative conclusion is my account
generallv reduces to Kratzer’s for cases that have partitioning schemes that are so intuitive,
we do not even realize they are there. These transparent partitioning schemes appear to
govern most ‘can’-claims, with the exception of certain cases of the ‘can’ of agent power that
happen to be prevalent in claims about options in ethical contexts.
I can now offer a formulation of my account:
W: the class of all possible worlds,
Wp: the class of all worlds where proposition p is true,
w, v: possible worlds in W,
c: the context of utterance,
f
t(w): a function that assigns in c a set of propositions, the context set at w,
R
c
: the accessibility relation relevant to context c,














Visibility: p is visible in FI c (w) iff for each cell, E 6E Ilc (w)> either E C Wp or E is
disjoint from Wp 14
Must: “it must be that p” is true at w with respect to the context c iff for every non-
empty union U of a set of cells, C, where C Q FIc (w), U Q Wp (no cell in nc(w)
contains any non-p-world ; consequently p is visible in nc(w))'’




For contexts involving agent power, where VP is a verb-phrase:
13 It is worth noting that I am defining the partition set as non-empty — this implies that I have a suitable story
for the case of inconsistent context sets so as to ensure that the set of worlds being partitioned is non-empty.
The smallest number of options an agent can have is 1.
14 Yalcin 2007, 16-17.
15 Notice that this definition of ‘must’ is strictly extensionally equivalent to Kratzer’s — that is, both definitions
imply p must be the case if and only p is the case in every accessible possible world.
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Alternative: “p is one of the agent’s alternative/’ is true at w with respect to the
context c iff “it can be that p” is true (at w, in c), and, “it must be that p” is not
Option: p is one of the agent’s available options iff p is one of the agent’s alternatives'
“Can-do”: for an agent A, “A can VP” is true at w with respect to the context c iff
there is a p visible in FI^w) such that p entails “A XT’s” is true
“Can-do” implicature: A has an alternative to p, q, and q entails that “A VPs” is
false
1
It must be that p if and only if every cell, and hence any union of any set of cells, is uniform
with respect to p (every world in it is a p-world). It can be that p if and only if there is a set
of cells such that its union is uniform with respect to p, and any cell outside of the set is such
that it is uniform with respect to not-p — this is the notion of visibility given by Yalcin above.
An option or an alternative is, in the context of agent power, any visible proposition on the
partitioned world scope where that proposition is not the only visible proposition. This lends
itself naturally to an account of what an agent can do : an agent can do something if and only
there is a proposition that can be the case that entails he does it. I tend to think that normal
power-‘can’ claims imply that the agent has multiple alternatives. The reason this is not a
truth-condition for “can do” statements is that its negation does not lead to the negation of
the related “can do” claim. For example, if we agree that 1 can take out the trash, and
subsequently someone notes that I have no choice but to do it, this news does not at all
incline me to change my original evaluation of what I can do. In the power sense of must
,
an
agent must do something if and only if no matter what he does, he does it too. This is a little
bit complicated, so I will discuss a few examples.
In view of my location, I cannot now swim. There is no world even accessible to me
where I am swimming, and therefore, there is no set of worlds that make up an equivalence
16 Grammatically, the notion of an option is sometimes taken to be a verb-phrase — this seems to me more
prevalent than taking an alternative to be a verb-phrase (rather than a proposition). I give the translation of the
account for verb-phrases in “can-do.”
17 Special thanks to Chris Potts for helping me understand many issues surrounding the definition of “can do”
and its implicature.
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class where I am swimming - no cell of the relevant partition on my accessible worlds is a
subset of that general proposition. Suppose there were a pool nearby. Then 1 could swim -
then, there would be many accessible worlds where I was swimming, and many where I was
not, and the partitioning relation involved in this claim would intuitively divide worlds
according to my physical prowess and knowledge in such a way that swimming worlds and
non-swimming worlds were separated cleanly into different cells. One such cell would be a
set of worlds in which I was swimming at each of them — this is a set of worlds that is a
proper subset of the general proposition that l am swimming. Therefore one of my options
(but not all) would be a subset of worlds m which 1 am swimming, and thus, I can swim
now. In simple cases like these, the simple cells of a partition that cleanly cuts the logical
space of the world scope also serve as the visible unions — here, the unions that are formed
on the singletons containing individual cells.
In the case of the coin toss, there is a set of worlds accessible to the agent where in
some of the worlds the agent refrains from tossing the coin, and in others the agent tosses
the coin. In some of the coin tossing worlds the coin lands heads and in others the coin
lands tails. Because the agent has the particular neurophvsiology he has, or because of the
objectively chancy nature of the agent’s world, the partitioning relation P does not induce a
partition where tails-worlds are cleanly separated from heads-worlds — any cell that has tails-
worlds will also have heads-worlds, and vice versa. It does however induce a partition where
flip-worlds are cleanly separated from refrain-from-flip worlds — there will be no cell with
both flip-worlds and refrain-from-flip worlds. So, there will be a cell that is a subset of the
proposition that I flip a coin, but no cell that is a subset of the proposition that I flip heads.
Therefore, my view gives the result that though you can flip the coin, you cannot flip heads.
For contexts involving agent power, 1 believe this is the right result. In contexts where the
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‘can’-claim at issue is closer to the notion of a continuant (rather than one that involves
agent power, and consequently permits finer-grained partitions delineated by, for example,
discernable differences in the outcomes), my account will yield the result that you can (in this
more general sense — the sense of (k) above) flip heads — again, 1 would argue, a good result.
There are unanswered questions about these partitions I have proposed. What are
the partitioning functions? What features of the context set affect them? How do the
partitions capture the ‘resolution’ of our actions? What is the relationship between these
partitions and the intuitive notion of ‘control’ — and can we give a non-circular definition to
the partitioning function by avoiding dependence on the notion of ‘control’? I end this
chapter with a discussion of the formal questions posed above, and return to the broadly
semantic questions in the next chapter.
IV. World scope and partitions
World scope is determined from the context set in a manner that Kratzer has
illustrated in broad outline. In the next chapter, we will sharpen that outline by focusing on
one particular sort of ‘can’-claim, that of agent power in etlncal contexts, in order to get
more specific about what the context and meaning of the claim provide by way of
restrictions to the world scope. I think that there are some central considerations, and rules
for how to apply them, that determine the world scope for these sorts of claims.
However, the manner in which the partitions are drawn across this world scope
depends on a different set of contextually relevant considerations. Though there is some
degree to which these considerations must be left vague until we settle on discussing the
ethical claim context in the next chapter, there are still some issues we can settle for power
‘can’-claims generally.
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It would be a significant mistake for me to offer ‘control-related facts’ as a category
of relevant propositions that partially determine the partitioning of the world scope. As I
mentioned earlier, I have chosen to produce an account on which control is a concept that
depends on power tor its analvsis or explanation. Though I think the decision for which
concepts to take as primitives is not entirely arbitrary, I think that when it comes to
“control,” “accessibility,” “power” and “option,” it is easy to imagine someone else carrying
out an account that would end up roughly equivalent to mine, but with a different choice of
primitives. On the account as I have presented it, however, it would be viciously circular to
claim that an analysis of power ‘can’-claims depends on a notion of a partitioned world
scope, where those partitions are entailed by the contextually relevant control facts, and control
is to be analyzed in terms ofpower ‘can '-claims. There must be some other way to describe the
sorts of facts that are relevant to an agent’s control over Iris actions, so that we can non-
circularly describe how those facts determine the partitioning of the world scope. This
intuition is bolstered by the fact that I do think that people can tell the difference between
those facts that are relevant to control and those that are not. Conversations about morality
often touch upon these considerations regarding control.
There are statistical tolerances and ranges that are brute physical facts about our
bodies. The body’s materials can bend, stretch or support so much until they break, tear or
give way. Muscles and neurons have ranges of response times that describe how long it
takes them to activate or deactivate. Many of the body’s systems have imperfections, such as
muscle wobble or jitter (shaking), the eyes’ blind spots, failures in the inner ear mechanisms
for balance under certain conditions, and so on. Agents sometimes differ as to which PAFs
are true of them, and to what degree — some surgeons have amazingly steady hands, while
some people with Parkinson’s disease have trouble with even gross motor coordination.
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This group of facts I will refer to as physical agentfacts (PAFs). PAFs determine aspects of the
options partition directly. Consider a case where a member of the bomb squad is attempting
to defuse a very complex bomb arming mechanism. Suppose that in order to defuse the
bomb, he has to move a wire between two other wires. Suppose the two other wires are
4mm apart. The particular physical makeup of our bomb squad member permits him to
move small objects with a precision of +/- 1mm in this context. In this case, it would be
natural to conclude that he can defuse the bombA It seems to me that this is something
that just “falls out” of the story — there are no intermediate references to control, power or
abilitv here — the PAFs simply imply facts about the agent’s options partition. In other
cases, the ranges or tolerances in a contextually relevant list of PAFs would imply that an
agent does not have all the options we might like — the surgeon simply does not have the
power to perform a surgical cut with the precision required to save this patient. These PAFs
cause the elements of an options partition make a particular outcome invisible. l ake a surgery
case for example. Suppose the surgeon has the option to perform the surgery, or hand it off
to a colleague. However, the surgeon in question does not have the physical abilities
necessary to perform the cuts necessary to save the patient’s life. If she performs a certain
cut, there will be some chance she will save the life, but a substantial chance she will end it.
In this case, the two cells in the surgeon’s options partition may be to operate or handoff.
But in the operate cell, there are cases (worlds) where the surgeon saves the patient, but also
cases where she does not.
1
So no option that the surgeon has can be accurately described as
18 The fact that the squad member can defuse the bomb does not entail that on this attempt he will be
successful — the actual world may not be in the union of cells corresponding to the option the agent selects.
The possibility of accidents or other kinds of unintentional failures does not seem to me to generally defeat
claims about agent power.
19 Note that this distinction, between the success cases in the option and the failure cases, is not a modal
resolution on this partition. If it were, there would be a sub-cell of “making the cut” that was a success cell,
and thus it would turn out that the surgeon could save the patient. It is in fact this distinction that would allow a
surgeon to save the patient by making the cut ifthe surgeon were skilled (and sober, and awake, and steady)
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“saving the patient” — no cell of the surgeon’s options partition is a subset of that
proposition. The surgeon in question does not have the power to save the patient — saving
the patient is not one of her options."' She might save the patient if she tries (I might flip the
coin heads if I try, too), yet it seems inappropriate to say that she has the power to save the
patient.
As far as I can tell, admitting Pr\Fs into the formation of option partitions in the way
I describe does not introduce any vicious circularity into my account. There are also other
sorts of considerations that affect the formation of options partitions. Two of the most
important are objective chance and agent knowledge.
One interpretation of the coin-flipping case is that objective chance prevents an
agent from having the power to flip the coin as he wishes."
1 When you flip the (fair) coin,
the governing forces of nature entail that no matter how you flip the coin, there is an
objective chance that you will flip heads, and a nearly equal objective chance that you will
flip tails. If this is the case, it would seem inappropriate to say that you had the power to flip
the coin heads. That would imply that you could control the outcome, and that implication
enough to accomplish the cut correctly. In that case, the modal resolution would contain facts that would make
the success case a sub-cell of the general option to make the cut.
20 One might object here that what I am saying about chance and power is too strict. For anything that we do,
there is a chance we will fail. If there being a chance of failure implies we do not have the power to do what
we are attempting, then we do not have the power to do much at all. But I do not believe that a mere chance
of failure defeats claims about agent power generally. Rather, I think that in particular contexts, a substantial
chance of failure that results directly from PAFs defeats claims about agent power. The context I am
illustrating with the case of the surgeon is intended to be such a case.
21 The other interpretation is that it is lack of knowledge and muscular precision that prevent this. On this
interpretation, it is the PAFs in the case that ensure that ‘flipping heads’ is nor an option for the agent.
Probably in the actual world, the lack of agent power is to be explained in terms of facts about the agent’s
muscles more so than in terms of facts about objective chance. It is a tricky matter to prove that quantum
mdeterminacies can “add up” in a way appropriate to rendering probabilistic such large-scale events as a coin
landing on a particular side. Considering the lengthy and substantial success of the theories that came before
quantum mechanics in predicting the behavior of large physical interactions, there may be a case to be made
that for large physical interactions, quantum mdeterminacies statistically “cancel each other out.” However, the
coin-toss case is vastly more accessible as an example than one somehow involving a decaying isotope.
Consequently, I will leave it to the reader to imagine a more suitable example if desired — the things I have to
say about the coin-toss case will not be affected by a different probabilistic example.
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flies in the face of the fact that your flip results are governed by objective chance.' So, 1
believe that these facts about objective chance imply something about agent control. The
way this works is that facts about objective chance entail that the options partition for an
agent are formed in such a way that outcomes that depend on chance are distributed across
an agent’s options. So, head-flipping outcomes are distributed across all of the coin-flipping
options for an agent (for example, “flip the com with my right hand,” “flip the coin with my
left hand,” etc.). Similarly, tail- flipping outcomes are distributed across the agent’s options.
The result according to my account is that outcomes that are significantly chancy are not
ones an agent typically has the power to bring about. This strikes me as the right result. No
option in which the agent flips the coin is uniform with respect to head- flipping, and
likewise no such option is uniform with respect to tail-flipping. An agent can flip heads or tails
though, as all of his flipping options are subsets of that disjunction.
Agent knowledge can also have an impact on the formation of option partitions.
Consider the case of the bank manager, the combination safe and the bomb.- ' If the bank
manager enters the proper combination, C, she can open the safe and let the bomb squad
defuse the bomb. But she does not know the combination, and her chances of guessing it
are less than one in a hundred billion billion. In this case, it seems right to say that she
cannot open the safe: she has the power to enter combinations but not the power to open
" This seems obvious, but it is a contested point. Those who hold an ‘agent causation’ view sometimes cite
quantum indeterminism as an enabling factor for free will — that is, so long as your action is not physically
determined, you can agent cause any of your available options. I take the implication here to be that if there are
genuine objective chances of various actions, then you can somehow (via agent causation) control which you
perform. I find this view mysterious at best. Of course, even those who hold an agent causation view of
human action do not believe that I can flip heads in the coin toss case. The story there has to be something
regarding precisely which sorts of events can be agent caused — presumably ones that are entirely external to the
agent’s own body (such as the spinning com) are not in the agent’s control. My point here wTas simply that
whatever distinction the agent causation theorist proposes, it cannot be as simple as my claim that objective
probabilities fly in the face of agent control generally. The supporter of an agent causation view does not think
that objective probabilities generally fly in the face of agent control.
23 The case of Alejandra, discussed in chapter 2.
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the safe. Even though there is some sense in which she ‘can’ enter C into the lock — her
fingers are working fine and she has plenty of time to do so — she is still apparently
powerless to open the safe. Somehow the fact that she is missing a key bit of knowledge,
the combination, causes her options partition to blur - that is, in the option that most
closely corresponds to “entering her best guess at the combination,” there are worlds in
which she does not guess correctly and therefore fails to open the safe. Here the metaphor
of options resolution is particularly straightforward: the bank manager cannot “see” any
difference between any random pair of combinations to the lock - to her, every' combination
is just like every other.
-4
One may immediately object to this characterization of the bank manager. Surely
she can see the difference between pairs of combinations, even in a sense relevant to agent
power. After all, I just said that she has the power to enter any pardcular combination into the
safe. If, then, the context of moral evaluation of the manager’s actions is also a context of
agent power, how can we avoid saving that the modal resolution does contain a cell
corresponding to the right combination — after all, the right combination is x, and she has the
power to enter x. My answer above was that the options partition was “blurred” in some way
here — that was far too vague. There are several ways in which my account works to cause
options to become invisible to an agent.
One way is that modal resolutions can be erased or prevented by certain facts. So, for
example, we will see in the next chapter that 1 accept a rule that implies that whenever two
possibilities resemble each other in a certain way, they must be present in any cell of the
options partition. That is, the modal resolution will not draw a line between those
24 A similar case that would illustrate the same point might be: you are aided by a tribe of Eskimos who will
defuse the bomb if you would just verify your worthiness by explaining to them the difference between two
kinds of snow. But all the snow looks the same to you, and you cannot do it.
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possibilities. The recurring example here is the coin-tossing case. There, heads-worlds and
tails-worlds cannot be teased apart due to the fact that they are, relative to the facts true in
the context set, resembling outcomes from the standpoint of agent power. I doubt that erasure
or prevention will help in the case of the bank manager. It does not seem to me that
similarities between the different combinations will erase the agent control lines that divide the
really quite distinct combinations. If the agent were so nervous that she could not control
her hands, then we might have a case where the modal resolution involving control was
removed or obscured. So I am doubtful that this particular result of my view helps in this
case.
Another way an option can become invisible to an agent is when the world scope
includes possibilities that themselves prevent a particular proposition from being visible on
the partition. Consider that the world scope is determined by the context set and that the
context set for the bank manager is one that includes a fact that is very salient in a moral
context: she does not know the combination. Suppose that the introduction of that fact
causes the world scope to include a proportional representation of worlds where any given
combination is a success and (overwhelmingly) worlds in which that combination is a failure.
That is, any combination x, for all the context set implies, might have been right (unlikelv)
and might have been wrong (likely). In this case, though the modal resolution will indeed
partition the manager’s world scope into cells corresponding to combinations of the safe, no
cell will be uniform as to whether she succeeds, and thus the proposition that she dial the right
combination will be invisible on tins modal resolution and hence not an option. Tins solution
gives the right result. It is also in the spirit of my earlier suggestion that ‘can’-claims will not
generally depend on contexts that hold fixed every feature of the actual world, but rather only
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select, relevant ones. As far as I can tell, this solution is the right one for the case of
Alejandra and the safe.
This discussion highlights questions 1 will not be able to answer fully in this essay:
how do all the rules for options partitions interact with each other generally? When are they
independent of each other, and when do they interfere with each other? My solution also
raises complex questions having to do with the interaction of confidence with the options
partition and moral evaluation. Suppose Alejandra does not know which combination is
correct, but she is 95% confident in her guess. How then do we evaluate whether she is
obligated to open the safe, whether she can open it whether she may be merely obligated to
try (even if trying has a chance of producing a worse result)? My instinct would be to appeal
to Yalcm’s account of (objective) probability- or confidence-weighted cells in the modal
resolution as a starting point (Yalcin 2007, 22). Developing this solution is outside of the
scope of my discussion here, though.
In some contexts it would be correct to say that the bank manager could open the
safe. For example, in a context where we were interested specifically in her physical capability
to do so, we would understand her options partition as being drawn simply along the lines of
controllable distinctions in what she does with her fingers in various accessible possibilities.
That is, even though her fear may make her muscles quiver in a way that she cannot fully
control, we do assume that she could have entered 3-35-16. . . or 4-56-10. . ., or any other
combination that she might have guessed. Another notable context in which we would say
that she could open the safe is one in which we believed that she knew the combination. There,
we would understand the options partition as one with an important cell where she entered
the combination she knew to be right — this cell in this case would be clear of worlds where she
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entered some other combination that did not result in the vault opening (and clear of worlds
in which she entered this combination, but it was the wrong one)
In summary: objecdve chance, agent knowledge and certain physical facts about
agents determine the partition induced on the set of worlds broadly accessible to the agent in
a particular context. It is difficult to give a general unified account of what facts are PAFs
because they form the foundation of our reasoning about power and control. We come to
know them by way of considering comparisons between more and less plausible examples
and reasoning based on our intuitions from linguistic competence and (hopefully
trustworthy) common sense. Occasionally we invoke science or certain laws of nature. On
this way of explaining agent power, what an agent has control over is understood in terms of
what he has the power to do. The agent’s power is explained in terms of what options are
available to him in the context. The available options are determined by PAFs, the
knowledge that the agent has and certain external physical facts such as those involving
objective chance. I will go into a lot more detail in chapter 5 about what kinds of tacts are
relevant in our usual evaluations of ‘can-claims of agent power in ethical contexts.
V. Inconsistent context sets, redux
Earlier, I skipped over a problem that Kratzer encountered in formulating her view
on ‘can-claims: the problem of inconsistent context sets. Here, I present some examples
that bring out the issue and then discuss her solution. I argue that since the notions of world
scope and accessibility are ones that my view shares with Kratzer’s, her solution solves the
problem of inconsistent context sets for me as well. This is important because my account
will also have to work for cases involving inconsistent context sets. This is because I claim
my account is an extension of Kratzer’s, and because I consequently want my account to
give the same results as Kratzer’s for the sorts of ‘can’-claims she tackled.
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Consider the following case: In New Zealand, the only source of law is precedent;
that is, the law is determined by the rulings of judges past. It turns out that in one part of
New Zealand, a judgment was made that provided that deer are not personally responsible
for the damage they inflict to young trees, while in another part of New Zealand, a judgment
was made that provided that deer are personally responsible for the damage they inflict to
young trees. So, the set of propositions that describes New Zealand law is inconsistent.
However, on Kratzer’s account of ‘can,’ something must be the case if it is true at every world
included in the context set. In the case of New Zealand law, no world is included in the
context set, and hence, any proposition must he the case. In particular, consider:
(Ml) In view of what NZ law provides, murder must be a crime.
(M2) In view of what NZ law provides, murder must not be a crnne.
Both come out true on Kratzer’s first definition of ‘must.’ (Ml) should come out true: after
all, no judge in all of NZ has ever attacked the ruling that murder was a crime. However,
(M2) surely should not come out true (and we certainly do not want both (Ml) and (M2) to
be true; Kratzer 1977, 347-8). Things are similarly bad for claims about what can be the case:
(Kl) In view of what NZ law provides, it can be that deer are personally responsible
for the damage they do to young trees.
(K2) In view of what NZ law provides, it can be that deer are not personally
responsible for the damage they do to young trees.
Here, both (Kl) and (K2) turn out to be false on Kratzer’s account: there is no world that is
consistent with the context set (for the context set is inconsistent), and hence no world m
which deer are (or are not) responsible for their inconsiderate behavior.
Kratzer’s solution is to revise the definition of accessibility.'
5 Suppose the only
propositions that are a part of NZ law are:
25 Strictly speaking, Kratzer does not formulate her account in terms of accessibility. However, based on
Kratzer’s translation of her account into one presented in terms of accessibility, the modification she offers to
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m: Murder is a crime.
q: Deer are personally responsible for the damage they do to young trees.
~q: Deer are not personally responsible for the damage they do to young trees.
In this case, the set of all consistent subsets of the NZ laws would be:
CS: { 0, { m }, { q }, { ~q }, { m, q }, { m, ~q } }
Though (Ml) and (M2) both follow from the inconsistent set of NZ laws, intuition tells us
that (Ml) is true but (M2) is false. CS gives us a basis for making a distinction between (Ml)
and (M2) in terms of compatibility with NZ laws. Ever)' set s in CS has this property: that
some superset S (in CS) of s entails the proposition that murder is a crime. This is not true with
respect to the proposition that murder is not a crime - tins latter proposition is not even
compatible with the sets { m, q } and { m, ~q }, and hence it is not compatible with some
(any) superset of m. Tins is encouraging: perhaps by taking the set of all consistent subsets
of our background presuppositions, we could redefine ‘must’ as something like (verv
roughly): it must be that p iff for every consistent subset of the context set, fc (w), there is some
superset s that entails that p. An account like this would entail that (Ml) is true — every
element of our example CS is such that there is some superset of it in CS that entails that
murder is a crime. It would not entail that (M2) is true — no set in CS is such that it has a
superset that entails that murder is not a crime.
Similarly, while (Kl) and (K2) are not consistent with the inconsistent set of NZ
laws, it would seem that both (Kl) and (K2) are true — that is, because of the rulings, deer
can be responsible for the damage they do to young trees (for example, if one of the relevant
deer rulings is more apropos), but they can also be not responsible for the damage they do to
young trees (when another, contrary ruling is more apropos). Again, CS is very helpful in
explaining our intuitions about (Kl) and (Iv2). There is some set s in CS such that even-
resolve the problem of inconsistent backgrounds is one that would affect the definition of accessibility in the
translation. My claim in the main text is simply shorthand for this more elaborate description.
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superset S (in CS) of s is compatible with the proposition that deer are personally responsiblefor
the damage they do toyoung trees. In tins case, the set
{ q } is such that every consistent superset
of it is compatible with the proposition that deer are personally responsible for the damage they do to
young trees. Similarly, the set { ~q } is such that ever}' consistent superset of it is compatible
with the proposition that deer are not personally responsible for the damage they do toyoung trees. A
rough version of ‘can’ based on these considerations might go as follows: it can be that p iff
for some consistent subset of f
c
(w), every superset of it is compatible with p. This sort of
view would entail that both (Kl) and (K2) are true.
These conclusions can be obtained by modifying our original view of accessibility.
In order to translate the remarks above into talk about worlds and accessibility, it will be
helpful to consider the inconsistent context set in terms of how that background partitions
the possible worlds accessible to the agent."' Consider every world compatible with the
whole of the context set. In the case at hand, there are no such worlds. However, by
dividing the context set into all of its maximal consistent subsets, we can reintroduce a
compatibility relation that will admit worlds and thus give us a relation we can use to define
accessibility.





Q: { m, ~q }
Let’s let WP be the set of worlds that are consistent with P (the set of worlds such that even-
proposition in P is true at it). Similarly, letW
( ,
be the set of worlds consistent with Q.
Finally, let lLJfc (w)] be the set of all worlds w such that #Hs consistent with some maximal
26 Kratzer 1991, 647 suggests a very similar line of reasoning.
27 The subsets such that the only consistent superset of it is it itself, relative to fc (w).
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consistent subset of propositions in f
c




We now have the definitions necessary7 to reformulate our account of accessibility:
Accessibility’: v is accessible’ to w (wR
c
v) iff v E U ]f
c
(w)]
Now we can give Kratzer’s revised accounts for ‘must’ and ‘can’ in a straightforward way: it
must be that p iff ever}
7 accessible’ world is a p-world; it can be that p iff some accessible’
world is a p-world.
Both my view and Kratzer’s, amended with Accessibility’, appear to get the cases
involving inconsistent context sets right. (Ml) comes out true, because every7 accessible’
world is one where murder is a crime. To see this, consider the fact that no set in CS is such
that every7 superset of it is compatible with a world where murder is not a crime. Similarly,
no world in If |f
c
(w)] is a world where murder is not a crime. Leaving aside problems that
arise when denying the law of the excluded middle, this implies that every7 accessible’ world
will be one where murder is a crime, and therefore (Ml) is true. (M2) however is not true.
Some superset of every7 set in CS is a counterexample to (M2) according to Accessibility’.
Also, every world in If |f
c
(w)] is a counterexample to (M2). Therefore, not every7 accessible’
world is one where murder is not a crime. Hence (M2) is false. Similar results obtain for
(Kl) and (K2). Some, but not all, of the accessible’ worlds are ones where deer are
responsible for the damage they do to
y
7oung trees (Rd). Likewise, some but not all of the
accessible’ worlds are ones where deer are not responsible for the damage they do to young
trees (~Rd). Thus, some accessible’ worlds are Rd worlds, and some are ~Rd worlds. This
implies, according to Kratzer’s definition of ‘can,’ that it can be the case that deer are
responsible for the damage they do, and also that it can be the case that deer are not
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responsible for the damage they do. This revision to Kratzer’s view appears to clear up the
trouble with inconsistent context sets.
Because the revision to Kratzer’s account affects only the notion of accessibility, I
believe that the very same revision to my own account will take care of the worries regarding
inconsistent context sets. This is because for both views, the notion of accessibility is what
determines what 1 have called the world scope
,
the set of worlds that make up the source set on
which options partitions are induced. The fundamental problem with inconsistent context
sets was that the world scope came out empty, and this brought out the typical
counterintuitive logical results involving must (every, any
,
all) and can (some, exists a). The
solution fixes the problem by allowing worlds on each side of the divide — that is, worlds in
which one of the propositions involved in the contradiction are allowed, and worlds in
which the other of the propositions involved in the contradiction are allowed. This causes
the world scope to be meaningfully populated for both Kratzer’s view and my own. Since
my view operates as a pure extension to Kratzer’s, defining ‘can ’ and options in terms of a
partition induced on the world scope rather than directly in terms of the world scope itself,
my view can reap the same benefits from the revision to accessibility as hers. The examples
above regarding the deer are explained in the same way on my view as on Kratzer’s.
Though it is not clear to me that contexts of agent power are ever inconsistent in the
way that e.g. legal contexts can be, it is fairly clear what my view would entail for the options
partition of inconsistent contexts. The revised notion of accessibilitv’ allows that the world
scope will include any world that is consistent with a maximal subset of consistent
propositions from the context set. The lines of modal resolution are then drawn between
any sets of worlds that differ with respect to something power-relevant. If a difference
between worlds from different maximally consistent subsets of the context set is relevant to the
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moral resolution, a line will be drawn for that distinction as well. If it is not, however, it will
not be. Because mv view entails that options are the unions of cells of the world scope
partition, all that need be the case for any such union is that it be univocal with respect to
some proposition (or result) that is intuitively an option for the agent. Worlds in cells of the
partition were already expected to disagree on some facts (after all, we’re assuming there are
often more than one world in a cell), and so if the facts that make for an inconsistent context
were not relevant to tins case of agent power, then the cells may have worlds that disagree
on those very facts. In short, the benefit to my account of this solution is merely that the
new account of accessibility’ ensures that there will be worlds in the world scope for any
‘can’-claim.
VI. Solutions to Manipulous and the problem of indeterminate consequences
I believe my account yields the correct results for the cases that were problematic for
CALJ and WU in chapter 2. In the case of Manipulous, his options partition looks like this:
Fig. 3
(Cells are black; outlines correspond to unions of cells.) 1-4 are the cells corresponding to
pushing buttons 1-4 and ‘no button’ is the cell where Manipulous chooses not to push any
162
button. The union of 1 and 4 is the option to push a square button. The union of 2 and 3 is
the option to push a round button. The union of 1 and 3 is the option to push a white
button. The union of 2 and 4 is the option to push a grey button. The union of all the
button-pushing cells is the option to push a button.
Suppose the valuations for the options given in the original example are correct. In
that case, my view could be wed to a simple maximizing normative theory to yield the result
that pushing button 1 is morally obligator}' for Manipulous. Although my view does entail
that there are options such as “pushing a grey button” available to him, the valuation of
those options does not proceed along the lines of the counterfactuals that are supposed to
govern his choices under various constraints. Rather, the value of any cell or union of cells
is calculated by some mathematical measure over the worlds of that cell. The fact that if
Manipulous were to choose to push a grey button, he would choose button 2 is not relevant
for the calculation of the value of that option (the counterfactual does not affect the modal
resolution of the case). Even though like Feldman, 1 do not propose that there is any
exclusive and exhaustive alternative set that corresponds to the agent’s options, the answer
my view entails is consistent with any way we want to describe Manipulous’ options due to
this way of calculating the modal resolution and the values of the options.
'
s
It is clear that if I wanted to, I could in fact define an alternative set based on the
minimal visible options of the agent. Since the partition guarantees mutual exclusion and joint
exhaustion of the world scope, this would be trivial. Similarly, the notion of rival alternative
sets does not arise for me. If I were to define alternative sets along the lines of the agent’s
28
I hope it is clear why I say this. Suppose the value of 1 is +10 and the value of 4 is 10 (as supposed in the
case). If so, my view entails (very roughly, as I have proposed no concrete mathematical measure for how to
“average” these sets) that the option to push a square button has a value of 0. In general, whatever minimal
cell has the highest value will always be the cell that maximizes utility for the agent, since any union it
participates m would by definition have a lower value.
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options partition, it would be well-defined which cells were minimal on the modal resolution
for the agent, and therefore it would be well defined which options were among the agents
alternatives.
Similarly, my view implies a determinate result in the case of indeterminate
consequences. The modal resolution for the basketball player will result in a partition that
gives him the option to shoot or not to shoot. Since the player cannot control whether he
makes the shot, the shooting option will contain a proportional representation (based on the
player’s skill and the context) of worlds in which he makes it and worlds in which he does
not make it. The proportional representation of the agent’s skills and facts about the context
ensure that the agent's contribution to the option is not lost. 1 identify the consequences of an
option as the worlds in that option. Therefore, the valuation for an option will be based on
applying a mathematical measure over the values of the worlds of that option. 1 have not
provided a concrete way of evaluating options, but the rough outlines are clear enough:
objective chance, or other objective measures over the worlds of an option in general, will be
a guide as to how to weight worlds or sets of worlds as to then- values. The valuation of a
world could be much as Feldman suggests, depending on the intrinsic values of basic value
propositions true at that world.
It should be fairly clear by now how my account handles all of the puzzles
mentioned in chapter 2. I return to consider some of them again at greater length in the
next chapter where I consider proposals for the truth-conditions of ‘can -claims involving
agent power, particularly in ethical contexts.
VII. Conclusion: Flexibility, accommodation and plausibility
The view I have presented is a revision to a view that already handled a very wide
range of cases involving ‘can’ and ‘must.’ My revision, if good, allows it to handle even more
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cases, and in particular, it allows it to handle a range of cases that are very important in
formulating an account of the moral rightness and wrongness of acts. The resulting view is
flexible, accommodating and plausible — these are the three major criteria that I presented in
chapter 3 for the success of a view of ‘can.’
The flexibility of the view is the measure of its ability' to account for a wide range of
‘can’-claims. While some views may only work as an analysis of human freedom, mine works
more generally as an analysis of not only ‘can’-claims involving agent power, but also as an
account of legal permissibility, of the epistemic ‘can’ involved in claims about conclusions
from evidence, of the ‘can’ used in statements about etiquette, and many more. Since the
view is not stated in terms of lam ofnature or other notions that restrict its applicability to
cases involving power or agency, it is easy to see how it can be used to explain such a wide
range of cases. Other views, such as Ayer’s, Lehrer’s and even Unger’s, cannot be extended
in this way. Since the notion of ‘can’ seems to be reasonably generic, and since the uses of
‘can’ in many different contexts do seem to have something in common, a flexible account of
‘can’ is valuable.
An account of ‘can’ is generally accommodating when it handles well the many ways in
which we actually use the word. Some people believe that special individuals can perform
miracles. Those people have views on what miracle workers can and cannot do. Many claims
we make are counterfactual, and on some plausible analyses of counterfactuals, the worlds
that are closest to our own sometimes differ from the actual world as to what the laws of
nature are (or at least, they contain local miracles). Counterfactual ‘can’-claims, then, may
also require some accommodation in a theory of ‘can.’ Some views of ‘can’ are spelled out
explicitly in terms of the actual laws of nature (or the laws of nature of the index world from
which a claim is made). Such views are very difficult to modify in order to make them more
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accommodating. My own view is more accommodating. The notion of a context set does
not presuppose that the laws ofnature are always a part of the background for any ‘can’-
claim.' What can be a part of a context set is highly dependent on the kind of ‘can’-claim
being made — we will review this in detail in the next chapter where I discuss what the major
elements of an ethical context set typically are. Because the notion of a context set is suitable
general, my view of ‘can’ easily accommodates many different sorts of claims, with their wide
variety of relevant bits of context.
Finally, as I have argued throughout this chapter, my view is plausible. The answers
it implies in standard cases of ‘can’-claims match our intuitions, and even for the trickier
cases involving inconsistent context sets and tough questions regarding agent power, it
appears to yield the right answers.
2>>
It may be right to say that this very question, of when the laws of nature are or are not a part of the context
set, is the fundamental question in the debate regarding the compatibility of determinism and freedom.
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CHAPTER 5
TRUTH-CONDITIONS AND PRINCIPLES FOR THE FRAMEWORK
In my presentation of a framework for understanding the ‘can’-claims of agent
power, particularly in ethical contexts, I raised two questions that I have not yet attempted to
answer. The first question was how does a ‘can’-clarm come to have the scope that it does
and the second was how does a ‘can’-claim come to be partitioned the way it does? I pointed
out that both the meaning of the claim involved and the context in which the claim was
made are involved in answering both questions.
Lewis’ “Elusive Knowledge” (1999c) is a good starting point for my discussion.
After a brief description of a formal framework for understanding knowledge, he offers a
series of rules that he argues provide the truth-conditions for knowledge claims. As noted
earlier, Hawthorne (2001) believed that Lewis’ presentation could be used as a template for
giving the truth-conditions for claims about freedom. Unfortunately, Hawthorne did not do
much more than outline how such an account would go — he certainly did not deliver a full-
fledged account of freedom. Nevertheless, the point that Lewis’ account can be used as a
template for giving the principles and truth-conditions for a modal framework is a good one.
In this chapter, I will briefly present Lewis’ account of the truth conditional rules for
knowledge. I will then present some of the rules for power ‘can’-claims. I will focus on the
way such claims are scoped and partitioned in contexts involving moral considerations.
Though I will not specificallv aim my presentation at an account of freedom, many of the
rules I will discuss may be the same as or similar to rules that would show up in an account
of freedom — this connection is non-accidental. If I am right about this, my presentation
here can be seen in part as a continuation of the project Hawthorne started.
167
I. Lewis and Elusive Knowledge: Rules for proper ignoring
Lewis’ account of knowledge is very simple to formulate:
(K) S knows that p iff S’s evidence eliminates every unignorable possibility P in which
not-p
(E) A possibility P is uneliminated for S iff S’s perceptual experience and memory are
the same in P as in actuality (otherwise, P is eliminated)
(I) A possibility P is unignorable iff (a) P is not being ignored by S, or (Id) P may not
properly be ignored by S
Suppose I am driving through a countryside where 500/o of the buildings that look like barns
are actually just the facades of barns. I point at one and exclaim, “That is a barn!” In fact
the building in question is a barn. Do I know that that is a barn? According to Lewis I do
not. There is a possibility that matches actuality in terms of my perceptual experience and
memory in which I am looking at a barn facade. And even though I am ignoring that odd
possibility at the time I make the claim, it turns out that by the application of some simple
contextual rules ofknowledge, that I may not properly ignore that odd possibility. Therefore, the
odd possibility is both unignorable and uneliminated. It follows that since this possibility is
one in which the building I am referring to is not a barn, I do not know it is a barn. There is
a possibility that is neither ruled out by my evidence nor properly ignored in winch I am
mistaken about the land of building I am looking at. This result matches the conventional
wisdom about the answer we should receive from our theory of knowledge for Gettier-style
puzzles.
The bulk of Lewis’ discussion revolves around the rules of knowledge that determine
whether a possibility is properly ignored when it is ignored. Here are the rules Lewis
proposes:
Rule of Actuality: The possibility' that corresponds to actuality may not properly be
ignored. This rule is roughly equivalent to the requirement that knowledge be a true
proposition — you cannot know thatp xip vs, false. According to Lewis, this is
168
because ifp is false, there is a possibility that may not properly be ignored (actuality)
in which not-p.
1
Rule of Belief: A possibility' that a subject believes may not properly be ignored by
the subject. Whether one’s degree of belief in some proposition is sufficiently high
to count as believing that proposition is determined by context. For example, it
could be influenced by the stakes — that is, by the relative risk of gain or loss in
having certain beliefs or engaging in certam behaviors in the given circumstance.
Rule of High Stakes: In general, when the stakes are higher, the thresholds of
other rules for ignoring possibilities are raised — that is, when the stakes are high,
fewer possibilities are properly ignored. This is a meta-rule, since it applies to
evaluating the context-sensitive elements present in the other rules.
Rule of Resemblance: If a possibility, P, may not properly be ignored on the basis
of a rule other than the Rule of Resemblance, and a possibility Q resembles P, then
Q may not properly be ignored. It is this rule that is applied in the barn facade case
above. Actuality may not properly be ignored due to the rule of actuality'. The case
in which I am actuallv observing a barn facade saliently resembles actuality7 and thus
also cannot properly be ignored.
Rule of Attention: If a possibility is not being ignored, it may not properly be
ignored. In most cases, once a possibility has been attended to, it becomes part of
the context and is no longer ignored, properly or otherwise. In my formulation of (I)
above, I have implicitly included this rule.
Rule of Reliability: A possibility- in which a reliable information transmission
process (such as memory, perception or testimony) fails for no contextuallv relevant
reason may defeasiblj be ignored.
Rules of Method: A possibility in which a sample is not representative of a
population, but in which there is no reason to suppose that the sample is non-
representative, may properly be ignored. Further, a possibility in which the best
explanation of our evidence is false, but in which there is no reason to suppose that
inference from best explanation would fail, may properly be ignored. These rules,
like the Rule of Reliability, are very defeasible. Any conversational move that
challenges assumptions about reliability ot information transfer or typical inference
from evidence patterns will tend to cause possibilities properly ignored by these rules
to no longer properly be ignored. Almost any other rule (such as the Rule of
Resemblance as it is invoked in Gettier-style cases) will trump these rules.
Rule of Conservatism: Again very defeasibly, we may properly ignore possibilities
that are generally ignored by those around us. To put the point another way, we are
generally permitted to adopt the presuppositions of our peers.
1 In the case of modal claims, it is the world of the subject of the claim that is relevant to evaluating the
subject’s knowledge. See Lewis 1999c, 428.
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Before discussing how these rules or ones like them might apply to my account, 1 would like
to examine where they would fit in such an account - that is, I want to clarify how the rules 1
will propose relate to the three central components (matching conditions, scope rules and
partitioning rules) of my account of the truth-conditions for ‘can’-claims.
On Lewis’ account, if we consider the worlds that meet all the relevant criteria the
accessible worlds, then we could say that Lewis offers two criteria for accessibility. The first
criterion is a (context-neutral, empirical) condition specifying a kind of match between actual
evidence and proposed possibilities" and the second is a group of context-sensitive rules that
typically causes a lot more worlds to fail the accessibility test in most contexts. Both of these
deal with the world scope for knowledge claims — they determine which worlds, and “how
many,” are accessible to the agent. This general structure is similar to my account of ‘can,’
where the world scope is determined by a less context-sensitive matching condition on my
counterparts (the cases that concern me most being ones in which the power ‘can’-claim is a
morally relevant one ’) and a more context-sensitive set of rule-like conditions on the worlds
that are considered accessible for the purposes of analyzing the claim.
On my account of ‘can,’ however, besides the world scope there is also a partitioning
relation that is in need of clarification that has no obvious analogue in Lewis’ account. I
think that the partitioning conditions can usefullv be specified as a set of contextual rules
much like those that determine world scope.
2 Strictly speaking, what is required here is a match in the perceptual and cognitive state of an agent and his
counterpart.
3 Though whether a particular claim is a moral one is also dependent on context, the impact of this context-
sensitivity on the scope of the claim is not subject to much variance — moral claims like knowledge claims
presuppose a certain match between actuality and the accessible possibilities that is itself not (very) context
dependent. The fact that context can be relevant in determining whether a claim is a knowledge claim or a
moral claim should not be confused with the question of whether the consequent matching relation is context-
sensitive.
170
iliis leaves me with three distinct tasks: briefly discuss the matching relation needed
for power ‘can’-claims (particularly those relevant to moral evaluation of agent action),
discuss in detail the rules relevant for the world scope of ‘can’-claims and finally, present the
partitioning rules for these claims.
II. Power ‘can’ and agent power - what I and my counterparts must share
When you know something, all of your relevant counterparts share your evidence.
What do your counterparts have in common with you when you can do something? It is
precisely here that compatibilists and incompatibilists about human freedom and moral
responsibility wage their battles. The issue at stake in the defense of these views boils down
to this: Should the laws of nature be lumped in with whatever else we say an agent and Ins
counterparts must have in common in an analysis of a ‘can’-clann? Since the discussion that
follows from this observation would take us far afield of our immediate interests, 1 will
return to it later.
Hawthorne hinted at an answer to the question of what we and our counterparts
must have in common in his formulation of freedom:
(I) S does x freely only if S’s action is free from causal explainers beyond S’s
control — Psst! — apart from those causal explainers that we are properly
ignoring.
4
There is a reasonably straightforward way to frame this as a matching condition for an agent
and his counterparts. Consider the agent A and his proposed action a. This agent has a long
and complex causal history. Parts of that causal history appear to be relevant to explaining
Ins performance of a while other parts do not. What an agent shares with his counterparts
when considering whether he freely performs action a are those parts ot his causal history that
are relevant to explaining his performance of a.
4 Hawthorne 2001, 68.
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However, Hawthorne’s own view is that if those parts of his causal histon’ actually
include things that were beyond the agent’s control and cannot properly be ignored, then he
does not perform a freely. The view does not imply that those parts of the causal history are
introduced in order to yield a counterpart similarity relation and nor does the view imply that
whether a person is free depends on any such relation. More simply: Hawthorne does not
introduce causal explainers in an effort to generate a modal account, but rather to directly
account for the freedom of an agent’s actions (if an actual causal explainer is uncontrollable,
then the agent’s action is not free).
I think this is a mistake. 1 believe a better view, and one that is more analogous to
Lewis’ view of knowledge, would be as follows. The unignorable causal explainers of the
action give the counterpart similarity relation. If some counterparts do perform the action
while others do not, the agent is free. If on the other hand every counterpart performs the
action, then the action was not free — given the causal precursors that are contextually
relevant, every counterpart performs the action, showing that the action was in some
important sense inevitable for the agent.
This revision of Hawthorne’s view is similar to my own view regarding the matching
relation for power ‘can’-claims in moral contexts. One structural difference that sets this
reformulation apart from my view is that a view about freedom comes with a logical twist.
On such a view, a free action is one that is accessible but notperformed by every counterpart. In
terms of ‘can,’ it is something you can do where you also can do other things as well — you
have alternatives to your available action. Though this change would affect the way the
subsequent semantic rules were stated, it is not much more than a slight technical difference.
The more substantial reason I have for a full discussion of mv own view is that the
reformulated Hawthorne view leaves out some important details. Claiming that the relevant
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parts of the causal history of the action determine whether it is free (or determine whether a
counterpart should be considered in the scope of this ‘can’-claim) is far too loose to be
helpful. In my discussion of this relation I will provide a lot more detail regarding which parts
of the causal history are relevant and why.
There are three classes of similarities that 1 will have in common with all of my
relevant counterparts for a particular ‘can’-claim involving agent power: physical state and
abilities
, beliefs and knowledge and dispositions to act. It would have been nice if there were a single
simple similarity that held for the case of ‘can’-claims as there was in the case of knowledge
with evidentiary similarity. Unfortunately I could not come up with any single similarity that
would do the trick and the lists I came up with ended up boiling down to these three.
A. Physical state and abilities
Facts about the physical makeup of a person, his physical circumstance and his
abilities are always relevant to whether a person has the power to exercise an alternative. If
you are armless, you are unlikely to catch a basketball. If you are tied up with rope, you are
unlikely to run very quickly. If you have never learned Chinese, you are unlikely to translate
a document written in Chinese. Most often, facts like these play only an implicit background
role in any conversation about whether someone can do something. However, once there is
any kind of disagreement, it is precisely these facts that are likelv to come into play in
resolving it.
As a grown-up, the vast majority of disagreements I have with other people about
what can be done boil down to a special case of arguing about physical state and abilities:
disagreements over time constraints. Can a test be taken in the allotted timer Can a project
be done by May? Can my wife get back from the supermarket by 7? When we agree about
the answers, the physical states and abilities of the participants in question are implicitly
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agreed upon and understood - you might not even recogni2e that they are being assumed.
However, if you reflect on any disagreement about these questions, and on the discussions
that would follow, you will notice that it is the physical states and abilities of the agents that
immediately come to the fore. No, I could not get back from the supermarket by 7. My cat-
only goes so fast. There were people in line I could not cut in front of. The person at the
register was as slow as molasses. 1 only have two arms. I can only do the math for the
budget this fast in my head. Reasoning about time constraints strikes me as the most
common form of reasoning about ‘can’-claims in terms of agents’ physical states,
circumstances and abilities.
Another common discussion about whether an agent can do something revolves
around questions regarding why an agent failed to bring about an option that he wanted to
and had the ability to do so. Someone I know can beat almost any expert rated chess player.
But in a particular game, he failed to beat a much worse player. He was not at the top of his
game — his abilities failed him. Considering why he was not playing at his best almost always
involves a discussion of facts about his physical state and circumstance. Maybe he had not
eaten enough at lunch and by the time he was nearing the end of the game his blood sugar
was low. Or maybe his chair was squeaking in a distracting way every time he shifted his
weight. When reference to his opponent’s abilities cannot easily explain why he lost, facts
about his physical state and circumstance are almost always introduced.
B. Beliefs and knowledge
The next most common sort of fact introduced into conversations about whether a
person can bring about an alternative is one that has to do with what the agent believes or
knows. The bank manager example from earlier is an example of a case in which what the
manager can do depends on what she knows. If there were a dispute about whether she
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could open the safe, it would be quite natural to think that the dispute arose from differing
assumptions about whether she knew the combination to the safe (e.g. one participant
assumes that since she is the manager, she must know the combination, while the other
happens to know that she did not in fact know it or have access to someone who did). A
similar example might be one involving insider trading on the stock market. Suppose I
happened to know that Sam knew that Hewlett-Packard was about to acquire Microsoft. I
might get into a conversation where the question is raised whether Sam, an owner of many
shares of HP stock, could have become a millionaire. I would know that the answer is ‘yes’
because of what I know about Sam’s knowledge. If someone thought Sam could not have
become a millionaire, mentioning what I knew would strongly favor the context to one in
which it was right to say that Sam could have become a millionaire.
Considerations regarding knowledge can be very7 tricky to apply to quesdons of agent
power. One reason for this is that in many cases lack of knowledge will not prevent a failure
in power to do something, even when doing that thing requires the knowledge in question.
For example, when the stakes are vert7 high and the knowledge is very nearby, one might be
judged to have had the power to do something even when actually lacking the knowledge
required to do so. Take the case of the bank manager, and add to it a risk of wider spread
destruction. If the bomb is not diffused, the world will explode. Now add to it the fact that
her boss had warned her of the danger of a bomb being placed in the vault and had given her
explicit instructions as to how to acquire the combination in advance, but being lazy, she had
not done so. Our moral judgments of her actions might change. In order for that to
happen, our judgments about what she could do, morally speaking, would have to change.
In particular, we would have to say that she could have opened the vault .
5
5 It is contentious to assume that moral culpability requires freedom, but here I do assume it for simplicity.
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Notice that the way this case works is that the double-time index implicit in our
general claim that she could have opened the vault has changed — surely we would still grant that as
ofthe crucial moment, she could not have opened the vault. What has happened is that the
rising stakes and previous failure in responsibility of the manager has caused the generically
stated ‘can’-claim to take on a wider range of times deemed relevant to a moral evaluation.
In this new case, if someone were to say, “but as of 1 minute before the explosion, she could not
have opened the vault,” 1 think this would tend not to change our generic, time-index-
neutral, everyday judgments about her power. Thus it would not change our now more
demanding view of her moral responsibility in this matter, and most likely would not change
our view that she did something wrong.
There is a parallel here to be drawn between the resistance of context to contraction in
the case of knowledge and in the case of ‘can’-claims. Lewis pointed out that contexts for
knowledge, once they are expanded to include more remote possibilities, very rarely (or very
slowly) contract again to include fewer possibilities. When there are high stakes or other
factors that invoke a more demanding context for evaluating what we know, this causes
context expansion. Similarly in the case of ‘can’-claims, more demanding contexts allow
more possibilities into the scope of evaluation and tend to expand our willingness to allow
that an agent had a wider range of alternatives. So while demanding contexts limit our
knowledge they also increase our power. If it were the very7 same contexts at play in claims
about knowledge and power, this would be something of a paradoxical result — or at least the
result would seem to create a tension between the two accounts. This is because as I have
been arguing, “knowledge is power” — increased knowledge tends to increase the power of
an agent, other things being equal. It would require some explaining if the very same contexts
that tended to limit power by limiting knowledge also increased power by allowing for more
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‘can’-relevant possibilities. But though this little puzzle is interesting to notice, I think it is
resolved by the tact that there are many differences between the contexts of evaluation of
knowledge and those of evaluation of power.
C. Dispositions to act
The trickiest and most contentious sorts of facts that I argue are relevant to any
evaluation of agent power are those that report the dispositions of the agent to behave in
certain ways under certain circumstances. Pathological fears, phobias and addictions all
seem capable of limiting agent power under extreme circumstances. Certain kinds of
external duress also seem capable of limiting an agent’s alternatives: put a gun to someone’s
head and suddenly that person’s world of opportunities to act seems much smaller. Habits,
too, may be a case where an agent’s alternatives are limited by patterns of previous behavior.
It is interesting to note in this regard that though dispositions to act most often seem to limit
the range of available options, it is not correct to say that this is the only role dispositions
play in determining what an agent can do. There are patterns of behavior that can make
unpleasant alternatives more available to agents who are hardened by experience. I think
this is a case where dispositions can make an agent more powerful.
Take the example of |ack Bauer, fictional hero in the television show, “24.” Bauer is
a seasoned government agent who has been in many difficult, often violent, situations. In
the most desperate of situations with a lot at stake, he sees alternatives that others would not
even see, much less be able to bring themselves to act on. Though he is not without
remorse when he must kill someone to save hundreds of others, he can do it where others
could not. I am reminded of the case of |im and the Indians discussed by Bernard Williams.
1
In that case, Jim is given the choice to kill one Indian in order to save the entire tribe ot
6 Williams 1973.
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Indians. If he does not do this, all of the Indians will be killed anyway. The conclusion I
used to draw from this case was that Jim quite simply should execute the Indian. In fact, Jim
is morally required to do so. But when I read descriptions of how awful it would be to have
to kill someone, and how Jim shuddered at the thought of doing so, I sometimes doubted
my convictions. My understanding of ‘can’-claims gives me the opportunity to offer an
unorthodox solution to the case: if Jim can kill the Indian, he should (otherwise, not). Jim may
be so accustomed to virtuous behavior that he literally cannot bring himself to kill the
Indian. His aversion, reinforced by everything in his moral upbringing and all of his patterns
of behavior up to tins point, may truly prevent him from taking that alternative seriously.
The fact that a good moral upbringing, laden with true judgments about right and wrong and
reinforced by habits formed from conformant behavior, could remove what would
otherwise be the best course of action from an agent’s alternatives is fascinating but not at all
contradictor}'. But the more Indians you throw into the equation, and the higher the stakes
for Jim’s failure to act, the less reasonable it becomes to allow that his past dispositions limit
his alternatives. Bauer would definitely kill the Indian to save the tube, but I do not know if
I could.
The literature on human freedom and earlier parts of this essay offer many examples
of cases where facts about agent disposition limit agent alternatives. You will find that when
these facts are presented in order to morally excuse an agent’s behavior, they are often
disputed. Facts introduced about agent dispositions which imply any limitation of agent
power are very defeasible: if someone challenges the claim that an agent cannot resist the
urge to steal, or challenges that the “irresistible” urge should be considered as limiting the
agent’s power morally speaking, then almost immediately the context becomes one in which it
is no longer correct to say that the agent could not resist the temptation. And as mentioned
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above, when the context is expanded to allow for a greater number of alternatives, it is very
difficult for that context to contract again and return to a state of more restricted agent
power.
D. Rejected proposals: the history of the world and the laws of nature
Facts about the state of the world before a given time — the history of the world up
until t — can seem inevitably related to the freedom of an agent. This is particularly so in the
context of a discussion about incompatibilism. If an incompatibilist were considering
whether an agent is free to choose a hamburger over some chicken for lunch, he might
reason as follows: take the history of the world before the decision and the laws of nature. If
the conjunction of those two things entail a particular action by the agent, then he is not free
— otherwise he is. By this very reasoning, the laws of nature also seem to be the sorts of
facts that one might suppose are always relevant to evaluating freedom and ‘can’-claims.
However, neither of these sorts of facts are always relevant to the evaluation of agent
freedom, and nor are they always relevant to the evaluation of a ‘can’-claim.
The way that history and the laws of nature work in the case of evaluating freedom
very closely mimics the way skepticism works in the case of knowledge on Lewis’ account.
Let us call the incompatibilist about human freedom the Scientist and call the conversational
maneuver of introducing the laws of nature and the history of the world into the discussion
raising the bogeyman of scientism. The Scientist is much like the skeptic and raising the bogeyman
of scientism is much like mentioning the possibility of a vastly powerful deceiving demon or
the possibility that we are all )ust brains in vats. Where the skeptic can force a context in
which we feel bullied into admitting that we have no knowledge (rightly thinking that in
Because I believe that the incompatibilist is forced into the position of moral (or free-will) nihilism whether
determinism is true or not, I can take a shortcut here and simply call this person an incompatibilist. This
controversial simplifying step can be made more palatable to someone who disputes this conclusion I have
drawn elsewhere by simply assuming determinism is true for the time being.
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some sense we did have some just a few minutes ago!), the Scientist can force a context
where we feel bullied into admitting that we are not free (rightly thinking that in some sense
we were just a few minutes ago!).
I mention this similarity because I think it explains why we might lie tempted to sav
that the history of the world and the laws of nature are always relevant for evaluating agent
freedom and ‘can’-claims. The skeptical position seems inevitable because when it is
introduced, it seems impossible to escape. In essence, it is easy to think that the possibility
of a deceptive demon is always relevant to whether you know something. In this case the
power of the skeptical move arises from the tact that contexts expand easilv and contract
with more difficulty.
Similarly, the rhetorical force of the lncompatibihst argument is almost irresistible in
most contexts. However, the power of the move here does not come from the fact that
contexts expand easily and contract with more difficulty - here, the incompatibilist appears
to have the amazing ability to contract our context and make it resistant to expansion ! This way
of comparing the cases would make them seem different. However, looking at the case of
the skeptic about knowledge and the incompatibilist in a slighdy different way shows an
important similarity.
I have noticed that when presenting the incompatibilist argument to a non
philosopher, I am almost never able to convince the person that he is not free. In fact, I
find it is often hard to get him even worried about the problem without making explicit
many other assumptions, such as assumptions about what freedom is, about alternative
actions and about moral evaluation of actions.
s
This more radical departure from the
original conversation (about freedom or whether an agent can do something) strikes me as a
* Interestingly enough, it is often hard to get a non-philosopher sufficiently serious about the deceptive demon
to lead him to join you in the skeptical context.
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case where the context has shifted in such a way that where we were talking about freedom
and power at the start, we are talking about different things bv the time we all agree that the
incompatibilist must be right.
The new context shares something in common with the one we are in when we
worry about the presence of the demon. Let us say that ideal knowledge is knowledge in the
most severe of contexts — in this case, the most severe context is the maximally expanded
context. Then we could say that idealfreedom or idealpowers freedom or power in the most
severe of contexts. In this case, the most severe context is the one that demands that we
understand our actions in the context of the physical operation of the universe as a whole.
This includes such a myriad of details that go beyond meaningful, understandable references
to human ability and physical opportunity that it boggles the mind, just as holding everyday
knowledge to the standard of ideal knowledge would destroy nearly all everyday knowledge,
so too would holding everyday freedom to the standard of ideal freedom. What the
incompatibilist and the skeptic both do is shift our attention to a grandiose ideal - if all of
our knowledge could be demon-proof, that would be the best possible way things could be;
similarly if our actions could be entirely up to us that would be the pinnacle of human power.
The suggestion that the laws of nature and history of the world are relevant to every
context of evaluating a ‘can’-claim is similar to the suggestion that the demon is relevant to
every knowledge claim. In both cases, a primary (but by no means decisive) reason to resist
the suggestion rather than to accede that indeed they are always relevant is really nothing
more than the principle of chanty — interpret what we say so as to make what we say true
where possible. If there is an interpretation of what we say under which context matters and
the scope of knowledge or power changes depending on what is at stake (among other
tlungs) and according to which we normally speak the truth about what we know and what
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we can do, then that interpretation is primafacie better than one according to which most of
what we say about what we know and can do is mistaken. The application of this principle
here is not meant to show that we should interpret as many knowledge or power claims as
true as we possibly can — that is, it is not meant to show that those claims are so vague or
absent of concrete truth-conditions that “anything goes.” Rather, it is a guide to choosing
the technical
x
iew of power and knowledge that will best match our everyday use of those
terms. I f there are two competing models for our usual ways of talking about knowledge
and power and one model tends to make what we say true and the other model tends to
make what we say false, then other independent reasons for rejecting either model aside, we
should prefer the former model. The rest of this essay has been dedicated to the task of
showing that my context-sensitive account of ‘can’-claims and human power does not fall to
one of those other independent reasons for rejecting it (and in fact has notable advantages
over other models). I am therefore in my lights to claim that since the general inclusion of
the laws of nature and the history of the world into the context of evaluation of ‘can’-claims
tends to flout the principle of charity, that therefore those sorts of facts should not be
assumed as part of every7 ‘can’-claim context.
Another non-decisive reason for thinking that the context of evaluation of ‘can’-
claims does not necessarily include the laws of nature and the history’ of the world is a
version of “Ockham’s Razor,” or what is known in engineering as the “KISS” principle
(Keep It Simple, Stupid). Here the principle would be something like: assume the minimum
possible number of implicit contextual facts that result in a meaningful interpretation of what
we say. Our actual reasoning about human power makes reference to human ability and
physical circumstance, and those sorts of facts give us the power to make the wide range of
evaluations regarding human power that we make on a day-to-day basis. If nothing appears
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to be lost by omitting reference to a dizzying array of facts that would have to be assumed to
be implicitly part of any similar context, then those facts should not be regarded as being
implicitly assumed in any similar context.
A third and more interesting reason to reject the global relevance of world history
and the laws of nature is due to Horgan. He offers a few examples of ‘can’-claims that do
not involve agent power or morally relevant contexts where it is quite clear that the laws of
nature and the history of the world are not relevant. For example, suppose I try
unsuccessfully to light a match at noon, and my friend then claims, “That match could have
lit at noon.” Is what he says true? It depends on what he has in mind — if he means that had
1 only struck it a bit harder, it would have lit, and if in fact striking it harder would indeed
have resulted in success, then I think that it is true. Or if instead he has in mind that if only
the wind had not been blowing so hard, then the match would have lit, and again if that
change in conditions would have resulted in success, then again I think the answer is that he
speaks the truth. Of course, there are senses in which he could have uttered the claim and
been mistaken. If the match had unbeknownst to both parties been doused with water and
had been incapable of lighting by noon, then pretty much regardless of what my friend has in
mind, his claim would be false. Notice that on all of these interpretations, the laws of nature
and the history of the world are not explicitly invoked. More importantly, many of the
claims that seem quite obviously true could not have been so if we had held fixed the laws of
nature and the history of the world prior to the match lighting event (Horgan 1979, 346-
347).
Lest you think that this case hinges on a sense of ‘can’ that has nothing to do with
agency, consider another of Horgan’s examples. Suppose there are two chess playing
9 Horgan 1979.
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programs called ‘Hal’ and ‘Sol’ who play a game of chess. Sol wins the game. One of Hal’s
programmers claims, “Hal could have won that game.” Is the programmer correct? That
depends on what he has in mind. If the programmer knows that Hal and Sol are very evenly
matched and that there is an element of randomness in how each program plays (which is
typical of chess programs), then he may be making a point about just how closely matched
they are and he might very well be right. Similarly, he could be making a point about the
time limits set for this particular game — Hal plays better in 2 hour games, while Sol plays
better in 1 hour games. If the programmer’s point is that Hal could have won because they
could have played a longer game (suppose for example the time limit had been set by a coin
toss), then what he claims could be true (Horgan 1979, 347-348). In this case it again seems
as though there are contexts where we should say that what the programmer said was true,
but in which including the laws of nature and the state of the world before the game would
have made that claim false.'
Having these examples in mind, consider now the typical ‘can’-claim that you come
into contact with on a day-to-day basis. It seems to me that ‘can’ is nearly always used in a
way that prohibits an interpretation under which the laws of nature and world history are
implicidy relevant. In fact, other than the incompatibilist ‘can’ of ideal freedom, it is difficult
to think of any interpretation of ‘can’-claims that would involve those sorts of highly
theoretical facts about our world, with the exception of ‘can’-claims where those sorts of
facts are introduced explicitly. So aside from being uncharitable and theoretically inelegant, it
seems strange to assume such a wide array of moral claims implicitly invoke a theoretical
framework that ‘can’-claims in general apparently do not invoke. There is no obvious reason
to think that morally interesting power ‘can’-claims would differ from the rest in such a
10 If you do not like thinking of chess playing programs as agents, simply imagine that Hal and Sol are people.
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specific and uniform way. The burden of offering some reason to think that such a
difference exists lies with the incompatibilists.
An incompatibilist would be unconvinced by what I have said. He would object that
incompatibilism is not tantamount to skepticism about human freedom because determinism
is required for that conclusion and determinism is false. So he is not, in his lights, like the
skeptic and the parallel fails. He would argue that in fact his notion of freedom and human
power is not an ideal notion and that it is in fact achievable in practice again because
determinism is false. Something is missing in understanding human action if the relevant
physical facts about your universe are not assumed as background data, lie would claim. The
notion of freedom at work in moral contexts is more demanding than usual and it requires
us to be free in a way that involves understanding our actions in the context of the laws that
govern them.
My goal though was not to prove that incompatibilism is false. Instead I wanted to
offer my rationale for claiming that the history of the world and the laws of nature are not
contextually relevant to every ‘can’-claim. Without having the space to present many other
arguments about freedom and power and determinism, I have had to make reference here to
some of my background assumptions. If these background assumptions are defensible, then
so is my rationale for claiming that these sorts of facts about the physical world are not
always relevant to evaluating a ‘can’-claim.
1
1
Ultimately, even for those who disagree with
my conclusion 1 believe there is value in this way of casting the debate. If 1 am right even in
the more limited claim that this is how the disagreement between compatibilists and
1
1
One of the assumptions I have in mind is that indeterminism is not any more helpful to an incompatibilist than
determinism is — that is, there are serious problems with understanding moral responsibility whatever your
views about the physical world are. To put it another way, the question of the truth of determinism is
orthogonal to the question of whether we are free simply because the alternative, indeterminism, fares no better
as a backdrop for explaining human freedom. Unfortunately I cannot present a full defense of this assumption
here.
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incompatibilists should be understood, then 1 have successfully taken a very long and messy
debate and isolated the key area of disagreement.
There may be no decisive arguments one way or another to resolve the fundamental
question of whether the history of the world and the laws of nature are always relevant to
human power — accepting or rejecting the relevance of these sorts of facts may be primitive.
Or perhaps a better way to put it is that there may be two theoretical models for freedom
and human power that are equally plausible candidates for an analysis of our everyday notions
of freedom and power. Our vague, everyday notions may ultimately give no guidance as to
which of the two is preferable. 1 have done the best I can here to offer the most compelling
reasons of which I am aware for why we should prefer a model of ‘can’-claim evaluation that
does not presume that the laws ol nature or the history of the world are always implicitly
relevant. If I am right, this has substantial implications for the debate regarding freedom and
determinism.
III. Scoping rules
Lewis proposed several rules that contribute to determining the scope of knowledge
claims. Morally relevant power ‘can’-claims are much less sensitive to context than
knowledge claims. Therefore many of the rules Lewis mentions either play a more limited
role or do not apply at all.
Rule of Actuality: Should the actual world be in the scope of possibilities for an
agent in the context of an evaluation of his power? Tins is a tricky question. In the
absence of a view like mine that calls for a partitioning of the possibilities and then
identifies options with the cells of those partitions rather than with possibilities, the
rule of actuality would have to be rejected. If you toss a coin and it comes up heads,
this does not mean that you can toss a com heads. So if you identify options with
possibilities you would have to exclude the actual world, since in the actual world
you do toss heads. To put the point another way, the actual world is not accessible to
you under the sort of possibility relation being invoked. However, because my view
identifies options with partition cells over a class of possibilities, I can accept the rule
of actuality. The actual world is in the scope of the worlds over which the
partitioning relation will range, and this does not imply on my view that you can do
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what you actually do in the sense of ‘can’ relevant to human power. Unfortunately,
this rule does not really have any interesting role in evaluating ‘can’-claims. It is
simply nice to notice that in the weak, scope-based sense of ‘can,’ you can always do
what you actually do.
Rules of Attention and Belief: These rules apply in the case of ‘can’-clanns only in
a very limited way. If you believe or consider some possibility that is consistent with
the restriction that it respect the agent’s abilities, physical circumstance and
dispositions then that possibility is part of the scope of the ‘can’-claim: Suppose that
you claim that you could not have gotten back from the ballgame in time to kiss your
wife to sleep. You cite the traffic, the extra innings and the long drive home. Once
someone raises the point that you could have left earlier or taken a different route
home, those other possibilities are vert7 difficult to ignore — it becomes nearly
impossible to continue claiming that you could not have gotten home on time.
Unlike the knowledge case, though, the possibilities raised have to be similar to the
actual world in important ways. Where you can believe something false and thereby
include a possibility' inconsistent with actuality into the context of a knowledge claim,
an analogous move is not possible in the case of ‘can’-claims relevant to morality. So
in the case above, suppose someone raises the possibility' of taking a different route
home, and everyone agrees. However, suppose also that in actuality, that route
would not have resulted in getting home any earlier. In this case, though everyone
<agrees that you could have gotten home in time, it is not the case that you could have.
So though the possibilities invoked can involve differences from the actual world,
they are limited to ones that are similar to the real world in an important way: they
do not differ with respect to facts relevant to the agent using his abilities or the
physical circumstances that would obtain were he to try to do so. We would have to
reject a possibility in which the agent makes it home on time because the alternate
route is shorter than it is in actuality', or in which there is for no good reason no
traffic on the alternate route when in actuality that route is very crowded. Moral
contexts do not expand as readily in the face of proposed facts, though they can be
expanded that way.
Rules of Reliability, Method and Conservatism: Reliable processes for
accomplishing certain goals, methods and strategies that are accepted as generally
successful for doing so and shared beliefs about general human ability are not
normally relevant for determining the scope of a ‘can’-claim. In assuming you can
get home in time, you might assume that your car is operating in pretty much the
way it was last time you drove it. However, if this is talse because your battery died
after your last ride, then the possibility that you drive home in vour car is not in the
scope of your ‘can’-claim even though you believe you can drive your car home.
You might think that this works against my interpretation oi the bank repayment
case in chapter 3. There, I claimed that the presence of a rogue tornado does not
entail that you could not repay your loan at the bank as of the time the claim was made a
day before the loan was due. Perhaps there I had in mind that rules of reliability and
conservatism could be used to defend my unorthodox interpretation. 3 et, here I
reject those rules for the contexts involved in power ‘can’-claims. Though I admit
there is a tension here, there is no conflict in my view. In chapter 3, my rationale for
claiming that you could still repay as of the earlier time depended not on a general
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rule of reliability but rather on my rejection of a much more obviously false rule: a
rule to the effect that ever}' fact about the future is relevant to the truth of a ‘can’
claim. It seems to me that every honest failure in ideal conditions can be reduced to
a description where something has ‘gone off-course,’ whether that be a misfiring
muscle nerve or an unfortunate failure of a sugar molecule to be converted to energ}
in time or a poorly timed tornado. Since my intuitions are divided in the bank loan
case, I feel obliged to point out that even if I am wrong there, my general rejection of
these rules in cases of power ‘can’-claims seems justified - perhaps even more so.
Rule of Resemblance, I (RR1): If a possibility, P, is in scope for a ‘can’ claim for
reasons other than RR1 and another possibility, Q, resembles P, then Q is also in
scope for the ‘can’-claim. If you flip a com and it lands tails, then barring any
extraordinary power you have over coins, this rule ensures that possibilities in which
you toss the coin heads will also be in scope. This rule also implies that possibilities
in which you miss the dartboard, as well as those in which you hit any particular spot
on the dartboard, are fairly evenly distributed among those in scope for you if you
are a terrible dart player. The similarity relation invoked here is fairly
straightforward, though vague: the possibilities are assumed to match at least on the
basis of the matching factors covered earlier. Depending on context, there may be
other similarities that are at work as well, though there is no general rule for what
those similarities will be.
Rule of High Stakes: Increased moral cost or gain, or the increased risk of greater
moral cost or gam has a distinct effect on the evaluation of power ‘can’-claims in
ethical contexts. When more is at stake, the scope of a power ‘can’-claim is
increased. Possibilities that normally would not be considered alternatives become
relevant. If someone holds a gun to your head and demands that you give him one
of the three sticks of gum in your hand, it seems fair to say that you have no choice
but to fork over the gum. However, if someone holds a gun to your head and
demands that you give him your new invention, a formula that could be used to
create a poison so lethal that one drop could contaminate the world’s water supply, I
am inclined to say you can choose to be shot rather than give up that secret. My
moral evaluation of the cases matches these intuitions: even if giving up the gum
results in a world that is a little bit worse than the one in which you get shot, I do not
think you are wrong to give up the gum. If you give up the formula, however, 1
think vou have done something very morally wrong. Though I couch these
examples in concepts normally associated with consequentialism, I do so only for
simplicity of exposition. Whatever your views of goodness, badness and risk are, the
rule of high stakes would imply that whenever more goodness or badness is at stake,
or more risk of the same, then the context for evaluation of a power ‘can’-claim is
more demanding. More demanding moral contexts are ones that have a wider scope.
In the evaluation of power ‘can’-claims, the scope of the claim is much less sensitive
to contextual factors than in the case of knowledge claims. The scope is fixed to a greater
degree by the matching relation between an agent and his counterparts - those possibilities
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in which the agent has the abilities he has, and is in the physical circumstance he is in and in
which he has the dispositions he does constitute the scope for the most part. This coincides
well with what I take to be the general intuition that the truth of moral claims are not as
subject to variance depending on the awareness ofon implicit agreement on contextual facts by the
agents involved, contra Unger. This extends I think even to how high the stakes are — in a
typical moral situation, the severity of the moral challenge is not dependent on the vividness
of the situation to the agents or the degree to which they are invested in it. Rather, the
severity tends to be regarded as an objective fact about the situation that can often be
deduced bv applying a particular normative theory of action (e.g. act-utilitarianism).
IV. Partitioning rules
A person’s options are the cells of a partidon imposed on the scope of a ‘can’-claim
by various partitioning conditions. Those conditions determine which worlds are similar to
one another in various ways — the resulting cells are equivalence classes. In addition to rules
that determine which worlds are relevant to evaluaung any pardcular ‘can’-claim, then, we
also need rules that determine one of two things: that two worlds are similar in a way that
forces them to be in the same equivalence class, or that two worlds are dissimilar in a way
that entails that they are not in the same equivalence class. Modified versions of one of
Lewis’ rules for knowledge are interesting in this regard.
Rule of Resemblance, II (RR2): If there are two possibilities that are in scope for
a particular ‘can’-claim that involve no differences that the agent has the physical
ability or knowledge to affect, or where the agent is in no physical circumstance in
which he is physically capable of having an effect, and in one possibility the agent
brings about p while in the other possibility the agent brings about not-p, then those
two possibilities are in the same partition cell.
There is one other rule that does not have an analogue in Lewis’ account as well.
Rule of Discrimination: If there are two possibilities that are in scope for a ‘can’-
claim, and the agent deliberately brings about p in one possibility and deliberately
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brings about not-p in the other, and RR2 does not apply, then, very defeasibly, those two
possibilities are in different partition cells.
These rules came up informally in chapter 4 when I reviewed examples involving chance and
physical precision.
V. Applying the rules
The major rules for evaluating power ‘can’-claims are the three Rules of
Resemblance (RR1-2), the Rule of High Stakes (RHS) and the Rule of Discrimination (RD).
Though I have hinted in various places how these rules would be applied to various cases
discussed throughout this paper, it will be useful to examine a few examples in detail.
A. Coin tossing (chance)
Suppose I toss a coin and it comes up heads. RR1 implies that possibilities in which
the coin comes up tails are also in scope. RR2 implies that some possibilities in which the
com lands heads and some in which it lands tails are in the same partition cell. In normal
cases, there will be no cell in which the agent flips the coin where there are only heads cases
or only tails cases. It is for this reason that no cell is accurately described as one in which the
agent flips the coin heads; thus it is not the case that the agent has the option or the power
to flip the coin heads. Flipping heads is not one of the agent’s alternatives. However, flipping
the coin is one of the agent’s alternatives. RD will, in many contexts, divide cases in which the
agent does not flip the coin at all into different cells from cases in which the agent flips the
coin. These contexts correspond to ones in which there is no good reason to apply RR2,
and in which the agent’s flipping behavior is mtentional and admits of no significant risk of
failure or mistake.
B. The clueless bank manager (knowledge)
The bank manager case can also be successfully analyzed by means of these rules.
The teller does not have the option to open the safe. This is because there are mam
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possibilities that match her state of knowledge and where the results of her efforts are
predominantly failures to open the safe regardless of which combination she tries. RR1
implies that both success and failure possibilities will be in scope for any combination try,
and RR2 implies that therefore any cell of any partition that corresponds to a trying of a
given combination will have both outcomes represented. There will be no cell that is
uniform with respect to her success or failure, and therefore no cell or union of cells that can
be considered an option to open the safe. Again, RD tends to ensure that she does have the
option to try opening the safe as well as the option not to try.
C. High jumping and dart throwing (limits in abilities)
Some Olympic athletes can jump well over 5 feet into the air and some pub denizens
can reliably hit a tiny dartboard target from 10 feet away. I cannot do any of these things.
All of this is true even though if I try, 1 will sometimes jump surpnsmglv high and
sometimes I might accidentally hit the bull’s-eye on the dartboard. Also, all of this is true
even though an Olympic athlete will sometimes fail to make a jump he makes on other
occasions, and an expert darts player will sometimes miss a shot he typically makes. The
rules of scope and partitioning go a long way towards explaining how this can be so.
Depending on exacdy how high I am attempting to jump, we might have
interestingly different scopes for a ‘can’-claim about my making it. Suppose the question at
hand was whether 1 could jump 8 feet into the air. In that sort of extreme case, it is the
matching condition that prevents possibilities in which 1 make the jump from being in
scope. Based on my existing physical abilities, I cannot jump that high. Facts about my
muscle mass, how limber I am and a myriad of other purely physical conditions related to
making such an extreme jump rule out possibilities in which 1 succeed. In these sorts of
cases, it is not a matter of my having the right amount of sleep or my calmness in the face of
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a giant audience that matters; it seems to me that something fundamentally different is at
work in our judgments that I cannot make an 8 foot high jump. In extreme cases like this, I
believe it is the matching conditions that put a high level restriction on the scope we are
permitted to consider.
However, take a different case in which the jump is only 4 feet. That would still be
quite a challenge for me. In fact, it might be right to say that a 4 foot jump is for me the
same degree of challenge as an 8 foot jump is for an Olympic athlete. If so, then this case
must admit of a different sort of analysis on my view. Here, possibilities in which I make the
jump do appear to be in scope. RD seems to be the rule to invoke — if 1 have sufficient skill
and practice, RD implies that possibilities in which I do make the jump are in a different cell
than ones in which I do not, yielding the result that I can make the jump. 1 his is true even if
sometimes when I try my best I fail to make it. The project of explaining a failure to do
what we can is very close in nature to the postfacto project of explaining why we could not do
what we thought we could do. I wasn’t warmed up enough, I didn’t have enough breakfast,
my blood sugar was low, it was colder than normal and the mat was less springy than usual -
if we had known these things before the jump and could have seen them to their
consequences, in that context, we might have been right to change our minds about whether
I could have made the jump after all — the possibilities in which I would have succeeded
were actually out of scope. RD is at work in the majority of our true ‘can’-claims and it is a
very defeasible rule.
The darts case is fairly similar. Notably, though, I think we typically judge accidental
success as being m scope for even the most novice of darts throwers. There is no high
degree of physical strength or complex footwork needed to accidentallv hit the bull’s-eye. In
tins case, I think we judge that the novice cannot hit the bull’s-eye due to RR2. Though
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there are possibilities in scope where he does hit it, and also ones where he does not (due to
RR1), these possibilities end up in the same cell due to the fact that there is nothing in his set
of physical abilities that would imply that he could deliberately decide between them.
Perhaps equivalently, there is a good reason to think that RD does not apply. The darts
expert is in a slightly different situation. Even though he can fail, I think the typical
evaluation of his power is that he can hit the bull’s-eye due to RD — in some possibilities he
deliberately and intentionally hits the bull’s-eye, and those possibilities closely correspond to
those in which he tries to do so. There may be some metric by which we could analyze cases
for RD applicability by means of comparing how many of the cases in which an agent tried
to bring about result R resulted in R and how many in not-R. 1 confess that beyond noting
that such a metric might be interesting, 1 do not know how to elaborate on it any further
than that (and I also have a suspicion that any elaborate or precise metric would be more
precise than accurate).
Someone paying careful attention to the last paragraph might immediately object.
The novice dart player can hit the bull’s-eye — anyone can hit it! After all, even on a wing and
a prayer, even on a hail Mar)' throw, the dart might just end up right where an expert would
have put it. Once this point is raised in the context of a ‘can’-claim, it is difficult to deny.
However, what must be noted is that the evaluation of the ‘can’-claim has left behind any
sort of power- or moral-context at this point. To test this statement, ask yourself: suppose
someone’s life depended on the novice hitting the bull’s-eye. If the novice makes the shot,
the person’s life is spared, otherwise not. If the novice can hit the bull’s-eye, he should do
so; he would be wrong not to in fact. Do you still think that the novice can hit the bull’s-eye?
My own intuition tells me that this line of thought returns the conversation to the context of
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moral evaluation, and that the temptation to say that the novice can make the shot
evaporates.
D. A gun to your head and “Jim and the Indians” (external compulsion)
Someone can, by putting a gun to your head, force you to do morally trivial things.
He can force you to tie your shoes, read a book or close your eyes. In situations like this,
where there is nothing at stake, people generally observe that you have no choice but to
comply with the gunman’s requests. Even when there is more at stake, the judgment
continues to stand — at least for a while. But make the stakes high enough, and the judgment
eventually changes. Suppose that the gunman is trying to force you to use a weapon only
you can operate to wipe out an entire city of people. Do you have to comply? Would it be
wrong of you to comply? Sometimes it is useful to work backwards from our moral
judgments in deciding whether we think you can do something — if we judge that it is wrong
for you to do something, then (if we accept a typical sort of options-based ethical theory) we
therefore judge that you could have done something else instead.
RHS is the rule responsible for expanding and contracting the scope of ‘can’-claims
in cases like these. Though it can work directly on other scope and partitioning rules, here
RHS causes changes to our evaluation of the overall scope of the ‘can’-claims by affecting
our judgments regarding the application of the otherwise context-insensitive matching rules.
In particular, when the stakes are high, there is a specific pressure to reject judgments that
certain possibilities are out of scope on the basis of existing agent dispositions and external
compulsions. To put the point crudely but simply, the higher the stakes are for an agent in a
morally significant context, the more likely we are to judge that the agent should just “suck it
up” and be willing to do things that are far outside of his normal comfort zone. In terms of
the scope of the ‘can’-claim involved, RHS causes the scope to grow when the stakes are
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higher by making possibilities in which the agent does something even though his natural
dispositions or externalpressures are compelling him not Jo do so part of the scope. The higher the
stakes, the stronger the dispositions and pressures that are disregarded by the scope.
“Jim and the Indians” is another case in which RHS may come into play. Earlier I
briefly described a “solution” for evaluating Jim’s choices using my view on ‘can’ and the
rules of scope and partitioning. Strictly speaking, this is an overstatement. A true solution
to the problem would yield a result for whether Jim was morally obligated to kill the Indian —
my view does not itself yield any particular result for this question. What my view provides
for a case like this is a working framework to understand why a very natural thought
experiment (on which we vary the stakes involved) yields different moral judgments for
different consequences. Some discontinuities in moral judgment in thought experiments
that vary the stakes can be understood as effects of RHS. Since those discontinuities in
judgment can seem very confusing in the absence of an account, 1 consider this an advantage
of my view.
E. Phobias and compulsions (internal compulsion)
Kleptomaniacs cannot generally resist the urge to steal. In an earlier example, a
person with a phobia regarding coming into contact with blood could not eat a certain red
candv. These cases share a lot in common. In both, the agents have very strong standing
dispositions that cause them to behave in ways that seem otherwise unreasonable. Also, in
both the dispositions are so strong and so contrary to normal behavior that they are
considered phobias or compulsive behavior. Finally, in cases like these there is a wide range
of degrees to which we might consider the agents involved forced to do what they do. In cases
of mild compulsion, we normally judge that agents are free to overcome that compulsion.
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However, in cases where the compulsion is strong enough we often deny that agents are
free.
Not surprisingly, our judgments about degrees of compulsion are affected by how
high the stakes are. A person with an irresistible urge to steal may not be able to stop
himself in a morally bland situation, but our judgments do not seem as lenient in cases where
a comparably mild compulsion must be overcome in order to achieve a result that is
unquestionably morally required. In fact, at times it seems that by focusing on even
relatively mild moral outcomes, the context can be swayed in such a way that barely any
degree of compulsion would count as an excuse for morally bad behavior — presumably, this
is because in that context, we continue to judge the agent free to resist the compulsion to do
something worse as an alternative to doing something better.
These cases are analyzed by my view in much the same way that cases involving
external compulsion are. 1 raise them separately here because 1 believe that the degree to
which RHS applies in cases involving internal compulsion differs from the degree to which it
applies in cases involving external compulsion. In particular, it seems to me that we tend to
judge internal compulsions as being generally less forceful than external ones. Contexts in
winch a person’s phobias prevent him from doing what is right tend to quickly become
contexts that though still morally focused, are ones in which the agent is not really prevented
from acting rightly. Cases in which the compulsion is external seem a bit more resistant to
that shift. Higher stakes are generally needed to expand the context in the face of external
pressures.
VI. Conclusion
RR2 is the rule that can most closely be associated with agent control. Rather than
formulate the rule directly in terms of control, which I argued earlier would be question-
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begging, I have attempted to explain the rule direcdy in terms of a range of physical facts
upon which our intuitions about control are based. If I am right, then my account will have
the power to yield a definition of control: an agent can control whetherp or not-p iffp is one
of the agent’s options, and so is not-p. My account of options, in virtue of having RR2 as a
component, will give intuitively correct answers in cases involving agent control.
RD is closely related to the requirement that an agent be able to intentionally exercise
a certain power in order to be said to have performed a free action. This sort of condition I
think correctly captures the idea, found in other accounts of freedom, that somehow
voluntary action is relevant to understanding an agent’s alternatives. There is also an idea here
that when an agent is correctly said to have distinct options, that is because there are certain
basic behaviors that the agent has direct physical opportunity to undertake, and as a result of
which saliendy differing results would be produced.
These rules then capture many aspects that are traditionallv thought of as being
intuitively related to freedom and agent power. It is an advantage I think that these
intuitions can be successfully explained using the rules I have presented.
The matching conditions, RR1-2, RHS and RD are by far the most important criteria
involved in understanding the scope and partitioning of ‘can’-claims relevant to normative
ethics. Using these criteria we get the right results for both the intuitive and the tricky cases
I have presented. The formal framework for understanding the ‘can’ of human power I
presented in chapter 4, combined with the rules for scope and partitioning presented here,
constitute a plausible and defensible theory of the ‘can’ of human power. My account is not
susceptible to arguments that prove many other theories of ‘can’ false. Further, it can be
applied generally to a wider variety of ‘can’-claims. It is a flexible and accommodating
account that does not fail to work for tricky sorts of cases, such as those involving God. It
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has important, if not completely decisive, implications not only for a correctly formulated
normative theory of moral behavior but also for the plausibility of a compatibilist account of
human freedom. In particular, it renders certain flavors of compatibilism more defensible
and certain flavors of incompatibilism less defensible. It seems to me it also tilts the balance
of burden of proof onto the incompatibilist to answer some tough questions, but this




At the point of intersection between the problems of formulating a satisfactory
theory of ethics and of reconciling the physical laws with freedom lies the question of what it
means to say that a person has options. I have argued that previous accounts of options
have all been generally unsuccessful because of a technical problem: those accounts failed to
explain the importance of partitioning possibilities and then failed to identify options with
the cells (or unions of cells) of those partitions. This relatively small technical difference
changes quite a lot about how we understand the ‘can’-claims of human power. More
importantly, noticing the importance of this relation makes it possible to describe a coherent,
general account that implies intuitively correct answers for a wide variety of cases, including
those that seemed puzzling before.
With such a theory, cases involving chance, lack of knowledge, control and apparent
indeterminacy of consequences can all be explained and evaluated in a way that is satisfying.
Issues as different as the problem of multiple alternative sets and the problem of fine-tuned
control over actions are handled equally well by means of the new technical machinery.
My account builds on a wide array of already existing ideas that simply had not been
put together in the right way to solve the problems that options-based ethical theories tace.
Hawthorne proposed a general strategy for utilizing Lewis’ account of knowledge for
freedom, but he did not have any coherent account of an option and nor did he elaborate
the rules that would apply in the new context. Ivratzer elaborated a technically elegant
account of ‘can’-claims, but did not extend it to the ‘can’-claims of agent power. The result
of carefully extending and finishing all of these projects is an account of ‘can’ and options
that is general, flexible, accommodating and intuitively accurate to our everyday judgments.
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Perhaps worlds have intrinsic values and perhaps the moral rightness of what we do
depends in some way on the value of the world we live in as contrasted with the values of
worlds we might have brought about by acting other than we did. If so, my more complex
view of options will need to be supplemented with an adequate theory of how to assign
values to potentially infinite sets of worlds. Given such a theory of value, it would be
possible to reformulate utilitarianism in terms of the kind of options I have described. On
such a view, one is morally obligated to pick the alternative that has the highest value,
morally permitted to pick any alternative such that no alternative is more valuable and
morally wrong to pick any alternative that is not morally permitted. Puzzling cases about
power and morally permissible action, such as the bank manager case, receive a simple and
intuitive treatment. Cases that have seemed intractable to some, such as Jim and the Indians,
may be easier to solve on the new view; or perhaps at least the new view puts into greater
focus how to debate the case.
One worry that plagues any contextualist account of the power-‘can’ relevant to
'morality is that such an account might imply some sort of relativism about the truth of
normative claims regarding the moral permissibility of alternatives. If two contexts unply
different things about what alternatives an agent has, then it is possible for those contexts to
imply different, conflicting moral obligations for that agent. Relativism of this sort is
something I want to avoid.
For example, Unger’s view that certain very lement moral judgments are true even
when they conflict with more stringent moral judgments is difficult to accept. Morally
speaking, if it is true that you should send $100 to UNICEF, then morally speaking, you should
send S 100 to UNICEF, period. Someone who claims that it is not morally required of you to
send $100 to UNICEF owes us a serious explanation as to why that more lement clami
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should be accepted. Supposing that some judgments are lenient and others are strict and
that therefore they can both be true flouts our intuition that where there are both these sorts
of claims on the table, there is genuine moral disagreement. The normal contextuahst
response here, and the one I believe Unger would have to give, would be that 1 am
evaluating these claims in a strict context, and so I assume there is a conflict. That is, I am
evaluating p and not-p in a single context in which they are genuinely at odds and in which
onlv one can be true. That does not mean, Unger might continue, that the more lenient
claim is not true in the context in which it was uttered.
1 tind this an unsatisfactory response. Moral claims are dependent on objective facts
about the values of worlds or the propositions true at those worlds. If what you do is bring
about a worse world when you could have brought about a better one, then what you do is
wrong. It seems as though there are relatively concrete facts that determine whether giving
$100 to UNICEF really does make things better. I agree that there is a difference between the
contexts of the lenient and the stringent statements, but the conclusion I draw from this is
that the lenient context may be utilizing a sense of ‘can’ that is too relaxed to he the power- 'can
'
relevant to morality or that the strict context may be utilizing a sense of ‘can’ that is too strict to be
the power- ‘can ’ relevant to morality. 1 just do not find it intuitive that both of these claims have
equal claim to being particularly moral.
But though my account does not force as lenient an interpretation as Unger’s (in fact
it is not even compatible with such a lenient account) it is still an account that is sensitive to
context. The most obvious way to see this is to consider the Rule of High Stakes.
According to that rule, you might do right to give in to a gunman in one case that makes the
world a worse place (say by giving him a piece of gum) but do wrong to give in to a gunman
in another case that also involves making the world a worse place (say by giving him the
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formula for a deadly poison). This is true because your alternatives could turn out
differendy in the two cases - in particular, in higher-stake cases, my view will tend to imply
that you have more alternatives. But didn’t I just say above that picking worse alternatives
was simply wrong? How can I accept a conclusion that lets differing contexts yield differing
results to that
?
1 have two responses. The first is that unlike Unger’s account, my account does not
make this particular difference in moral evaluation dependent on conversational context.
The Rule of High Stakes is not one that is affected by speaker urgency or listener acceptance
or rules like the Rule of Attention or the Rule of Belief. Accepting, believing, noting or
otherwise considering various propositions does not have any affect' on how the Rule of
High Stakes gets applied. Rather, the Rule of High Stakes depends in its application on the
values of the alternatives that are involved. So if you accept that worlds have objective
intrinsic values, then you should accept that the application of the Rule of High Stakes
depends on objective features involved in evaluating a particular ‘can’-claim. The kind of
conversational context sensitivity at work in my account of ‘can’ does not come into play for
the Rule of High Stakes. Also, where this Rule actually makes a difference in our moral
evaluations is precisely where real, substantive debates about moral permissibility take place
anyway. For example, simple act-utilitarianism nnplies that you are morally wrong for
1 It may be wrong to say that conversational context has no effect on the application of the Rule of High Stakes.
Perhaps by raising a morally relevant possibility that has an unusually high or low intrinsic value, one can raise
the stakes. In general, tins move tends to make moral contexts stricter. Making contexts more morally
demanding might impose a higher standard for rightness at one point in a conversation than in another
Though this does raise the relativist worries I mentioned, I think it is mitigated by the fact that very rarely is
raising such a possibility what is relevant to a moral context. In general, if there was infact a morally w’onderful
or morally hornble alternative that was available to the agents mvolved, then that alternative was in fact relevant
to the moral evaluation of the act even before the agents took note of it (and even if they never realized it at all).
It may be inevitable on my account that there will be multiple concepts of rightness that will have nearly equal
claim to being the concept of moral rightness. In some contexts I may even be forced to say that while an
evaluative context just got stricter by introduction of certain facts, that both the former and the latter contexts
are distinctly moral. My intuition is that this sort of case is relatively rare, but I am nevertheless painfully aware
of the worry’.
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handing over the gum if it would have resulted in the slightest bit better overall result had
you chosen to get shot instead. Reaction to this implausible conclusion has generated a
number of variations to simple act-utilitarianism that are designed to yield a more reasonable
result. One of these variations is a satisficing version of utilitarianism according to which
your actions should be sufficientlygood in order to be permissible. The Rule of High Stakes
tends to apply in cases like this that are already worthy of legitimate dispute.
Second, though I have tried to spell out the intuitions that seem most obvious to me
regarding the semantics of morally relevant ‘can’-claims, I am not committed to the view that
the rules I have presented here are the only rules that apply. There is some remaining
flexibility in the account for removing certain kinds of context sensitivity from playing a role
in the evaluation of what we can do. It is fairly easy to see how such a project might go.
First, identify an area where the rules I have listed allow for a seemingly inappropriate degree
of context sensitivity (or perhaps the wrong kind of context sensitivity). Next, add a rule
specified in terms of some objective criteria on the basis of which cases that were once open
to contextual evaluation now depend on this rule.
It was my intention to present a theory of ‘can’-claims, options and alternatives that
would further the project of normative ethics as well as provide a useful framework for
debating the relative merits of the claim that freedom and determinism are incompatible. I
also wanted to offer an account that was distinctly better than its predecessors as measured
by the plausible results it yielded, by the generality of the account as an analysis of all sorts of
‘can’-claims and by the flexibility to and accommodation of very diverse cases in which we
use these claims in seemingly meaningful ways. In these efforts I did the best 1 could.
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